

MILITARY LEADERSHIP AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

THE BRITISH ARMY AND SMALL WAR STRATEGY SINCE WORLD WAR II

VICTORIA NOLAN

I.B. TAURIS

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AFM	Army Field Manual
ATOM	The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (handbook)
CGS	Chief of the General Staff
CIGS	Chief of the Imperial General Staff
C-in-C	Commander-in-Chief
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CT	Communist Terrorist (in Malaya)
DS	Directing Staff
EOKA	National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters
FARELF	Far East Land Forces
FM	Field Marshal
GHQ	General Headquarters
GOC	General Officer Commanding
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IS	Internal Security
IWM	Imperial War Museum
JSCSC	Joint Services Command and Staff College
JWP	Joint Warfare Publication
LHCMA	Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives
LICs	Low Intensity Conflicts
MCP	Malayan Communist Party

MELF	Middle East Land Forces
MRLA	Malayan Races Liberation Army
NA	National Archives
NAM	National Army Museum
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
RAF	Royal Air Force
RIC	Royal Irish Constabulary
RUC	Royal Ulster Constabulary
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
SEP	Surrendered Enemy Personnel (Malaya)
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNFICYP	United Nations Force in Cyprus
USA	United States of America

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> [The] dynamic processes of culture creation and management are the essence of leadership and make one realize that leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin.[1]

The period after World War Two was hugely important in shaping the modern British army. The decline of the British Empire and consequent decolonisation saw soldiers involved in numerous 'small wars', from Palestine to Northern Ireland, and this vast range of experiences shaped a distinctive approach to counterinsurgency, keeping the peace, and military aid to the civil power. Based on a legacy of imperial policing and internal security duties within the British Empire, the British army had developed a unique 'way' of conducting operations, with the two World Wars coming as exceptions in a far longer history of 'small wars', where military means were subordinated to political authority. Indeed, it is often claimed (especially in recent years with counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq) that the British army is particularly suited to conducting small wars due to its legacy of imperial policing. The British approach to small wars is considered by many to have become firmly established during the period of decolonisation following World War Two, when the army was involved in conflicts that entailed subordination to the civil authority, close coordination with civilian and police elements, the minimum use of force, and the

prosecution of an accompanying social and economic development campaign ('hearts and minds').[2] During this period, traditions and mindsets became institutionalised within the British army, as it learned, adapted and evolved as an organisation focused on the conduct of 'small wars'. The British army's approach is therefore 'not a modern invention by a talented group of intellectual staff officers but rather the result of a range of experience in both Imperial Policing and Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations throughout the twentieth century'.[3]

This book traces the evolution of this British approach to 'small wars' between 1948 and 1960, focusing on military culture, behaviour and the organisational learning process. In particular, I look at the role that leadership and campaign commanders played during this period in the process of organisational adaptation and in the evolution of the British army's distinctive approach. Leadership is a key element in driving the institutionalisation of organisational knowledge, and commanders act as owners, custodians and guardians of the organisational culture of an army. The aim here is to discover the way in which leadership matters in driving cultural evolution and organisational learning, and what type of leaders are influential in this process.

Military Leadership and Organisational Culture

The British army is said to have developed a 'distinctive' approach to small wars between 1948 and 1960, but it should be pointed out at the outset that reference to a 'distinctive' approach is not to say that it is an *ideal* way of conducting small wars.[4] There are weaknesses to the British approach as well as strengths, and the use of the term 'distinctive' merely recognises that a *unique* approach has evolved, based on historical experience and national and military culture, which is different from that of many other countries and which is often referred to in analyses of counterinsurgency operations, as is the extensive experience that the British army has gained in small wars over the years. In this context there has recently been much valid criticism of British counterinsurgency methods, especially the applicability of old

ideas and practices to more modern, complex campaigns (especially in Iraq and Afghanistan), along with well-known comparative studies of, for example, British, US and French approaches to small wars.[5] In addition, with hindsight it is clear that the decolonisation conflicts in which the British army was involved were by no means clean or clear-cut affairs – these small wars were often also brutal attempts to retain control of colonial territories through the use of force, and independence and other political solutions often were only reluctantly considered after much pressure and once other alternatives had failed. Nonetheless, the focus here is on the manner in which the British army conducted these conflicts (whatever their nature) and on how, in turn, elements of that behaviour became embedded within military organisational culture; the sometimes coercive nature of these campaigns is therefore acknowledged throughout the case studies as a controversial but given premise. The government or counterinsurgents are defined as the 'legitimately constituted authority of a given state (and the armed and security forces it commands)',[6] which, during the period covered, was Britain (as the colonial power) and the British military.

In order for there to have been development in the army's approach, organisational learning must have taken place (by building on positive and negative experiences). Certain factors are important in this learning process, such as the contemporary political and social context, the historical background of the British army and the regimental system, and military doctrine. Here, the focus is on an additional, crucial factor – leadership. The role of leadership in organisational learning and its place in the continued institutionalisation of the British army's approach to small wars is considered in the period between 1948 and 1960, which is important since 'in studying effective leaders' behaviours in a given setting, one is also studying the culture of that setting'.[7] Organisational theory is drawn on to develop an understanding of military organisational learning and culture and the central role of leadership. An historical investigation is then undertaken through specific case studies to recover the evolution of the British approach to small wars and the leadership-driven learning process during this period. Three key conflicts during this period are studied in order to

examine how military leaders influence the organisational learning process and the evolution of military organisational culture.

Figure 1.1 explains what is meant by organisational learning, and the relationship between learning, the acquisition of new knowledge and the perpetuation of existing knowledge. The question of how military leaders influence the organisational learning process and the evolution of military organisational culture prompts more detailed enquiries in three main areas, which provide the structure for subsequent chapters.

Firstly, do military leaders transmit and embed organisational culture (i.e. in this context, the British army's small wars culture), and if so, how? I explore here whether leadership plays a central role in the embedding of learning and transmission of organisational culture. This suggestion is supported by the view of the relationship between leadership (management) and the evolution of organisational culture (from the business world) put forward by Edgar Schein. Schein identifies leadership and culture as being 'two sides of the same coin', with leaders being responsible for the creation and management of culture. He notes that visionary leadership is important 'in that the vision sometimes serves the function of providing the psychological safety that permits the organization to move forward'[8]; furthermore,

> if the group's survival is threatened because elements of its culture have become maladapted, it is ultimately the function



Experience
Acquisition of new knowledge
Institutionalisation of learning in doctrine
Embedding and transmission of culture
Organisational learning
Internalisation of learning in behaviour and actual operational practice

Figure 1.1 Organisational learning

> of leadership to recognize and do something about the situation. It is in this sense that *leadership and culture are conceptually intertwined*.[9]

The case studies covered in this book explore the role that military leadership plays in embedding and transmitting culture (in this case, the British army's 'small wars culture'), and make use of Schein's ideas and models of how this takes place in organisations in general. This notion ties in with Sashkin and Rosenbach's ideas on the ways that leaders embed shared values and beliefs, i.e. how they promote behaviour that is in line with the organisational culture of the military.[10] The link between culture and behaviour is also made by Kier and Legro, who note that military culture shapes preferences for actions, which will not necessarily be an efficient strategic response.[11] So here we build on the exploration of this three-way relationship between leadership, culture and behaviour which, when combined, points to connections between leadership style (Pheysey, Bennett), culture and learning (Brown, Schein).[12]

Secondly, what are the qualities displayed by those military leaders who are successful in transmitting and embedding culture, and how do these characteristics influence the evolution of the distinctive British approach to small wars? Here I look at the notion that for leaders to be successful in the transmission and embedding of culture, they need to be *charismatic*, and this is dependent on certain qualities or characteristics. As Roger Bennett notes

> transformational leaders have charisma, vision and empathy with subordinates' needs. A charismatic leader is one who is perceived by subordinates as possessing extraordinary powers, characteristics and abilities, and who can inspire loyalty and enthusiasm among those who are led.[13]

It is these charismatic qualities that the case studies explore, since they are important for the internalisation of culture by leaders. As Schein argues,

> The simplest explanation of how leaders get their message across is through charisma, in that one of the main elements of that

> mysterious quality is undoubtedly the leader's ability to communicate major assumptions and values in a vivid and clear manner.[14]

Finally, I investigate the conditions that have enabled military leadership to be influential in the organisational learning process for the British army. Here I look at two additional ideas: first, that the support of senior leaders is essential to enable campaign commanders to embed small wars culture in military operations and practice; second, that leaders need to have continuity of past experience in order for the learning process to be successful. I explore the importance of the military leaders in these small wars having the support and backing of their superiors (both military and civilian), so that their small wars culture can be operationalised and further internalised in the practical behaviour of soldiers in the British army. This could, for example, be a matter of the support of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) for small wars methods, and of the role of such a senior person in championing and disseminating concepts more widely. Again Schein is insightful here, and notes that ideas that receive support can lead to the positive reinforcement of those beliefs and any associated behaviours.[15] The case studies explore the importance of the leaders having support networks in place, so that their ideas, ethos and approach are championed by influential people who are of the same mindset and think similarly about the effective conduct of small wars.

The case studies also throw light on the idea that leaders need to have continuity of past experience in order for the learning process to be successful and for the British army's approach to small wars to evolve. I consider the importance of prior small wars experience for leaders, and explore the implications of interruptions to their learning by conventional warfare experiences. This view is supported by Downie's aforementioned work on institutional learning, which he defines as

> A process by which an organisation ... uses new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional norms, doctrine, and procedures in ways designed

to minimize previous gaps in performance and maximize future successes.[16]

Downie describes the learning process in terms of a cycle, in which shortcomings are recognised, solutions are sought and new methods are adopted (see Figure 1.2). Any interruptions to this cycle (for example, through leaders breaking a sequence of experiences in small wars to undertake conventional warfare) can cause learning to be lost, and the inculcation of best practice approaches and methods can be disrupted. The three cases explore the continuity of experience of the leaders involved, and the impact of this on their role in the evolution of the British army's small wars culture. Downie's model is also revisited in the concluding chapter.

In short, I argue that the British army has a 'small wars culture' that influences its approach and behaviour, and that leadership is a key factor in promoting, embedding and perpetuating this culture. In particular, I focus on the way in which leadership matters in driving behaviour, cultural evolution and organisational learning, and on the type of leader who is influential. The period following World War Two was important in developing and promoting the British army's distinctive approach to small wars and since the 'lessons learned' process during this period was often not formalised, the role of leadership was



Individual action/ attention to events
Organizational performance gap identified
Search for alternative organizational actions
Sustained consensus: accept/reject appropriate/alternative solution as doctrine
Transmit interpretation: publish doctrine
Change in organizational behaviour

Figure 1.2 Downie's institutional learning cycle.
From Richard Duncan Downie, *Learning from Conflict: The US Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p.38.




Figure 1.3 Where the book fits ...

key to the transmission and institutionalisation of the British army's organisational culture. My conclusions regarding the importance of leadership in perpetuating military organisational culture (and changing it where necessary) are equally as applicable in today's military context as in the period considered here.

Some knowledge of the existing ways of looking at these small wars is important, and this context can be supplied by understanding three interlocking fields (see Figure 1.3): military history during this period, which provides the context; organisational studies, which provide the framework for the analysis; and military sociology, which offers a theoretical basis for the findings. These three overlapping topics provide the structure for the forthcoming analysis of the links between leadership, military (organisational) culture and the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars.

Historical Accounts

The initial accounts of post-war counterinsurgency were by authors such as Julian Paget, Robert Thompson and Frank Kitson, all 'soldier-scholars' who tried to present elements of theory and counterinsurgency doctrine in addition to personal experiences and narratives of

the conflicts. Kitson served with the Royal Green Jackets (in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Muscat and Oman, and Northern Ireland), Thompson gained valuable experience in Malaya and went on to advise the USA in Vietnam (although much of his advice was not adopted) and Paget served with the Coldstream Guards in Palestine before working in Kenya, Cyprus and Aden. Kitson's work centres on the insights he gained during his experiences in 'small wars', and particularly on the importance of intelligence in counterinsurgency operations.[17] Thompson's seminal work draws on the lessons from the Malaya campaign, and culminates in his expression of five basic principles of counterinsurgency, namely: having a clear political aim; acting within the law; having an overall plan (political, social, economic, military, police and administrative); prioritising the defeat of political subversion; and securing base areas first.[18] Paget wrote *Counter-insurgency Campaigning* in 1967, while still a serving soldier. It provides a history of the campaigns in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus, and draws out lessons for the future.[19] Also in this category of historical accounts, Gregory Blaxland's 1971 book traces the departure of the regiments from various outposts of the British Empire.[20] These works are significant in demonstrating how the experiences and judgements of military officers fed in to the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars in this period, and are important sources for exploring the impact and influence of leadership on the perpetuation of military culture.

A second generation of historical accounts of the conflicts, supported by the lessons that had been learned about the most effective way to deal with insurgencies, is provided by authors such as Ian Beckett, Michael Dewar, Charles Townshend and John Newsinger.[21] Newsinger departs from the usual assumptions of British superiority in counterinsurgency operations, and makes the important point that many of the histories of these campaigns are 'distorted' in their views on the extent of British successes. He argues that where there was some success it was due to the establishment of a large enough political base among the local population, and that 'divide and rule remained the key to success in the wars that accompanied the end of the British Empire'.[22] These academic studies focus on the key elements of the distinctively British approach to small wars: the use of minimum

force, the overall political aim and civilian control, the coordination of police, civil and military action, and the use of 'hearts and minds' campaigns to gain the support of the local population. This kind of analysis is found also in the work of Thomas Mockaitis, who 'traces the development of a distinctly British approach to counterinsurgency ... [through] a history not of campaigns but of *principles*'.[23] He traces the impact that imperial policing had on the British approach to counterinsurgency (from 1919 to 1960, and in the post-imperial era), and the development of the three broad principles of minimum force, civil–military cooperation and tactical flexibility.[24] Mockaitis sets narrative accounts within a broader analytical framework in order to better understand the British approach to counterinsurgency, and in this book I undertake a similar analysis in exploring leadership as a 'driving force' in the evolution of the British approach.

Mockaitis does not make specific mention of military culture in his analysis but the concept runs intuitively through his work, and it is a theme and mode of analysis that is expanded on by Rod Thornton in his work on the British approach to small wars, particularly on the history of the concept of minimum force.[25] Thornton provides the link between the British army's small wars principles and practices, and the evolution of military organisational culture within the army as a whole. He relates this distinctive British approach to two factors: the influence of Victorian values and Protestant ethics, and the practicalities of imperial policing.[26] In the British army, particularly because of its regimental class-based tradition, commanders are inculcated into this ethos and mindset: they 'become guardians of such norms and naturally take on the role of the "gatekeepers" of the organisational culture'.[27] David Charters takes this analysis a step further in considering organisational development and learning since 1945 and the army's ability to adapt to 'small wars', and the implications of this for conventional warfighting, focusing on Palestine and Malaya.[28] He notes that 'the British Army's ability to adapt was probably never more thoroughly tested than during the period since 1945'.

What the literature of historical accounts lacks, however, is a specific focus on any single element which could have influenced the evolution of military culture and the process of adaptation during this

period, and this is the focal point here, which brings together complementary fields of thought to explore the importance of *leadership* in the learning process that the military went through in this period (see Figure 1.2 above).

Organisational Studies and Organisational Culture

The field of organisational studies (in the business and management context) is incredibly broad, but the sub-group within it that covers organisational culture and learning provides valuable insights into the processes involved.[29] In the business world, organisational culture and culture change have been studied rigorously over the past 30 or 40 years. The concept of organisational culture concerns the institutionalised sets of beliefs which are the accumulation of learning from historical experiences, visionary leaders and broader national and social cultures; this organisational culture is strengthened through policy and procedures, and is embodied and reproduced in current practice, doctrinal documents, training and organisational structure.

Organisational culture has been defined in numerous ways, by both organisational theorists and military writers, offering an 'embarrassment of definitional riches'.[30] The definition of organisational culture which is used here is by Edgar Schein:

> A pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.[31]

Schein also describes three levels of organisational culture (with the levels distinguishing how observable the cultural trend is): artefacts; values; and basic assumptions.[32] At the most easily observed level, artefacts are the visible manifestations of culture in structures, processes and documentation, and can be seen in dress codes, ceremonies and language, especially within the military. Values are the less visible cultural aspects such as rules, advocated behaviours and leadership

style; although in practice actions of the organisation may diverge from these values. At the deeper level of culture are basic assumptions, i.e. the taken-as-given fundamentals, which unconsciously shape behaviour. These are deemed to be 'non-negotiable' and if they are not demonstrated then you are deemed to be foreign to that organisation.[33] Culture comes from the beliefs, values and assumptions of the organisation's founders, learning experiences as the organisation develops, and new beliefs brought in by new members and leaders.[34] These three cultural levels are also evident within military organisations.

Andrew Brown is particularly insightful on culture and learning. He notes that in studying organisational learning we can examine how and why organisations adapt to their environment, and this is revisited later when we consider military innovation and learning in particular.[35] He also comments that 'the relationship between culture and learning is one of reciprocal interdependence', in other words, culture influences when and how learning takes place and what is learned, and the learning process in turn influences organisational culture. Brown asks three questions:

(1) how do organisations learn?
(2) what are the barriers to learning?
(3) how do organisations store and retrieve their learning?

He concludes that learning takes place through experience, and through following the events of other organisations, based on positive and negative experiences.[36] Organisational culture shapes the learning process: it affects the perception of problems faced by the organisation and can provide 'boundaries' for the range of solutions that are considered. Learning can also be inhibited by both politics and culture, and especially by trauma – what an organisation learns during traumatic situations is often not challenged or tested to see if it is the optimal approach, and any subsequent changes may be very difficult to implement.[37] Brown also notes that organisational memory is maintained through shared experiences and the passing on of methods and stories – a process in which leaders play an important role. In taking this analysis a stage further, I explore the role of leadership in the

learning process and the role of learning in embedding culture, in addition to Brown's analysis of the role of culture in influencing learning (the relationship of 'reciprocal interdependence').

Leadership

It is clearly important to know about the role of management and leadership in organisations and business, the characteristics and styles of effective leaders, and cases of successful leadership in organisational transformation.[38] The key point is that the effective functioning of systems depends on the quality of leadership.[39] The focus is often on qualities such as charisma and decisiveness, and different leadership styles. Using Diana Pheysey's distinction, we can see that military leaders are necessarily 'formal' leaders, in that they are appointed and followers respect the position they hold, and their more managerial skills are vital; however, to be successful they must also be 'charismatic' leaders, who offer particular knowledge or skills, whose followers respect their contribution and expertise, and who have personal charisma which symbolises the organisational values.[40] The approach of the charismatic leader is 'seen by subordinates as being somewhat unconventional, self-sacrificing, risky to the position of the leader concerned, and of substantial value to the entire group'.[41] Roger Bennett identifies some factors for assessing the charisma of a leader:

- whether the leader and subordinates share a common interest
- the extent of the subordinates' trust in the leader's abilities
- subordinates' emotional commitment (if any) to the goals of the organisation
- whether the leader is liked by subordinates
- subordinates' attitudes towards obedience and authority
- the leader's personal conviction in his or her beliefs and abilities
- the leader's persuasive and influencing skills
- the leader's image of competence, knowledgeability and past success.[42]

These attributes can be used as a benchmark against which to analyse the leadership in the cases covered here.

Culture, Learning and Leadership

The work of Edgar Schein in the study of organisational culture, learning and leadership provides an important framework for this book.[43] He combines the fields of organisational culture and leadership, and builds on the key theme that

> [The] dynamic processes of culture creation and management are the essence of leadership and make one realize that leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin.[44]

Few books are as explicit as his in their analysis of the leadership/learning/culture nexus, and for this reason it is important to summarise his key points. Some of these ideas are also covered by Smith and Peterson, who discuss leadership as the 'management of meaning', i.e. making sense of and articulating what the organisation is for and how it should achieve these goals.[45] Schein prescribes a culture of innovation, adaptation and learning as a norm within organisations, the essence of which will be held in the group's underlying assumptions. Leadership is vital since 'culture begins with leaders who impose their own values and assumptions on a group. If that group is successful and the assumptions come to be taken for granted, we have then a culture that will define for later generations of members what kinds of leadership are acceptable'.[46] J. Steven Ott concurs, saying that 'dominant, charismatic, organizational founders and chief executive officers are the primary sources, transmitters, and maintainers of organizational cultures'.[47] Therefore, cultural understanding is essential for leadership and 'it is leadership in the history of the group that has created the particular culture context that the group ends up having'.[48]

As Schein's definition of organisational culture (see p. 11) shows, leaders are responsible for issues of external adaptation and internal integration; they are responsible for shared assumptions about mission and strategy, goals and measurements of success, along with developing norms, common language, group boundaries and rewards/punishments.[49] Therefore, in the context of small wars, examining the role of leadership in the development of the distinctive British

approach can be seen to be extremely important. Schein proposes that leaders embed and transmit organisational culture in different ways: for example, through what they pay attention to, measure and control; through their reaction to critical incidents; by deliberate role-modelling, coaching and teaching; and through their choice of criteria for allocation of rewards and for recruitment and promotion.[50] Schein also comments that leaders help to embed culture through 'teaching' basic assumptions to the organisation and its members, both consciously and unconsciously, through charisma.[51] Bennett's aforementioned factors for charismatic leadership can also be considered, since they will help to determine whether the teaching is absorbed by the members of the group, and thus whether the culture becomes institutionalised and internalised. Here, in the context of military leadership, especially in small wars, I examine how important leadership is, and what types of leadership matter, in teaching and embedding the British army's 'small wars culture'. Schein identifies the characteristics of a learning culture within an organisation, and the attributes that need to be promoted by leadership. These traits include being a proactive, pragmatic organisation that is willing to learn, being adaptable and able to cope with complexity, with the correct mix of authoritarianism/participation and individualism/groupism.[52] How well a leader promotes these factors can determine the organisation's ability to learn and adapt, and therefore affects the institutionalisation of a certain organisational culture.

The Sociology of Military Culture

Culture frames the perceptions that organisations have of the problems they face, and the solutions they consider and adopt to overcome them. This is particularly relevant for military organisations, since their culture has a significant impact on how they see the nature of a campaign, and the behaviour that they should demonstrate in conducting it. Militaries are strong organisations, and therefore develop strong, change-resistant cultures. However, Schein's concept of 'trauma-learning' plays a large part in the evolution of military culture.

Trauma learning is the process of cultural adaptation following threats or challenges to the organisation, and the military is greatly affected by this, with much learning taking place during and after conflict, in times of anxiety.[53] In military terms these 'threats' or 'challenges' can be as extreme as defeat in war, which can be one of the most influential, traumatic experiences to induce military organisational change. Succeeding or achieving victory also strongly embeds those lessons which helped to achieve that victory, and the culture that evolves from both positive and negative traumatic experiences can be very difficult to change. This is closely related to the idea of collective memory, which is shaped by agents (such as political elites and civil society) and has a bearing on identity, and therefore on culture. Collective memory is particularly influenced by traumatic events, which are remembered and expressed through literature, art and monuments (i.e. as cultural artefacts).[54]

Military culture can be analysed by looking at the *organisational* culture of the military, in terms of Edgar Schein's aforementioned levels – artefacts, beliefs/values and basic assumptions.[55] It is this final level, the basic assumptions of militaries, which is formed from past experiences and develops into patterns and unconscious routines which underpin military culture; as Schein concludes, these are the essence of culture, and 'to understand a group's culture, one must attempt to get at its shared basic assumptions and one must understand the learning process by which such basic assumptions come to be'.[56] Lessons that are learned from past experiences become internalised and institutionalised within militaries, and are then expressed both formally in, for example, doctrine, and also informally, in the organisational routines, unexamined assumptions and institutional beliefs of the officer corps.[57] Consequently, although it is difficult deliberately to change organisational cultures, organisational learning and cultural evolution *do* take place over time, through the impact and influence of such factors as strong leaders and successful experiences, and, equally, crises and failures. As Andrew Brown states, 'people learn from the positive and negative feedback they receive about their actions, repeating what gains positive feedback (is successful) and giving up behaviour that receives negative feedback (is unsuccessful)'.[58]

Culture within a military organisation, such as a national army, takes the form of concepts such as hierarchy, discipline and etiquette, shared identity, uniform, ceremonies, professional ethos and a sense of community or *esprit de corps*.[59] These cultural attributes provide some predictability and familiarity for soldiers, and help them to deal with the 'fog of war'. Discipline provides orderly conduct and patterns of behaviour and is instilled through instruction and drill, both individually and in a group (for coordination and effectiveness). What constitutes good discipline and how both to instil good discipline and punish poor discipline changes over time, as society, and its view on what is acceptable, changes. Professional ethos is formed by identity and traditions, and incorporates characteristics such as bravery and loyalty, military knowledge and competence, leadership and trust. Ceremonies and etiquette form military rituals which instil confidence and routine in soldiers and lead to the formation of a common identity and purpose. They are also important for celebrating and honouring achievements and for demonstrating the meaning of the military to wider society. Cohesion and *esprit de corps* are the products of concepts such as morale, identity, comradeship, pride and commitment, and the structure and belief systems of the military. It has been demonstrated that for soldiers this is not so much about national pride but more about loyalty to the lower level military groups.[60]

British military culture has traditionally grown from historical, geographical and broader social influences, which have led to military institutional norms such as the make-up and attitude of the officer corps, the regimental system, flexibility and pragmatism among soldiers, and the ease with which the civilian political leadership of the country can oversee and direct the independent military. The officer corps of the British army is characterised by its professional ethos and volunteer (non-conscript) nature, which make up part of British military culture, along with the broader traditions of the army which include dress uniforms, parades and mess rituals, which all contribute towards the less tangible elements of British military culture. Other factors that are said to contribute to the unique British military culture are Victorian religious sentiment and values (or 'Protestant ethics'), the public school education system, the portrayal of the military

in British literature and film, and the concept of the British 'gentleman' (which encapsulates traits such as bravery, loyalty, honour and duty).[61] As noted by Allan English, 'the officer corps ... bears the responsibility for creating and modifying the organisational culture of the military forces as necessary', but they will be constrained by the role of the military and by wider society.[62]

Military Learning and Innovation

Various accounts of military organisational learning and adaptation have been proposed in the past which offer different explanatory frameworks for doctrinal and behavioural preferences and innovation. These provide an important background, since they are concerned with the influences on behaviour and adaptation to an environment; however, they do not provide a detailed analysis of the links between leadership (both political and military) and culture in this context.[63] The organisational learning process is essentially about adapting to, and even actively shaping, an environment, which is basically what I consider here. How did the British army adapt to the 'small wars' environment, and, in particular, what role did leadership play in that process of adaptation? How did leadership 'shape' the small wars environment? Part of the connection is made by Jeffrey Legro, who notes that organisation culture can change, or reinforce, existing preferences.[64] Here I look at the role that leadership plays in this interplay between culture and preferences.

A major debate between Barry Posen and Stephen Rosen provides contrasting theories on the causes of military innovation. Posen concludes that military bureaucracies are resistant to change and military innovation will only occur when there is civilian intervention. Rosen argues that innovation is driven from within militaries themselves, by senior leadership who then have the opportunity to promote like-minded officers through internal alliances.[65] Posen examines the doctrines of Britain, France and Germany between the two world wars, and contrasts balance of power theory with organisational theory, concluding that in times of conflict, balance of power theory explanations are more influential in accounting for military innovation.[66] Rosen, on

the other hand, covers a broad range of 21 cases, to demonstrate that internal innovation is in fact possible, especially when senior leadership, mid-level officers and internal alliances all align to create the necessary conditions for innovation.[67] These propositions are expanded by Deborah Avant and Kimberley Zisk, with Avant providing a further breakdown of Posen's argument, and Zisk expanding the argument to cover a wider range of influences.[68] In Avant's review of US and UK doctrinal adaptation in Vietnam and Malaya respectively, she claims that the causes of doctrinal adaptation are a combination of the degree and type of civilian control, the type of political institution in place, the incentives that civilians provide for military innovation, and therefore the endorsement of military innovation by the civilian authorities.[69] Zisk also introduces a broader range of causal factors in her analysis of Soviet military doctrine between 1955 and 1991, which combine the pressure from developments in foreign countries' doctrines, influence from the broader policy community, domestic power politics and innovation entrepreneurs within the organisation.[70] These four sources already provide an idea of the complexity of understanding military adaptation; however, they do all point in one direction – the underlying idea that people in positions of influence (i.e. leaders), be they internal or external to the organisation, can be key enablers of military learning.

Another common concept is the influence of organisational culture on military doctrinal and behavioural adaptation and learning. Cultural explanations have been put forward by a group of scholars who argue that there is more involved in decision-making than rational, balance of power type influences. They use anthropology, organisational theory and, specifically, organisational culture as explanatory factors when considering the causes of behaviour and the shaping of military preferences.[71] These sources (Allison, Kier, Legro) compare theories (balance of power/rational choice, government politics, organisation theories) and conclude that the cultural arguments in organisation theory are the most relevant, with organisational culture, be it that of the military or domestic political institutions, framing behaviour (even if it leads to an inefficient strategic response).[72] Using anthropological and organisational theories, Isabel Hull also argues that military behaviour in Imperial Germany

(in this case extremism) was driven by military culture.[73] Downie takes this a step further in saying that institutional learning theory (almost as a sub-set of organisation theory) best explains doctrinal adaptation by the USA in El Salvador, Vietnam and in the 'drug war'. He argues that there is a 'learning cycle' which needs to be 'unblocked': that is, there needs to be institutional consensus for learning to take place, which is driven by both external pressure and the institution's learning ability.[74] More recently, both John Nagl and Robert Cassidy, building on Downie's work, have examined the role that culture plays in the military organisational learning process, with Nagl comparing British learning in Malaya with a lack of US learning in Vietnam, and Cassidy exploring British and American doctrinal adaptation using the cases of Bosnia and Somalia.[75] Both conclude that cultural preferences determine the capacity of military organisations to learn successfully. An organisation whose culture promotes learning (as described by Edgar Schein), i.e. a 'learning institution',[76] is likely to be able to innovate and learn from its past experiences. Nagl comments on how the British army in Malaya encouraged junior officers to innovate, and then more senior leadership pushed these innovations forward; using Downie's ideas on the learning cycle, Nagl points out that the British army was able to complete several cycles, showing a 'flexibility of thought and actions' which was assisted by a supportive strategic vision.[77] The US army in Vietnam, however, was hampered by a strong institutional culture that resisted innovation, and was therefore unable to complete the learning cycle. Cassidy shows how cultural preferences with regard to the use of force (based on historical experiences) influenced the development of doctrine and the conduct of operations, and led to markedly different approaches.

Therefore, there is an emphasis on both culture and leadership as critical enablers of learning and innovation within organisations; for example, whether one sides with Posen or Rosen, they both consider forms of leadership as causal factors, be it (external) civilian leadership at some levels, as proposed by Posen, or (internal) military leadership, as put forward by Rosen. The cultural argument is strong, and therefore these studies imply a connection between culture and leadership; here I look at leadership as a key enabling factor in promoting organisational culture, and therefore at how leadership is instrumental in

organisational learning and adaptation. This ties in with and supports the views of Edgar Schein (as discussed earlier), that culture and leadership are 'two sides of the same coin'.

Military Leadership and Command

The literature on military leadership and command is extensive, and tends to fall into two categories (or combinations of both): the identification of the characteristics and qualities of good (and bad) leaders, and studies of specific leaders (e.g. Napoleon, Churchill, Haig).[78] Themes include the debates on whether leaders are born or developed (i.e. whether leadership is an inherent personality trait), leadership as an art, and the links between civilian and military leadership.

However, there are two gaps here. First, there is very little background on the inculcation of military culture in the literature on military leadership, and it is rarely stated explicitly. The connection is rarely made between leadership and organisational culture in a *military* context (as it is made by Edgar Schein, for example, in the organisational sphere). One exception to this is in *Military Leadership* (edited by Taylor and Rosenbach), in which two chapters go into detail on the role of leadership in shaping organisational culture, and the link between leadership, values and 'climate'.[79] Sashkin and Rosenbach provide a high-level overview of the role that leaders play in military organisational adaptation, coordination, the achievement of goals and in the definition and embedding of shared values and beliefs. They go on to explain that leaders do this by (1) developing a clear, values-based philosophy and mission (in the context of the environment); (2) empowering others to develop policies and programmes in line with that philosophy; and (3) leading by example and through personal behaviour.[80] Later in the book, Taylor and Rosenbach identify the links between leadership and organisational climate, which is defined as the 'personality' of an organisation. They say 'leadership style sets the stage, and we believe it is the major influence on climate'[81]; a leader who promotes a shared vision, trust,

empathy and integrity helps to embed those qualities within the organisational climate, since 'the leader's behaviour sets the tone and creates the climate'.[82]

Secondly, there is little specific coverage of command (in the sense of leadership) in different *types* of conflict. While some of the writers cover leadership in wartime vs. peacetime, at different levels (tactical, operational, strategic) and at different ranks, few of the case studies are 'small wars' or cover small wars leadership (apart from, perhaps, studies of the US leadership in Vietnam). Two exceptions to this are Frank Kitson's book called *Directing Operations*, and an article by David Benest on leadership in 'irregular wars'.[83] Kitson talks about operational command in both conventional and small wars, and in peacetime, and the characteristics of effective leaders. In small wars, he notes, the major difference to conventional wars is the primacy of political activity. Military actions need to be even more closely tied to political, economic and psychological actions, and in order to be effective, commanders therefore need to work more closely with politicians and officials, and to have far more of a presence in the community. They must be especially effective at the beginning of a counterinsurgency campaign, when they will need to establish a framework of military–police–civil measures, and advise the government on the best course of action. Military leaders will also at this time be dealing with the immediate onset of the insurgency, and planning for the longer-term campaign.[84] Kitson is insightful in noting that 'the way in which a counterinsurgency campaign develops depends very much on the skill of those occupying the senior military command positions at the start, because arrangements which they succeed in getting established will, to a large extent, determine the course of the campaign'.[85] Here I develop Kitson's idea and look at the role of military commanders in successful cultural evolution as well as in successful campaign leadership.

David Benest's article in the *British Army Review* identifies five themes that run through leadership in British small wars in the twentieth century: the moral and legal dilemmas that face leaders (and the use of minimum force); the importance of leadership in developing strategies; and also in the triumvirate of military–political–police direction; the reluctance to remove bad leaders; and the importance

of the prior selection of leaders. He also identifies the distinctive British approach to small wars that is explored here, and comments that leaders are likely to have similar characters due to the education, selection and training systems that they pass through during their careers.[86] They have been exposed to an existing military organisational culture, which they have absorbed, and they then transmit this culture through their leadership practices. For example, when leaders demonstrated excessive force, it was widely viewed as an exception to the rule,[87] which went against the culture of minimum necessary force. Benest also cites some possible reasons behind leadership failures (based on a survey of British military officers), and these include a lack of integrity, decisiveness, communication skills or professional knowledge, poor innovative qualities, and a lack of vision, humility, or team leadership skills.[88] He argues that military culture influences leaders' behaviour, and here we also examine the reverse process, i.e. how leaders promulgate culture, in Brown's aforementioned relationship of 'reciprocal interdependence'.

Small Wars

As the subtitle of this book suggests, the term 'small wars' will be used throughout, and therefore it requires some definition.[89] Although the term originated in the colonial environment in Victorian times, 'small wars' is used here in a broad context, as a generic term that brings together the experiences of the British army in operations other than conventional, inter-state warfare, and that spans the time period that is covered here. Charles Callwell wrote about *Small Wars* in 1906, in which he aptly describes them as 'all campaigns other than those where both the opposing sides consist of regular troops'.[90] Callwell recognises that these operations are considerably different from regular warfare, and that troops need guidance in their conduct of them. Robert Cassidy reiterates this definition in saying that

> Small wars are not big, force-on-force, state-on-state, conventional, orthodox, unambiguous wars in which success is measurable by phase lines crossed or hills seized. Small wars are

> counterinsurgency, low-intensity conflicts (LICs), and peace operations, where ambiguity rules and success is not necessarily guaranteed by superior firepower.[91]

Therefore, 'small wars' is used as an umbrella term to describe the campaigns that are used as case studies.

It needs to be noted that counterinsurgency (COIN) operations are defined as 'those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency', where an insurgency is 'an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. It is an armed political struggle, the goals of which may be diverse'.[92] They are linked as 'small wars' because the imperial policing campaigns prior to World War Two and the decolonisation counterinsurgency operations between 1948 and 1960 share the common characteristics of not being purely military campaigns; they are driven by overall political objectives, and involve social and economic solutions which are equally as important as military ones for resolving the campaign. They are not conventional wars; they involve the police and civil government in triumvirate leadership with the military, and gaining the support of the local population (who may often be closely involved in the campaign) is crucial. It is in this sense that these conflicts can be grouped together under the heading of 'small wars'.

Leadership, Management and Command

It is important to briefly describe and define the concepts of management and command (in a military sense), and their relationship to the idea of leadership. In terms of defining leadership, Ulmer provides a concise explanation saying that leadership is 'an influence process whereby one gains the trust and respect of subordinates and moves them towards goals without undue reliance on positional authority'.[93] In essence, leadership is a quality, often described as an art (rather than a more scientific skill), which involves characteristics such as honesty, integrity, empathy and charisma. As Edgar Schein notes, 'leadership can occur anywhere in the organization. Leadership is the attitude and

motivation to examine and manage culture'; this is what sets leadership apart from management and administration.[94] Frank Kitson identifies another mode of leadership, in terms of what is required in the role of operational command. He notes that directing operations involves 'working out how to apply resources, within a given set of circumstances, for the purpose of achieving a specific aim and then seeing that the arrangements decided on are put into effect'. It is a matter of 'constantly adjusting ... plans to take account of changing circumstances' and requires 'both intellect and willpower'.[95] The official British army doctrine *ADP Land Operations* comments on the role or position of command and its relationship to 'management'. The exercise of command entails authority, responsibility and accountability, and consists of decision-making, leadership and control.[96] 'Management' in a civilian organisation is the equivalent of 'command' in a military context.[97] Since my concern is how key individuals in positions of command, with leadership qualities, influenced the evolution of the British army's 'small wars culture', I define leadership thus

> Leadership is a position of influence which involves gaining the trust and respect of subordinates and moving them towards a predetermined goal within certain constraints, while managing the culture of the organisation. It involves the attributes of honesty, integrity, courage (physical and moral), empathy, decisiveness and charisma.

The Military Services and Security Forces

The focus here is solely on the British army (and primarily the officer corps), and not on the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force. The reasons for this are two-fold. Firstly, the army is a self-contained organisation which has a distinct culture, and therefore this provides clear parameters for the work. Secondly, it is arguably the army that bears the brunt of the hands-on work during many small wars; while the navy and Royal Air Force have important roles to play, it is the soldiers who will be the most affected by operational aspects such as a 'hearts and minds' approach, the use of minimum force, and working with locals

and civilian agencies. In addition to this, when considering leadership, the key positions of command were most often occupied by leaders from the land force component, so this will be the area of emphasis here.

It is also important to recognise that in these conflicts the British army was invariably working together with both the local police, and local indigenous security forces, and that 'a key part of British COIN has been its reliance on local forces to take on the burden of maintaining security'.[98] A key element of the British approach to small wars that is emphasised throughout is the necessity for civil–military–police cooperation, and the importance of conducting the campaign under this triumvirate. The army was also working alongside auxiliary forces taken from the local population, such as the Special Branch in Malaya, and the King's African Rifles and Kikuyu Home Guard in Kenya. It is important to note, however, that these police and local troops are not the primary focus here. These indigenous forces, while important for the campaign, would not have developed as organisations in the same manner as the British home army, and therefore their organisational culture cannot be considered comparable for the purposes of this work. In this respect, I generally concur with Thornton, whose broad argument in his ongoing debate with Bennett is that it is important to differentiate between the different actors, i.e. the different security forces on the ground in these campaigns, especially when considering the culture(s) of these different groups.[99] This book focuses on the cultural evolution of the *British* army, that is

> an institution whose personnel had been socialised and acculturated into operating in a certain way due to various exogenous and endogenous influences. These influences pertained to those who were actually in the British Army; i.e. the army raised within and manned by residents of the United Kingdom.[100]

Case Studies

As mentioned earlier, the years following World War Two are seen to be of special relevance when considering the manner in which the

British army developed a distinctive approach to small wars, and I therefore focus on the period between 1948 and 1960. In order to trace the evolution of the British small wars culture, I look at three key small wars to explore the manner in which British military culture has developed through prolonged exposure to these complex operations. Key events in the history of the British army's involvement in small wars have 'locked in' certain developments in the approach that is taken and the mindset that is adopted in undertaking these operations. The cases that have been chosen are particularly relevant to the British army's involvement in small wars over time, in terms of the culture that has developed through undertaking them.

In addition to covering the historical background to this period, in terms of the legacies left in the British army by years of internal security missions and imperial policing (from Victorian times through to 1948), the three major conflicts that have been selected are the Malayan Emergency (1948–60), the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya (1952–56), and the unrest in Cyprus (1955–60). In each case, the focus is on leaders and the role of leadership: Generals Briggs and Templer in Malaya; General Erskine and Lieutenant General Lathbury in Kenya; and Field Marshal Harding in Cyprus. Where appropriate, key figures in the police and civil spheres (such as Sir Hugh Foot in Cyprus, Sir Henry Gurney and Oliver Lyttleton in Malaya, and the Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff) are also considered in order to undertake a full analysis of the effect of leadership in the triumvirate of civil–military–police coordination which is so important in these small wars. As discussed earlier, these campaigns are all linked under the rubric of 'small wars' due to their complex nature involving political, civic and military solutions, and the central significance of the local population, in defeating an insurgency.

The book is divided into three parts. Chapter 2 provides the background and context for the remainder of the book. It traces at a high level the evolution of the British army's involvement in and approach to small wars from Victorian times, and considers some of the key leaders and their influences on army practices and military culture. These figures include Field Marshals Roberts, Wolseley, Kitchener and Slim, and Major General Orde Wingate. This chapter explores the

way in which leadership played a major part in the inculcation of a small wars ethos within the pre-World War Two British army, and the legacy that these personalities left for other leaders to draw on in subsequent conflicts. It is in this era of imperial policing that the British army's small wars culture was initially shaped, grew and began to become institutionalised, and this chapter draws out the essential emerging elements of that culture.

The second section contains the three main studies, which explore the role of leadership in the process of military-cultural adaptation. They examine the evolution of the 'British approach' to small wars and the process of organisational learning during the period between 1948 and 1960. During this time, the British army as a 'small wars army' was in what Schein would term its 'organisational midlife', where it has a history and its culture has developed from past experiences and successes. In this period, visionary leaders need to be able to interpret the military organisational culture; 'to help the organization evolve into whatever will make it most effective in the future, leaders must also have culture management skills'.[101] A core element of the analysis here is the linking of campaign-level leadership to the embedding and perpetuation of military culture, in particular the British army's 'small wars culture' at this time. Chapter 3 explores the leadership role in the Malayan Emergency, Chapter 4 undertakes a similar analysis for the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya, and Chapter 5 covers the unrest in Cyprus. Each conflict is briefly introduced in each chapter, in order to set the remainder of the chapter in context. In order for some comparative analysis to be undertaken, each chapter then addresses the questions that have been identified relating to the manner in which leadership is important in the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars, and explores the role of leadership in shaping behaviour that is consistent with organisational culture and in driving the evolution of military culture. The institutionalisation of culture in doctrine is also considered in each study, and the studies consider the link between leadership, the development of doctrine and the dissemination of that small wars doctrine through military training (conflict-specific) and education (more broadly, for example at the Staff College). Each chapter is thus concluded by studying the role of leadership in

the promulgation of the British army's distinctive approach to small wars, and the organisational learning process within the British army during that conflict. Annex A provides a one-page timeline of events so that the case studies can be seen overall in context.

Finally, Chapter 6 draws the investigation together and develops some broader conclusions regarding the role of leadership in (a) the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars; (b) organisational learning/adaptation; and (c) the perpetuation of organisational culture.

CHAPTER 2

THE LEGACY OF IMPERIAL POLICING

This chapter sets the scene for the forthcoming case studies, and provides some historical background; it examines the emergence of the British army as a 'small wars army' in the Victorian era, and the conduct of these small wars continually from then up to 1945 (and beyond). During this period the British army began to develop a distinctive approach to small wars, and principles and guidelines were established that formed the essence of the British army's 'way' in fighting small wars. In learning from experience, the British army's approach to small wars evolved, and this learning and the methods that were developed began to be both institutionalised within the army (through formal and informal doctrine) and internalised within the mindset and ethos of soldiers in the British army (through actual operational practice). This chapter establishes the emerging tenets of the British approach to small wars, how they became institutionalised and internalised during this period, and discusses whether and how a 'small wars culture' was able to become embedded in the British army prior to the period covered by the main case studies. As discussed in the introductory chapter, leadership is important in the embedding and transmission of (military) organisational culture, so this chapter also examines the influence of some significant leaders during the colonial small wars and how they were involved in the evolution of the British army's distinctive approach.

Small Wars before World War One

When Queen Victoria came to the throne in 1837 it heralded a period of expansion and consolidation of the British Empire, which often meant a pacifying and policing role for the small British army of the time.[1] The British army was generally successful in these small wars, due to good organisation and 'the resourcefulness of commanders such as Sir Garnet Wolseley, Sir Frederick (later Lord) Roberts and Horatio Herbert (later Lord) Kitchener'.[2] Undertaking a large number of different campaigns in a relatively short period of time meant that the army had to constantly adapt and improvise, and the lack of a formalised General Staff meant that each field commander had to find innovative solutions for the crises that occurred. Pragmatic leaders were required, with the experience of these small wars that could provide continuity in thinking. Following World War One the army quickly reverted to being a 'small wars army' and continued with its imperial policing missions, although it had to adapt to changing attitudes within society as a whole – and the violence in Ireland brought this small wars experience to the doorstep of Britain itself. World War Two again interrupted the steady stream of colonial missions, but certain elements of the conflict (for example the campaign in Burma) were to provide a good learning experience for future small wars. Finally, the first post-war counterinsurgency conflict, in Palestine, was to provide many examples of how *not* to conduct small wars, and showed that the British army would have to continue to adapt quickly if it was to succeed in these types of conflicts.

Sir Garnet Wolseley

Sir Garnet Wolseley was one of the most popular of the Victorian generals – one of his biographers describes him as 'the supreme master of irregular warfare in an expanding Empire'.[3] His career was spent primarily engaged in the small wars of empire, gaining and retaining territory, and pacifying local populations. He was at the forefront of the British army as it became well-established as a 'small wars army', and he was the driving force behind many of the army reforms of the Victorian era. But how was military culture developing in the

Victorian era? Even though the army was excelling in small wars, the military ethos remained bound to a traditional, Wellingtonian view of warfare, in which conventional European war was the main role for the army and imperial policing was a necessary but lesser role for the military, and views on the nature of the enemy and what was required to 'defeat' or pacify him were not advanced. Opponents in small wars were invariably 'savages' and Wolseley still considered the Crimean War a 'proper' war in comparison to the imperial policing missions. He thought the policing duties following the pacification of India were 'quite derogatory to a soldier's profession' and did not offer possibilities for romantic notions of honour and glory.[4] Despite his wide range of experience in small wars, he was of the opinion that these wars did not compare to, and the experience was not relevant to, European war, on which the army ostensibly was focused.

Wolseley was, however, forward-thinking in his frustration with the army's lack of learning from previous conflicts and the outdated assumption that excelling in drill was adequate preparation for leadership in combat.[5] He was intelligent and studious, one of the few army officers who was not 'anti-intellectual' (which made him unpopular with traditionalists, who thought him too radical), but also brave to the point of recklessness when he was younger. Later in his career, he was instrumental in advising Edward Cardwell (Secretary of State for War, 1868–74) in his far-reaching reforms in 1870, which established the army's regimental system as it is known today, and abolished the purchase system. Many of the elements of British military culture were instilled into the army ethos during the mid to late 1800s during the army reforms led by Edward Cardwell. These reforms were multi-faceted and involved moves such as restricting recruitment to a 12-year maximum, abolishing the sale of commissions, and strengthening the two-battalion regimental system (with localised recruitment to regimental areas), in order to improve the quality of the forces. This meant that the British army could become far more effective in its key role in the Empire, by having one battalion serving overseas, while the other was stationed at home for training (although one of the shortcomings of this system was that the home battalion was often stripped of men and materials which were given to their overseas counterparts).

This reinforced the traditional cultural ethos of having a large navy for national defence, and a small expeditionary army for colonial duties. So, military culture in general was evolving, with the reformed system helping to create the *esprit de corps* and traditions that are still in place today. But while he was open-minded about reforming the British military *system*, Wolseley was not so forward-thinking in his attitudes to warfare and the types of conflicts that were being fought. Some people had begun to be shocked by the violent conduct of troops in these Victorian small wars, but it was still for the most part socially (and culturally) acceptable.[6] Wolseley did object to looting and the destruction of property, but for reasons of discipline and efficiency,[7] rather than out of any respect for the local population or for fear of creating resentment. His approach now seems contradictory, urging his troops to be kind to local native carriers and porters but then burning local villages and kidnapping locals to be porters[8] – the legal (and moral) aspects that so controlled future conflicts were not yet dominating the British army's approach. Of course, this is not necessarily surprising. The modern laws of armed conflict were only just beginning to emerge, before which there was little expectation for the use of force to be controlled.[9] As a 'learning leader' Wolseley was forward-thinking about the army system, but there was little emphasis on changing the mindset or ethos of the army based on the type of operations it was conducting.

Tactically, however, under generals like Wolseley the Victorian army was developing a distinctive approach to these small wars. The war in Burma (1852–53), where Wolseley was fighting against guerrillas, was known as the 'subalterns war', since junior officers were required to demonstrate initiative and responsibility against an enemy which was agile and largely hidden, while the soldiers of the British army were still wearing red coats![10] Later, during the Ashanti campaign in West Africa in 1873–74, it was only possible for the officers to control small numbers of troops in the jungle fighting against the Ashanti, so small groups were used, along with lightly equipped flying columns,[11] something which was re-learnt years later in both Ireland and Malaya. Wolseley's qualities as an innovative leader came through in the Ashanti campaign, where he successfully married technology and organisation, in other words, logistics,

which are key to the successful conduct of small wars.[12] Throughout his small wars experiences he collated a wealth of knowledge and produced the *Soldier's Pocket-book for Field Service*, which contains tactical-level guidance for all elements of campaigning in the Empire, including information on equipment, rations, transport and horses, making camps, sentry duty, night attacks, bridges and surveying.[13] In this book he also discusses the role of the army, and recognises that, even though he thought these 'little wars' not the primary task for the army, small wars were at that time the mainstay of British army operations. He stresses 'the absolute necessity, in all small wars, of suiting not only our tactics, but, in the first instance, the organization of the force to be employed to the nature of the work to be done and of the enemy to be encountered' and the importance of selecting the best troops for these 'little wars'.[14] Other tactical observations show the development of his thinking on the best approach to small wars, for example noting 'the effect of artillery is absurdly small upon an enemy who does not fight in large or even in formed bodies, and whose fighting line is a thin line of skirmishers without either supports or reserves'.[15] Finally, he shows great insight in saying that, in small wars

> you must to a great extent adopt the enemy's mode of fighting, which is invariably well suited to the country they occupy; their tactics carried out by highly-disciplined, well-armed soldiers will generally be successful, but you must strike hard and strike quickly.[16]

Many of these lessons were not to be fully learnt and implemented for at least another 50 years, but this does demonstrate the early institutionalisation at a tactical level of some of the elements of the British army's approach to small wars.

Although Wolseley had a dislike of civilians and politicians, he found that many of the conflicts he was involved in required a dual approach, and he recognised the problems of divided civil–military responsibility. In fact, he proved to be a shrewd politician. In the Ashanti conflict, Wolseley took charge as both the civil and military

authority, set up intelligence-gathering facilities and coordination with politicians, and ensured that troops received training in local history and geography.[17] In Cyprus he was both High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief, and in Zululand he was Governor and General in Command of South Africa – more roles involving united civil and military command. So, while the principle was not yet recognised that military action should be subordinated to political aims, in practice the political and military activities during these small wars were in fact very closely coordinated. The main element that was missing from many of these conflicts was that of 'irregularity' or 'unconventionality': the British army in practice fought conventionally, and, importantly, her enemies often tried, and frequently failed, to fight in a similar, conventional way. This meant that there was yet to be much experience of countering a full-scale insurgency or 'guerrilla war' which involved the whole population and had political motivations, so there was little opportunity or requirement to develop a mindset geared towards this type of conflict.

A final point is worthy of discussion. Both Wolseley and Lord Roberts (who is discussed shortly) had select groups of officers to support them in their work – the infamous Wolseley and Roberts 'rings', between which there was much rivalry. These commanders selected the most able and talented staff, who agreed with their approach and their ideas, and used them in all the small wars that they fought. This provided continuity and rapid promotion but was controversial in that it was very much a clique of favoured staff. Kitchener also surrounded himself with a group of personally selected colonels who concurred with his way of working.[18] Stephen Rosen has written about the reasons for military innovation and learning, and concludes that a major factor in the process of innovation is the influence of senior officers with political power in the service, who have a strategy for innovation (in reaction to a change in the security environment), who then establish new promotion pathways for like-minded subordinates to follow.[19] Being able to protect these individuals as their careers progress is also important, so having the support of senior military (and political) figures for new ideas and approaches is vital (both Wolseley and Roberts had the backing of different senior politicians). In many respects this

is what both Wolseley and Roberts were doing – ensuring that people who could continue the evolution of an effective approach to small wars, and who had an ethos geared towards small wars, would continue to innovate and be influential in the future.

Lords Roberts and Kitchener

The South African War, 1899–1902 (also known as the Second Boer War), can be seen as a watershed in the British army's involvement in small wars. Here, the army 'faced a Boer army with a doctrine not unlike those that have been encountered by world powers since World War II'.[20] While the first years of the war were fought relatively conventionally, from late 1900 onwards the Boers took to guerrilla warfare, becoming elusive and mobile, and thus compelling the British troops to fight differently. So, did the attitudes and approaches of the leaders, and ultimately the mindset of the soldiers, reflect these changes? When Lord Roberts took command in South Africa the conventional phase of the fighting was still ongoing, although this was again another 'small war' or imperial policing mission. The real transformation of the conflict into guerrilla warfare happened as Roberts was handing over command in South Africa to Lord Kitchener, although neither realised the extent of the guerrilla campaign at the time. Kitchener had small wars experience in the Middle East, and against the Egyptians and Sudanese, and was seen to be a leader who could improvise with determination and good judgement. He had a reputation as a 'distinguished general, first-class administrator and organiser, and an excellent negotiator and diplomat – although in practice he did not always live up to this reputation'.[21] He was a workaholic, who was ambitious and ruthless, and was largely unpopular with other soldiers, although he found favour with the British government.[22]

Tactically, techniques continued to evolve to deal with the changing nature of conflict and the opponent. The elusive nature of the enemy meant that information on their whereabouts was key, and therefore Roberts set up the Intelligence Department – he was realising the changing nature of the conflict and of the enemy, and noted how 'they slip away in the most extraordinary manner'.[23] Later, Kitchener

also wrote to Queen Victoria, recognising the difficulty of fighting an opponent that does not wear uniform and who can blend into the civilian population.[24] Roberts also realised that the British troops would need to increase their mobility if they were going to defeat the Boers – he therefore requested more horses, and emphasised the need for mounted infantry. Traditional British units were converted into mobile, mounted columns.[25] As Wolseley also found, it was necessary in these small wars for junior officers to take on much of the responsibility of command. Roberts is quoted as saying after the South African War that commanders were 'obliged to leave the command of companies to the captains, while the captains have to trust in a great measure to their subalterns and section leaders'.[26] These tactical developments built on those that commanders such as Wolseley had advanced in earlier conflicts, and this demonstrates an almost subconscious continuation and internalisation of the army's effective approach to small wars.

In leadership terms, Lieutenant General Ian Hamilton was also a prominent figure in the conflict against the Boers, working for both Roberts and Kitchener (as his Chief of Staff). One of Hamilton's big influences was to propose and push for the decentralisation of command, supply and transport in the South African conflict, and also in recognising that the time for big drives was over, since they were not useful in catching the dispersed Boer guerrillas.[27] In a letter to his wife, he writes, 'I must succeed in persuading K. to let me work out a system of decentralisation'.[28] However, Kitchener continued to use large sweeps of the country (his New Model Drives), utilising the blockhouse system to try to drive the Boer guerrillas into corners where they could be captured. This was deemed necessary partly due to the intelligence and communications situation but was nonetheless not significantly successful. Kitchener also resisted decentralisation, which reflected a character trait of not being able to delegate. This shows how a lack of learning or innovation by leaders further up the chain of command can impede the evolution of best practice.

The role of the police was also evolving during the South African War; both Roberts and Hamilton thought that the police were 'more useful than soldiers now for settling South Africa', and that 'police are

needed more than soldiers for the final pacification of the country'.[29] Kitchener also wrote to the Secretary of State for War later, saying that 'it is no real war out here but police operations of considerable magnitude', and again saying 'if only the Prime Minister would do as I advised him at first, and put his money into really efficient police, and leave Army matters alone'.[30] However, the real necessity for close army–police cooperation that was seen in future small wars was not yet realised. Kitchener also refers in his letters to the impact that the press was having on the conflict, with negative reports back home serving to prolong the war. While people may think that the involvement of the media in conflicts is a relatively modern phenomenon, leaders were in fact dealing with this issue in many of the Victorian imperial policing campaigns.

A key feature of the war as it progressed was the number of civilians, ordinary members of the local population, who were both affected by and involved in the conflict. Roberts wrote to Kitchener in January 1901 recognising that the guerrilla opposition was formidable since a majority of the population supported them.[31] The increased guerrilla activity led to a reaction by Roberts, subsequently developed further by Kitchener. Villages and farms were burned, collection camps were set up for Boer families, and the system of blockhouses was extended to capture the mobile guerrillas. These methods had been used in previous conflicts but now they were on the fine line between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour by the British army. Society was changing in its attitudes towards native populations and the use of force, and soon there were questions being asked about the necessity for such brutal action. Separating the guerrilla from his popular support was the right thing to do, and something quite new; the methods being used, however, were increasingly seen by the public at home as inappropriate and cruel. Despite this, military leaders were not of the mind that their methods were excessive or disproportionate. Roberts and Kitchener wanted to create a psychological effect and destroy the Boers' will to fight, and did not fully consider the negative repercussions of their actions and the ensuing resentment. In attempting to remove popular support from the guerrillas they made no counter-effort to gain the support of the locals themselves, taking actions instead that

would push them further away. As with Wolseley earlier, Kitchener's approach appears contradictory. In one official memorandum, of 16 January 1900, he states that 'The Field Marshal Commanding in Chief wishes to impress on all officers … the grave importance of doing all in their power, by good and conciliatory treatment, to secure the co-operation of the people of the country'.[32] This shows the distinctive British approach to small wars in its infancy, with contradictions yet to be ironed out and 'best practice' yet to be agreed. Mao's later notion that guerrillas move among the population like fish in the sea was yet to be realised by the leaders of these Victorian small wars.

Despite their treatment of the local population, however, Roberts and Kitchener did seem to be aware at a political level of the legacy that the conflict would leave, and that the two parties to the conflict would need to live together once the war was over; they were not keen to destroy the enemy, rather they wanted a settlement that would lead to lasting stability in the country. It seems that the military commanders in South Africa recognised the need for a negotiated, political settlement, whereas the civilian leaders (for example Lord Milner, the High Commissioner) wanted to hold out for an outright victory and were opposed to any conciliatory measures.[33] Ian Hamilton agreed with Roberts and Kitchener that a negotiated settlement was the way forward, otherwise he was certain that another war would break out within two or three years.[34] Kitchener's correspondence sometimes gives the impression that he felt his hands were completely tied by politicians, and his only, unworkable, course of action was to try to catch all of the Boer guerrillas. Hamilton concurs, in an undelivered letter to the Secretary of State for War, saying 'political hatred is at the bottom of the continuance of this struggle, and not military hatred'.[35] To a certain degree, then, it was external influences, that is, political leadership, which prevented the military from adopting a new approach to the resolution of small wars, and therefore constrained their actions.

In terms of military leadership, Roberts and Kitchener were constantly assessing their commanders in the field, and Kitchener wrote to Mr Brodrick (Secretary of State for War) to say that 'in this sort of warfare almost everything depends on the leader'.[36] Hamilton was

incredibly forward-thinking in his approach to small wars and in his 'small wars ethos'. In a letter to Lord Roberts, Hamilton commented in length on how the Staff College was not preparing officers sufficiently for small wars; it was too 'traditional', focusing on Napoleon and Waterloo, and an officer '… finds that much of what he has learnt is quite useless, and that he has to fall back on his mother-wit'. He suggests that the course should focus more on matters of imperial defence.[37] Hamilton also drafted a book focusing on leadership, called *The Commander*, which was published posthumously in 1957. In his unpublished drafts, he draws on the lessons of the Afghan and South African wars, stressing the importance of manoeuvre, organisation, discipline, mobility and accurate fire. He comments on 'the worthlessness of text book precepts, except when they had been tested and independently reaffirmed in the Commander's mind'. He also hints at what we now call mission command, and the importance of junior ranks taking responsibility and themselves commanding their troops.[38] Hamilton uses the phrase 'sort of war' to describe a small war, and attributes this term to Lord Halsbury (a former Lord Chancellor): 'our usual type of campaign is a sort of war; not an orthodox war. There the position becomes reversed and the brunt of the business falls upon the administrative side of the machine' – but these 'sort of' wars still needed leaders who were 'fighting men' rather than just administrators.[39] Hamilton was one of those leaders who could have been instrumental in the internalisation of an evolving military culture that was better suited to small wars. However, as I show in the next section, a lack of continuity of experience and the onset of World War One interrupted this learning process.

It is obvious in this conflict that the British army's approach to small wars was developing, but a 'small wars culture' had not yet evolved; there was no 'minimum force philosophy', no 'hearts and minds' campaign, and little integration of military activity with political aims. This lack of cultural change is partly due to the nature of the issues involved, how they changed over time, and the nature of British political and societal influences. Whereas in later conflicts there was a definite struggle for independence which brought the political elements to the fore, these were 'internal' small wars in which it was less

obvious that a long-term local political solution was required. Views on the local population were still driven by imperialism – the 'enemy' were still 'savages' who needed to be pacified. The modern laws of war were only just beginning to emerge and therefore were not yet embedded within the army. Although society was beginning to change its outlook, as demonstrated by the outcry in Britain over the conditions in the Boer camps, military leaders and the army in general were not so aware of the importance of these changes; they did not realise the implications of the camps, or the impact that they would have on the opinions of the local population.[40] Senior leaders were beginning to recognise that this type of conflict required a longer commitment (which was not necessarily popular with the people back home), and that removing popular support from the guerrillas was going to be imperative in future conflicts of this type, but the methods for doing this were not yet developed. So, while learning at the institutional (or cultural) level was still not advanced, a new approach was evolving at the tactical level: the importance of small group activity, improved intelligence and increased mobility was gaining recognition.[41] As noted by Deborah Avant, 'the army's ability to realize its initial losses and change its approach to the war in order effectively to counter the Boers must be regarded as a successful case of adaptation'.[42]

As discussed in Chapter 1, the relationship between leadership and culture is one of reciprocal interdependence – leaders in these small wars recognised that a new approach was required, especially in guerrilla warfare, and they began to adapt accordingly, but these changes were yet to become institutionalised in doctrine or internalised consistently in practice, and therefore were not yet part of British military culture. This seems to be almost a generational change – the British army was still settling into being a 'small wars army' in its expanding imperial role, and therefore there had not yet been time for a small wars mindset and culture to become embedded within the army.

Leaders and Doctrine

Military leaders were involved not only in developing an approach to small wars in practice but also in codifying their approach in military

doctrine. Leaders formalised their experiences and learning in informal publications, and these provide a written record of the evolution and institutionalisation of the British army's 'way' in fighting small wars. Major General Charles Callwell is the best known of these intellectual leaders in the pre-World War One era. Callwell served on the staff of Redvers Buller in South Africa in 1899, and the 1906 edition of his book *Small Wars* incorporates his views on the lessons from that experience, providing an overview of the principles and practices of small wars strategy and tactics.[43] Despite his being deemed 'no use at all' as a soldier in the South African War,[44] this seminal work from Callwell went on to become a key manual for providing guidance on the conduct of small wars. It was designed to be

> a sketch of the principles and practice of small wars as regards strategy and tactics, and of the broad rules which govern the conduct of operations in hostilities against adversaries of whom modern works on the military art seldom take account.[45]

Callwell recognised that these operations were considerably different to regular warfare, and that troops needed guidance in their conduct of them. After the South African War, popular support for imperialism was waning – public attitudes towards the use of force were changing, as were their views on the 'savage' nature of local populations. These external pressures caused the army once again to consider its approach to small wars; fewer troops and funds were now made available for imperial policing missions, so the army learnt to make the best use of scarce resources.

Callwell refers to 'boldness and vigour' being the key to success rather than an overwhelming number of troops, but often this was out of necessity rather than expedience. From his small wars experiences, Callwell recognised the importance of good intelligence, in terms both of knowing the terrain and topography well, and also knowing the enemy. However, he also recognised how difficult this could be in many of the imperial small wars.[46] He also touches on the importance of public opinion, to win over any 'waverers'.[47] In commenting on leadership style in small wars, Callwell notes how 'undecided' leadership

leads to 'desultory operations' and that all actions must have a definite purpose. Good leaders with small wars experience are required, because it is important to realise that you are dealing with a potentially hostile population, rather than just a hostile army.[48] But Callwell doesn't seem to fully realise the negative implications and impact on the local population of, for example, burning property and destroying or taking food and livestock, claiming that the objections to this approach are because it is not in the spirit of war, rather than because they can be counterproductive to the overall aim.[49]

One element of small wars that Callwell does not really touch upon is the importance of the military working towards political aims and solutions. He emphasises the avoidance of a protracted conflict (which in reality small wars often are), which is connected to this lack of political thinking. The 'we're in this for the long haul' mindset of future counterinsurgency campaigns was yet to be recognised as an important ingredient for success (despite the South African War experience). Up to this time small wars had not been as protracted as they were to become in the future. The South African War was one of the longest wars of this type, and many of the imperial policing duties were thought of as 'business as usual' punitive tasks associated with the British Empire, rather than as self-contained conflicts (as they were to become in the future).[50] So, while some of the learning from earlier small wars was incorporated by Callwell into this intellectual work, other elements are missing which would only evolve at a later date. Nonetheless, this important text demonstrates that the role of leaders in learning and cultural evolution is not only through actions but also through written work and 'doctrine', which can be viewed as the institutionalisation of learning in cultural artefacts.[51]

Following Callwell's *Small Wars*, the British government produced various pamphlets on undertaking duties in support of the civil authorities. In 1912, *Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* was produced, which mainly covered the tactical level administrative actions that should be taken when dealing with pickets and strikes, and emphasised that a magistrate should accompany troops in aid of the civil power whenever possible.[52] This manual was updated numerous times over subsequent decades, to include more on the minimum use of

force, working with civil authorities, using troops as a last resort, and not using them for policing tasks.[53] However, that the focus of the manual was on the use of the army to support the civil power when dealing with strikes within the UK shows the lack of official 'doctrine' or formal guidance that existed to cover the use of the army in imperial policing duties, which had been the focus of army work for so many years. At this point in time the British army remained on the whole 'anti-intellectual' and did not see a need for formalising principles and guidelines for conducting small wars.[54]

World War One and the Learning Cycle

In the early years of the twentieth century the British army was involved in other imperial policing campaigns but most of these were of the traditional variety with little guerrilla or insurgent activity.[55] In the years following the South African War, before 1914, the British army's distinctive approach to small wars was definitely starting to emerge, but it was certainly not institutionalised or part of the mindset of leaders and soldiers. This process of learning and cultural change was incomplete, as may be illustrated by reference to Richard Downie's organisational or institutional learning model.[56] In his work on institutional learning Downie describes the learning process in terms of a cycle, where shortcomings are recognised, solutions are sought and new methods are adopted (see Chapter 1, Figure 1.2). For adaptation to take place, organisations such as militaries must be 'learning institutions': changes in external conditions (such as the changing nature of an enemy from conventional to guerrilla warfare) will cause an organisation that has consensus and is open to learning to change its doctrine, in order to capture and formalise lessons. This amended doctrine reflects learning from experience and is a 'conceptual repository for … new ideas', which are then applied in future operations, showing them to be persistent.[57]

The outbreak of World War One in 1914 meant that this learning cycle could not be completed for the British army's approach to small wars; World War One disrupted the institutional learning process that had been gaining momentum throughout the small wars of the Victorian era and the early twentieth century. As noted in an article

in the *Army Quarterly* on small wars, the Great War 'interrupted the sequence of our small wars and consequently the training and experience of our officers in this nature of warfare'.[58] Some new solutions were beginning to be accepted, and some (informal) doctrine was being formulated, but the involvement of the army in a large-scale European conflict meant that these solutions could not become embedded in organisational behaviour (see Figure 2.1). There was also an increasing lack of consensus as to the primary role of the army – small wars or conventional war – which affected the learning process.

In the Victorian and subsequent imperial policing campaigns, events demonstrated that there was a gap in organisational performance (i.e. steps 1 and 2 in Downie's learning cycle), and it was recognised that new methods and principles were required for the effective completion of these small wars. Based on their experiences, individuals (leaders such as Kitchener) took note of these gaps in performance (for example, the inability to counter the Boer guerrillas) and began to



Step 1
Individual action/ attention to events
Step 2
Organisational performance gap identified
Step 3
Search for alternative organisational actions
Step 4
Sustained consensus: accept/reject appropriate/alternative solution as doctrine
Step 5
Transmit interpretation, publish doctrine
Step 6
Change in organisational behaviour
World War One
Learning cycle was broken here by conventional warfare
Cycle was weak/hindered here, due to the anti-intellectual attitude of British army, lack of formal doctrine, weak consensus

Figure 2.1 The interrupted small wars learning cycle – World War One

think of alternative behaviours that might be more successful. This corresponds to step 3 in the learning cycle, with key military figures searching for different, better ways of conducting these small wars. Organisational learning was thus taking place, with the cycle initiated and passing through its early stages. However, step 4 of the cycle is where the learning process becomes weak. There was, prior to the outbreak of World War One, some consensus on the new ideas that should be adopted in small wars, demonstrated by the continuity of thinking between Wolseley, Roberts, Kitchener and Hamilton among others, and these methods were beginning to be articulated in informal doctrine (for example Callwell's *Small Wars*). However, the progression from step 4 to step 5 of the learning cycle was retarded by the anti-intellectualism of the British army at the time. There was a lack of formal doctrine, training or broader military education for small wars and there was only a weak overall consensus on the best way of conducting these operations. Thus step 4 in the institutional learning cycle was initiated but not fully completed, and transmission of these new ideas via doctrine and the progression to step 5 was impeded by the distinct avoidance of formal doctrine by the British army.

As the events of 1914 drew nearer, the focus on small wars disappeared, and along with it any sustained consensus on alternative solutions to the problems of guerrilla warfare. Therefore the organisational learning cycle was interrupted by the outbreak of World War One and step 6 was not reached (see Figure 2.1). Senior military figures were traditionalists who believed that conventional, European warfare was the main role for the army (which World War One seemed to vindicate),[59] and hence that written guidelines for internal, imperial policing missions were not necessary, and neither was a more formal lessons-learned process. These factors all meant that the outbreak of World War One caused the cycle of learning about approaches to small wars to be interrupted and broken. The organisational behaviour of the army in small wars could not be changed (i.e. step 6 of the cycle) to take account of learning from experiences, since the entire focus of the British military was now on mobilising for a large-scale European war. World War One also interrupted the continuity of small wars experience for commanders. They had built up a wealth

of experience in imperial policing missions and had developed new approaches and solutions, but these were abruptly set aside once the war began and were quickly forgotten. Learning about conventional wars was the urgent priority, and those leaders who had developed new approaches to small wars needed to refocus their command skills on leading troops in an entirely different type of conflict; consequently, step 6, the most important step in the learning cycle, did not take place. Britain had to very quickly raise a massive land army and introduce the large number of new recruits to the methods of conventional warfare.[60] Most of these recruits would have had no experience of small wars, and those remaining in the army after the end of World War One would have had no earlier experience from which to develop a wealth of small wars best practice. When organisational personnel change so do ideas;[61] therefore any small wars mindset that had begun to be internalised in soldiers prior to World War One was swept away by the experiences on the Western Front.

A further aspect of Downie's work is the concept of institutional memory and its importance in the organisational learning process. Institutional or organisational memory can be seen as the conventional wisdom that is developed and established within an organisation such as the British army through the widespread practice and acceptance of certain beliefs and behaviours, and it is represented in doctrine, norms and standard operating procedures. He also suggests that a change to institutional memory is a prerequisite for institutional learning, and that this change to memory can be brought about by the capture and institutionalisation of lessons.[62] Institutional memory can easily be lost if a traumatic experience overshadows any previous positive experience, and lessons do not become internalised. Positive changes to institutional memory based on small wars experiences did not become embedded within the British army due to the onset of World War One, and conventional wisdom on small wars could not develop and become internalised within the organisation. Consequently, the small wars culture that had begun to emerge could not become embedded, so that, after the War finished and the army returned to imperial policing duties, much of the earlier learning had been lost, and it had to re-learn many of the important lessons. In his introduction to the

1996 reprint of Callwell's *Small Wars*, Douglas Porch comments on how World War One changed people's views on small wars, with reference now being made to T. E. Lawrence's novel approaches to insurgency within the conventional warfare context of World War One, rather than Callwell's insightful views on small wars methods from earlier campaigns.[63] There was indeed a certain amount of amnesia following World War One about the British army's previous small wars experiences. However, the inter-war years were to show that many of the lessons from before World War One would have to be re-learned, if the army was to be successful in another series of small wars.

The Inter-War Years

After World War One the British army soon returned to its pre-war role of policing the Empire and supporting the civil power. However, little of the learning from the South African War and other campaigns appeared to be taken forward; the army seemed to think they did not provide a template that could be applied to future conflicts. The revulsion at World War One by the public and the military alike led the army to a quick return to focusing on the imperial policing role, but the learning process remained focused on conventional warfare. One element of conflict that was changing was the attitude of society towards violence, and excesses in small wars were not so readily tolerated (as was demonstrated by the Amritsar incident, to be discussed below). A 1927 article notes how methods would have to be 'more above board than was the case in bygone years', or there would be an outcry leading either to the fall of the government or the intervention of another major power.[64] There was also a sharper focus on the involvement of the local population, possibly in reaction to the South African War, as noted in the 1923 *Army Quarterly*: 'There will be no army to deal with, rather a whole population, not necessarily nomad but very mobile'.[65] On the North West Frontier of India, British troops were beginning to understand that social improvements and the reduction of poverty could 'pacify' some of the unrest, and projects such as the construction of roads were initiated to improve conditions, provide employment and develop the economy.[66] Dening's

1927 *Army Quarterly* article comments that 'the most effective remedy to be sought by the Great Power is the removal of the main causes of grievance upon which the insurrection relies for sustenance'.[67]

On the whole, however, the means of dealing with the local population were, in practice, still relatively primitive, and an inclusive, carefully thought out 'hearts and minds' policy had not yet been developed. The aforementioned 1923 *Army Quarterly* article on small wars notes that success in these conflicts was in part down to the British love of sport and adventure![68] But the article does comment on the importance both of *policy* in the conduct of small wars and of the political officer, stressing that military and political chiefs must work together with a common goal and aim: 'the commander ought to bear constantly in mind the political results of his actions'.[69] Many of the small-scale conflicts between the two World Wars, for example in India, Burma and the Middle East, involved guerrilla tactics being used against the British, and had political implications. The most notable of these are the Amritsar incident in India, and the unrest in both Ireland and Palestine.

Amritsar, 1919

The Amritsar incident in India in 1919 is commonly seen as a major turning point in the military approach to duties that fell short of all-out, traditional war; this complex affair remains as controversial now as it ever was. The political and military background in India was complicated, and unrest was being responded to inconsistently: some disturbances were met with violence and repression, others with non-violent methods and concessions. In 1918, emergency powers were introduced which brought with them detention without trial, search without warrant and the abandonment of trial by jury, and this motivated the local population to react with demonstrations.[70] As the unrest in Amritsar became more serious, General Dyer, who was in command of the British troops there, issued a proclamation that limited movement and imposed a curfew, and also forbade gatherings and demonstrations; he warned that if these took place force would be used to disperse them. It is unclear whether all the local population were aware of the proclamation, or whether they merely defied

it, but a disorderly though non-violent gathering still took place, in an enclosed square from which the crowd could not easily disperse. British troops led by Dyer arrived at the demonstration and, without warning, immediately opened fire; they continued to fire upon the crowd for ten minutes, even though it was rapidly attempting to disperse, and at least 380 civilians were killed.[71]

In the investigation that was subsequently ordered (the Disorders Inquiry Committee or Hunter Committee), Dyer gave both written and oral evidence,[72] representing himself without legal guidance. He readily admitted that he wanted to create a moral and psychological effect through his actions at Amritsar, which would send a message to India as a whole. Dyer was convinced that a full-scale uprising was about to occur (which was strongly contested), and was certain that he had acted appropriately, as these extracts from his evidence show:

> If I fired I must fire with good effect; a small amount of firing would be a criminal act of folly.
>
> I fired and continued to fire until the crowd dispersed, and I consider this is the least amount of firing which would produce the necessary moral, and widespread effect it was my duty to produce, if I was to justify my action. If more troops had been at hand the casualties would have been greater in proportion. It was no longer a question of merely dispersing the crowd, but one of producing a sufficient moral effect, from a military point of view, not only on those who were present, but more especially throughout the Punjab. There could be no question of undue severity.
>
> The necessity was very great indeed and the means have been justified by the end … many inhabitants subsequently thanked me and recognized that I had committed a just and merciful act.[73]

But he did not ask for advice beforehand on how best to implement the loose guidance he had been given on the use of force and the wider political situation,[74] and he did not consult with the civil authorities in the area. Neither did he tend to the dead and injured, for which he was

strongly criticised in the subsequent enquiry. When asked if he could have dispersed the crowd without firing, Dyer responded

> Yes: I think it quite possible that I could have dispersed them perhaps even without firing … I could disperse them for some time, then they would all come back and laugh at me and I considered I would be making myself a fool.[75]

Given the changing views on acceptable military behaviour, especially in an imperial policing campaign within the British Empire, this justification for the use of disproportionate force against civilians was weak and ill-conceived.

Such use of force was widely regarded as excessive and indiscriminate, and there was outrage at Dyer's evidence before the committee, although he was supported by Sir Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant Governor of the Punjab, and other senior British military figures. The Hunter Committee, reflecting the changing attitudes towards small wars, concluded that excessive force was likely to have the opposite effect to that desired, and would prolong the rebellion and turn the population away from supporting the British:

> continued firing upon that crowd cannot be justified because of the effect such firing may have upon people in other places. The employment of excessive measures is as likely as not to produce the opposite result to that desired.[76]

While the majority element of the Report (i.e. by the British contingent of the Committee) found Dyer's action to be 'injudicious and improper', the minority element of the Report (i.e. by the Indian contingent) compared Dyer's actions to 'the acts of "frightfulness" committed by some of the German military officers in Belgium and France in 1914' and concluded Dyer adopted an 'inhuman and un-British method of dealing with subjects of His Majesty the King Emperor'.[77]

Significantly, the Secretary of State for India, Lord Montagu, on reviewing the Report of the Hunter Committee, concluded in a letter

to the Government of India that

> The principles which have consistently governed the policy of His Majesty's Government in directing the nature, and the methods employed in the course, of military operations against a foreign enemy may be broadly stated as the employment of no more force and destruction of life than is necessary for the purpose of forcing the enemy to subdue himself to the Military Commander's will. This principle has governed their policy still more rigidly when military action against enemy non-combatants is concerned … It must regretfully, but without the possibility of doubt, be concluded that Brigadier-General Dyer's action at the Jallianwala Bagh was in complete violation of this principle.[78]

This concurs with the *Report, Proceedings and Memoranda of Cabinet Committee on Indian Disorders*, vol. I, which states

> it is certain that he [Dyer] made no attempt to ascertain the minimum amount of force which he was compelled to employ, that the force which he actually employed was greatly in excess of that required to achieve the dispersal of the crowd, and that it resulted in lamentable and unnecessary loss of life and suffering.[79]

This articulation of the use of minimum necessary force as a principle represented a significant development in the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars. As Rod Thornton notes: 'Amritsar came to be seen by some observers as the seminal event that set in train a "specifically British approach" to imperial policing in that brutality was not acceptable'.[80] The example of Amritsar became a reference point for the *principle* of minimum force being established as a key philosophy of the British army when conducting small wars. From this point onwards, the minimum force philosophy began to be internalised within the ethos of British soldiers; even though it was not always adhered to, any future application of excessive force was very much seen as breaching an established principle. Although this principle was not institutionalised in doctrine for some time (unofficially in articles in

the 1920s, in Gwynn's 1934 *Imperial Policing* and officially in the 1937 version of *Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* – see later), the Amritsar incident was referred to into the 1960s, in literature and training manuals, at the Staff College and anecdotally;[81] the enduring lessons of Amritsar helped to define an attribute of the British army's small wars culture.

Ireland, 1919–21

The 'small war' in Ireland following World War One was a novel situation, much closer to home than any of the previous conflicts; it posed unique problems, and is an example of much of the existing learning not being implemented in practice. It was different to many of the previous small wars, with the police and the army required to act more closely together, and the police retaining a greater degree of responsibility for regaining and retaining order. However, it developed as a guerrilla conflict similar in many respects to the South African War, with the insurgents living amongst the local population and relying on their support. While the origins of this small war are rooted in history, especially local opposition to British land ownership, the immediate causes of the conflict are connected to events in Ireland during World War One. In 1916 a small group of Irish rebels seized British government buildings in the centre of Dublin and declared an Irish Republic. The Easter Rising, as it became known, was a turning point in the Irish struggle for independence because it mobilised popular Irish support for armed opposition to British rule. Initially, public opinion was against the rebels and in favour of constitutional means to achieving an independent Ireland. However, the execution of captured rebel leaders by the British authorities caused outrage and generated great sympathy for the rebels and their cause.[82] In 1919 the Irish Republican Army (IRA), formed by the rebels of the Easter Rising, began another violent campaign to dislodge the British from Ireland, with the army increasingly becoming a target. By mid-1918 the IRA had thousands of members and was 'quasi military' in structure and organisation,[83] and it continued to increase in size during 1919, also improving its equipment and training. By 1920 the IRA was involved in a full-scale guerrilla war against the British and in January open attacks on

Crown forces were authorised;[84] the IRA also targeted locals within the community who did not support its cause, especially members of the local police force, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC). The IRA used a combination of urban terrorism and rural insurgency through the use of flying columns and ambushes to attack and intimidate the police, army, local population and civil authorities.

From 1917 onwards the legitimacy and power of British authority was being eroded, and in the summer of 1920 the British administration in Ireland ceased to function effectively; the police withdrew from many areas, jurors refused to attend trials and the Inland Revenue stopped work, all compounded by a policy vacuum. The RIC became increasingly insecure and anxious, and the tension led to demonstrations, and unrest and hostility from both sides. The British response was to introduce emergency regulations, but there was little political guidance for the military and police in Ireland as to what their approach should be towards the disturbances. 'Special military areas', for example, were introduced in early 1919 in a response to the increased violence, but these prevented public meetings and even markets, which increased local feelings of resentment. As it moved on to more violent actions the IRA was increasingly demonstrating that it posed a military threat and was carrying out more than merely criminal activity. The British response, however, was inconsistent, unclear and uncoordinated: 'the authorities were uncertain as to what the most appropriate reaction was to stop these large-scale displays of defiance'.[85] A cycle of military intervention and arrests provided some stability at first, but also served to increase resentment. The use of hunger strikes in response by captured insurgents was initially very effective; the British authorities were forced to back down and release prisoners, which greatly diminished their power and support and was seen as an IRA victory in the eyes of the public.

The 1920 Restoration of Order in Ireland Act gave the army greater powers, but the military was resistant to having a large army presence in Ireland, and was also preoccupied with post-war demobilisation, which had dramatically reduced the number of available troops. This led to the militarisation of the local Irish police force, and by late 1920 anti-Sinn Fein 'squads' were believed to have been operating within

the RIC.[86] In response to IRA guerrilla and terrorist attacks, British forces undertook indiscriminate reprisals against both the guerrilla forces and the local population. The lack of guidance and accurate intelligence also led to violent, arbitrary actions by the paramilitary police force, targeting of the civilian population, and the destruction of property. The dearth of intelligence was made worse by the IRA targeting British intelligence networks; for example, Michael Collins led a hit squad that destroyed the RIC intelligence-gathering operation in Dublin. Angry at the lack of political support and resentful of their poor working conditions, the police sought an outlet for their frustrations, and found it in taking violent action against the IRA. At the same time, the army tried to pressurise and intimidate the local population by destroying any property that shots were fired from or that the IRA used for preparations.[87] This approach backfired, and many locals were converted to the IRA cause by the excessive measures taken by the troops.[88] Such 'unofficial reprisals' were reluctantly tolerated by commanders, which demonstrates their lack of learning from previous experience about what approaches might achieve success.[89] In early 1920, deportation and internment were introduced, which might have been 'the first hint of a British counter-insurgency strategy'.[90] This, again, had the opposite effect to that desired, and the violence continued. The army's new powers were withdrawn in May 1920 in an attempt to pacify the situation, but tit-for-tat reprisals by the police and the IRA, against both people and property, led to an increased desire for revenge in the summer and autumn of 1920.

The situation of minimal guidance and control and the excessive use of force was compounded by the introduction of former British army personnel into the RIC from January 1920 onwards, which created the infamous 'Black and Tans' and Auxiliaries. These were special units designed to hunt down the IRA insurgents (to compensate for the lack of army support); however, their role fell into the grey area between policing and military action, and therefore they had little guidance and few rules. They met terror with terror, used raids and ambushes themselves to attack the IRA, and were accused of acts of brutality and excessive force. It is interesting to note that the IRA saw themselves as an organised army and the Auxiliaries as terrorists,

and vice versa.[91] A majority of the members of the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries had only recently served in World War One, and had no police or even small wars experience and little training; they saw themselves still as soldiers fighting an enemy rather than as policemen in an internal security operation. They had poor intelligence and their opponents were elusive, which meant that few arrests were made, leading to frustrations and increasingly inappropriate actions. The acts of violence by the Auxiliaries 'bred an urgent desire to respond in kind';[92] both sides in the conflict undertook beatings, kidnappings and arson attacks, thus eroding the legitimacy of the British forces and preventing them from regaining the monopoly of violence.

By late 1920 the nature of the violence was beginning to change, with more sectarian attacks between the Catholic and Protestant communities occurring. However, the insurgency continued and on 1 December 1920 the British cabinet took the decision to impose martial law where necessary in an attempt to restore order (in Cork and its three adjoining counties). These greater powers meant that more searches and arrests could take place, and military courts were more effective. Intelligence gradually improved, partly due to greater army–police collaboration, and also due to forces getting more involved in the community, making contacts and generally improving their understanding of the situation.[93] This meant that more effective small unit operations could be mounted; however, by then it was too late for any major changes to be successful. This progress was also hindered by the official British sanctioning of reprisals against property in January 1921, in an attempt to regain some control, discipline and legitimacy. Rather than trying to gain the support of the local population and acknowledge that their grievances required a political solution, the British forces seemed to be basing their response on intimidating and punishing the locals, which of course had negative repercussions. As Joost Augusteijn notes, 'their [the authorities'] indiscriminate approach and exaggerated reaction to the violence radicalised and involved an increasing number of men everywhere'.[94] The guerrilla conflict and reprisals continued to escalate until the summer of 1921, with a never-ending cycle of violence. The increasing sense of stalemate (and pressure from America) led to both sides agreeing to hold talks, and a truce

was signed on 11 July. The subsequent negotiations eventually led to the division of Ireland into Southern and Northern Irish territories, which sparked the consequent Irish civil war.

All the lessons from years of imperial policing, the South African War and Amritsar seemed to have been lost, or not deemed relevant, in this counter-guerrilla campaign. This ineffective approach was in part down to the nature of the army that was involved in Ireland; troops operating in Ireland during this period were invariably either new recruits, or soldiers who only had experience of World War One and trench warfare. Training for this type of guerrilla conflict was poor, and therefore learning from earlier small wars experiences was lost. This small war occurred so soon after World War One and so close to home, and the British appeared to be in shock; the result was extreme and inappropriate responses which were not based on the best practice that had been established over many previous years of imperial policing. Of course, learning was also limited because much of the response in Ireland was undertaken by the police, and as yet there seemed to be no real mechanism for transferring lessons between army and police, despite the blurring of their roles in Ireland. Army activity, however, still did not show a high degree of learning from experience or the continued evolution of the effective British approach to small wars.

The local population was crucial to the successful resolution of this conflict, but the British failed to focus on gaining and retaining their support. The police and army remained in barracks when not patrolling, which meant that the IRA was free to win over the indifferent elements of the population while the British focused more on 'punishing' them. Also of great importance was the IRA propaganda campaign, which the British put little effort into countering; insufficient attention was paid to winning and maintaining public support, both in Ireland and on the mainland. There was a shocking lack of emphasis on intelligence, despite the importance of good intelligence having been realised in many earlier conflicts. Unity of command, and the efficiency that it brings, was never introduced, and there was a considerable degree of friction between military and police forces. As Charles Townshend notes, 'a hesitant attempt to create a "generalissimo",

with command of both police and military forces, came to nothing, partly as a result of traditionalist attitudes. In consequence, uncertainty and disagreement persisted in almost every department of the administration'.[95] The military commander in Ireland, General Nevil Macready, concerned at the ever violent nature of the police force, reluctantly advocated martial law, simply so that he could gain some control over the police and improve their discipline.[96]

One of the major lessons that had been learnt by the end of the conflict was that guerrilla warfare could not be countered by solely military means; this had been tried and had failed in Ireland, where there was incredibly poor civil–military cooperation. Because the Irish claims were not seen as being legitimate, the unrest was considered to be civil disorder and criminal activity rather than an insurgency; consequently prompt, firm, discriminate military action was not used. The British did not expect a guerrilla campaign to follow on from the initial acts of unrest and violence, either because they were focused on World War One, or simply because they were burying their heads in the sand. This led to the fiasco of the militarised police forces, and the excessive reprisals. As Charles Townshend noted

> Simple military logic, which in essence is the application of superior force, is, in operations in aid of the civil power, complicated by many political and social factors. Power has to be tempered with restraint, and exercised according to criteria which were not, until the mid-twentieth century, habitual among soldiers.[97]

Political aims and objectives were needed, which the military could assist in reaching, if a successful small wars campaign was to be prosecuted – however there was no firm political action here.

In terms of leadership, the problems of this unique situation were compounded by its proximity to World War One. As will also be shown with the 1946–8 Palestine campaign, the mindset of the military and political leadership at the time was, understandably, firmly rooted in conventional war.[98] For example, Field Marshal John French, who had fought in both the Sudan and the South African War, had been heavily involved in World War One, before returning to suppress

the Easter Rising in 1916, and then moving on to become the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland. He was strongly in favour of the use of force in Ireland to suppress the guerrilla struggle (the 'Black and Tans' were his brainchild), and is quoted as saying 'we have taken strong measures and may have to take stronger' to overcome the militants.[99] Major General Henry Hugh Tudor, who was the Chief of Police from 1920 and operationalised French's ideas for the militarised police force, had also served in the South African War, but the more recent, traumatic experience of conventional warfare in World War One seemed to overshadow his small wars thinking. As discussed earlier, whatever learning had been set in motion by their previous small wars experiences, World War One interrupted this learning cycle and blocked the internalisation of lessons and the evolution of a small wars culture during this conflict.

Inter-War Small Wars Doctrine

Although formal doctrine within the army did not yet exist, 'soldier-scholars' were producing work which articulated and institutionalised the lessons of the ongoing small wars and the approaches which worked well in them. An influential work, which could be considered 'informal doctrine' on imperial policing, was written in 1934 by Charles W. Gwynn, following his numerous experiences in colonial campaigns (and learning from incidents such as Amritsar). He was well aware of the changing nature of both the British Empire and society as a whole – there was now less public interest in, or understanding of, imperial policing, and campaigns were now more about retaining civil control of territories rather than expanding the Empire. His writing echoes many of the small wars principles that had been developing over the years; he 'recognised the importance of cooperation between military and civilian authorities',[100] and he keenly noted that 'it is the duty of army officers to keep in touch with the political situation in order to be prepared to act intelligently in any situation which may arise'.[101] He stresses the responsibility that junior ranks will have in these small wars, and that guiding principles are often more important than specific orders. Many other small wars principles are also articulated in

Imperial Policing, such as the acceptance that these conflicts will take a long time, the impact of propaganda and the press, and the need for dispersed troops, accurate intelligence, small groups, mobility and cooperation with police forces.

Gwynn emphasises the 'minimum exercise of force',[102] and states that 'another … important principle is that the amount of military force employed must be the minimum the situation demands'.[103] This reflects the philosophy that had been established in the British army following the Amritsar incident, and demonstrates the changing attitudes of society towards the use of force. He makes the point that 'excessive severity may antagonize the neutral or loyal element, add to the number of rebels, and leave a lasting feeling of resentment and bitterness' and that 'drastic punitive measures to induce surrender, or in the nature of reprisals, may awaken sympathy with the revolutionaries, and in the long run militate against the re-establishment of normal conditions'.[104] Finally someone had formalised the idea that excessive force, especially against the local civilian population, and the destruction of property, can have serious repercussions, and actually increase support for guerrilla forces. These concepts gradually formed into the British 'maximum strength/minimum force' philosophy;[105] this meant balancing the display and 'presence' of force and the power and resolution of the troops against the use of that force only as a last resort.[106] In discussing the Amritsar incident, Gwynn comments both on Dyer's actions, which were 'at variance with accepted principles', and on the subsequent inquiry, which was politicised and partial.[107] He stresses that Dyer should have given a warning, should not have prolonged his troops' firing, should have asked for advice from the civil authority prior to taking action, and should not have used 'causing a moral effect' as a justification for his actions.[108] However, it is important to note that these 'accepted principles' that Gwynn refers to primarily developed as a result of the Amritsar incident, and therefore they were not yet standard, internalised philosophies within the army at the time of Dyer's actions.

Some elements of the 'British approach' that would become evident in future conflicts were yet to be realised, however, despite experience which would suggest their utility. For example, *Imperial Policing*

does not touch in great detail on the need to address the causes of the unrest and legitimate grievances. Because of the lack of formal literature and training on imperial policing, Gwynn recognises that 'tradition becomes the only means of broadcasting experience';[109] he was also aware of the dangers of applying past lessons to a different type of conflict. But he does not draw on the experience of Ireland in the inter-war years, which shows there were still gaps in the thinking and learning on small wars. Nonetheless, in terms of the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars, *Imperial Policing* is definitely a 'cultural artefact' (using Schein's terminology) that was important for the institutionalisation of the principles behind the successful conduct of small wars.

Duties in Aid of the Civil Power, the official War Office guidance pamphlet, was released again in 1923 (and in 1929, 1937 and 1945). Although it remained a tactical-level pamphlet mainly covering the use of the army in support of the police when dealing with strikes and disturbances within the UK, the impact of recent experiences, especially the Amritsar incident, is evident. The first page makes it clear that

> His [the soldier's] aim is not the annihilation of the enemy, but merely the suppression of a temporary disorder, and therefore the degree of force to be employed must be sufficient, but not more than sufficient, to restore order. The commander on the spot is alone in a position to estimate the degree of force which must be used, and if he takes such measures as he honestly believes to be necessary to effect the immediate object, he need not fear the results of enquiry into his conduct.[110]

Emphasised later in italics is the rule that, 'some form of warning must be given to the crowd before fire is opened'.[111] It also emphasises close liaison with the police, and not provoking the local population, plus the importance of intelligence.[112] Another official pamphlet was also produced in 1934, *Notes on Imperial Policing*, but it was, like *Duties in Aid of the Civil Power*, more of a tactical-level manual.[113]

Finally, in 1938, H. J. Simson wrote *British Rule, and Rebellion*, although this book is far less well known than Gwynn's (or Callwell's

earlier).[114] It draws on the Ireland and Palestine experiences (discussed below) to discuss the British response to violent rebellion ('sub-war') within her territories, and is critical of the slow British response and inability to deal effectively with the threat, and the lack of progress made in the British ability to counter local aggression. Simson comments on the lack of continuity in political guidance and direction given to the military in countering rebellion, and emphasises the importance of civil–military cooperation and working towards the same aim. He stresses 'the four means of rule – civil, police, legal, and military. The cure seems to depend on good coordination of these four means of rule'.[115] Simson puts forward principles for effectively dealing with rebellion, when the military is called on to support the police and the civil power. He emphasises the importance of reliable intelligence[116] and unity of control under a single director of operations,[117] and recognises the unique circumstances of rebellion:

> those in active rebellion do not wear distinctive uniform, but hide their weapons under civilian clothes, with the intention of confusing those whom they attack. The solution of the difficulty seems to lie along the lines of making junior NCOs face their responsibilities in a way which will not curb their initiative.[118]

However, Simson appears driven by criticising the Ireland and Palestine campaigns, and therefore the broader principles of an effective way of conducting small wars that could really be useful in the future are not clearly laid out.

Despite these few unofficial texts providing guidance on the conduct of small wars, at this point the importance of official doctrinal guidance was not realised, and many lessons of conventional as well as counterinsurgency warfare were not learned or officially recorded and disseminated, since their value was not recognised back in the UK.[119] Military education in imperial policing and small wars was also thin. The 1921 *Staff College Regulations*, for example, show that duties in aid of the civil power, and small wars (their principles and practice; i.e. Callwell) were covered, but we have no idea how long was spent on these subjects, and these regulations stress that the army was

'particularly anxious' for staff college students to learn the lessons of World War One.[120] In general, the three principles of minimum use of force, civil–military cooperation and tactical flexibility 'were passed on as traditional wisdom from one generation of officers and civil servants to the next with almost no effort made to formulate doctrine, and little attention paid to preserving past experience in an organised fashion'.[121] 'Reinventing the wheel' on operations was a common side-effect of 'muddling along' with this lack of formal doctrine, as noted by Christopher Bellamy:

> Colonial wars gave commanders – sometimes quite junior ones – experience of public relations and politics as well as war. Britain, the United States, France and Russia all accumulated a vast and fascinating repertory of experience of colonial warfare – but it was never incorporated into a coherent theory of war.[122]

The Palestine Mandate

Britain had a mandate from the League of Nations to rule Palestine after World War One and, via the 1917 Balfour Declaration, also supported the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The number of Jewish immigrants to the country increased dramatically, and this caused friction between the two communities, leading to widespread violence on numerous occasions (for example in 1921 and 1929). Tensions between the two communities in Palestine increased to the point of breaking in 1936. Arab groups began an insurgency to which the Jewish community reacted with violence. British troops were responsible for regaining and retaining internal security, and this conflict has been described as standing 'at the crossroads of imperial policing and modern counterinsurgency'.[123] As Charles Townshend notes, 'The situation in Palestine was a perfect illustration of the difficulty of finding an appropriate response to an oppositional movement which remained in the indefinite zone between passive resistance and open warfare.'[124] However, the British army had been dealing with precisely this type of problem for many years, and had a wealth of experience that it could have drawn on, but did not. Civil disobedience led to an insurgency

developing initially in the countryside, and ultimately to a guerrilla conflict. As cases of Arab violence increased, the British forces were initially confined to defensive measures, and attempts at implementing unity of command were unsuccessful.[125] In a desperate attempt to regain control and authority, the British response developed to include punitive measures such as collective reprisals and the destruction of property. Again there had been little learning as to the negative effects of these actions; and the British had once again misinterpreted the nature of the conflict, seeing it more as criminal 'bandit' activity than as a serious nationalist or insurgent movement, which meant that the response was inappropriate and ineffective.

Captain Orde Wingate, one of the most controversial figures in the British army's small wars history, was posted to Palestine as an intelligence officer. While most British troops tacitly supported the Arab cause (because of the wealth of previous experience in other Arab countries), Wingate, a deeply religious Christian himself, ardently supported the Jewish community. As an intelligence officer it was vital for Wingate to understand the political situation in the country and also to talk to the local population – two of the key tenets of the British approach to small wars. Despite his unorthodox approach and eccentric personality, as a commander he was 'an inspiring leader of low-intensity military operations'[126] who learnt important lessons from his experience in Palestine and took them forward into the jungle in World War Two. However, he was a maverick, and many of his solutions to the intricacies of small wars created much debate. Wingate is known for creating a force of Jewish troops led by British officers to defend Jewish territory but which were in fact used in offensive operations against the Arab insurgents, and became known as the Special Night Squads.[127] Their aim was in effect to play the insurgents at their own game, to demonstrate that they could operate in the same manner and surprise the enemy with offensive operations, and not only react defensively to the violent attacks. Intelligence was key to operating in this way, and Wingate used his knowledge of both Arabic and Hebrew to make contacts in the local community. These squads operated at night, sweeping known insurgent areas and detaining or killing gang members, while (in theory at least) protecting a vital oil pipeline. As

Wingate's counterinsurgent activities became more controversial and more conventional troops arrived in Palestine however, moves were made to close down his squads.

Tactically, the approach to small wars as developed in Palestine – especially by Wingate's Night Squads – continued to evolve and improve. He developed techniques for moving across country, usually off paths and in silence. Again this was described as a 'subaltern's war' by Wingate,[128] with small groups operating far more effectively than large units (although large-scale cordon and search operations were still used by the more conventional forces). Only some of the broader small wars tenets that had started to emerge in recent times were actually being successfully applied in Palestine. Efforts were made to remove popular support for the guerrillas by occupying villages, in order to deny the insurgents food and shelter,[129] but there was a lack of political policy to which the military action was subordinated. The military was given extraordinary powers of arrest and detention, collective fines were levied and property was destroyed – all things which had been proven counterproductive in previous operations.[130] In creating the Night Squads, Wingate was not in favour of having a united body of police and military forces,[131] and he was ruthless, not a true follower of the 'minimum force' principle. As we have seen in previous conflicts, a distinctive and effective approach to the tactics of small wars was being developed by the British army, but many of the wider concepts involved in successfully conducting a small war, and the mindset required, were still in their infancy.

Wingate as a leader worked his troops very hard; he was respected and admired, if not understood. He had both mental and physical energy, was courageous, could inspire troops, and was determined.[132] But, to a great extent, it was because Wingate had the support of senior figures such as Wavell that his plans could go ahead.[133] This shows the importance of having the support of senior leadership in getting new ideas accepted, and Wavell supported Wingate again in Ethiopia and Burma. However, while being confident and different can lead to commanders being supported and new approaches being adopted, being *too* unorthodox can lead to being sidelined, and therefore many ideas are not taken forward. This was often the case with

Orde Wingate, whose ideas and ethos were overshadowed by his eccentric and controversial personality. However, still greater factors were to disrupt the small wars learning process.

World War Two and the Learning Cycle

As with World War One, World War Two interrupted the process of learning and adapting in relation to small wars. The inter-war years had demonstrated the changing nature of conflict and the importance of small wars thinking, but the 'learning leaders' were diverted from this by the outbreak of another conventional war. The learning cycle could not be completed, and so a certain degree of learning with respect to small wars was not embedded within the British army (see Figure 2.2).

As in the period before World War One, the primary role for the army in the inter-war years had been imperial policing duties and small wars, and these had demonstrated that there were gaps in organisational performance. The army recognised that their methods and approaches needed to be adapted in order for them to be successful in




Figure 2.2 The interrupted small wars learning cycle – World War Two

these campaigns, which shows that steps 1 and 2 of the learning cycle were again taking place before World War Two. Innovative leaders in these inter-war conflicts began to look for ways of adapting their methods and alternative actions were adopted (step 3 of the cycle), as demonstrated by some of Orde Wingate's innovations in Palestine. However, the outbreak of another conventional large-scale war meant that the institutional learning cycle could again not be fully completed, and steps 4 and 5 of the cycle were only able to be partially commenced. There was little consensus on the best way to approach small wars even before the outbreak of World War Two (as seen by the inappropriate responses to both the Ireland and Palestine insurgencies), and now the army once again put aside thinking on small wars to concentrate on mobilising for conventional war. This would require completely different skills, methods and weapons to those that were needed in imperial policing campaigns; infantry techniques were supplanted by artillery and tank tactics, and training now focused far less on mobility, flexibility, initiative and adaptability (the exact skills and ethos that would be required in future small wars). The army rapidly increased in size again with a huge influx of new recruits,[134] and the implications of this for the army in the post-war era were great: soldiers entering the army in 1939 and then remaining in it after the war would have had little if no small wars experience, hence that continuity of learning and experience was all but lost. As noted by David French, 'The vast majority of regimental officers during the Second World War had, therefore, been civilians in 1939 and the wartime officer corps was composed overwhelmingly of amateur soldiers.'[135] Also, by October 1941 only three out of every ten soldiers were in the infantry, and often these were the less able of the conscripts.[136] This did not bode well for post-war small wars, which were to be primarily infantry campaigns.

Therefore the outbreak of World War Two meant that step 5 of the learning cycle was weak, and this was once again compounded by the fact that the British military had remained averse to the formalisation of doctrine. While the inter-war period had seen the documentation of informal guidelines (for example Gwynn's *Imperial Policing* and Simson's *British Rule, and Rebellion*) and formal tactical doctrine (*Duties*

in Aid of the Civil Power and *Notes on Imperial Policing*), these did not provide a comprehensive guide to an effective British approach to small wars since various elements were missing. The institutional learning cycle was broken completely by the start of the war, and step 6 could not take place with regard to small wars; organisational behaviour in small wars could not be adapted to take account of learning from past experiences, since all attention was again refocused on conventional warfare. Institutional memory for small wars was not preserved (which was compounded by the lack of collective experience and knowledge of small wars for a majority of soldiers who joined during World War Two), and therefore organisational learning was lost. This meant that in military culture terms there was scant opportunity for a 'small wars culture' to continue to be transmitted and embedded within the British army. There are two exceptions to this: firstly, higher ranking officers who had served before World War Two did have that small wars experience, and continued to recognise its relevance, despite the interruption and the focus on large-scale conflict (but their influence waned following World War Two); secondly, there was one theatre of war where 'irregular conflict' was required, and therefore soldiers could still develop skills that would be relevant in future small wars. This theatre was the Far East, and the conflict in Burma in particular provided an opportunity for the army to continue in its development of a distinctive approach to small wars, led by dynamic and forward-thinking commanders.

Burma and the Chindits

Orde Wingate built on his experience in Palestine and in other 'irregular' World War Two campaigns, particularly against the Italians in Abyssinia (now Ethiopia), to create the Chindit force in Burma, from 1943 onwards. The Chindits were Special Forces, created to operate at long range behind Japanese lines. Their aim was to cut Japanese lines of communication, to help to capture airfields, and generally to harass the Japanese so they could not operate effectively, with the intention of using irregular methods to outflank the enemy; but they were far more organised than any guerrilla force and were never intended

to be like one.[137] Initially, the group had little visible success, but the novelty of the concept meant that it made a positive impression, and it continued to be used, with improvements being made. As the campaign continued, however, and especially after Wingate's death in March 1944, the role and composition of the force began to change, which meant that it was not being used for its intended purpose, and many of the important lessons were lost.

Tactically, many of the developments that had been made over the previous years of imperial policing were improved on here by Wingate. He operated small groups and 'flying columns', using light weaponry against an elusive enemy: 'He [Wingate] clearly understood that mobility is relative to that of the enemy in the element in which the war is being fought, and that it must be employed to threaten and attack the enemy's vitals at the critical point in time and space'.[138] The Chindits operated in virtual silence, carrying their equipment and rations with them, creating their own route through the jungle rather than using well-trodden paths. Two innovations made the Chindit operations possible, wireless radio communications and air supply/support, both of which Wingate exploited to the full. Radio technology meant that the groups could communicate far better with each other, and could therefore operate more independently but were far more coordinated in their actions. Support from the air enabled the Chindit forces to spend longer in the jungle (since they could be supplied with rations and equipment using air drops), and air power was also used both to transport the troops into the jungle (aeroplanes, gliders and helicopters were used) and to evacuate casualties. Intelligence, as always in these 'small wars-like' conditions, was vital for finding the elusive Japanese troops.

As Shelford Bidwell recalls in his account of the Chindit war, 'the heart of the British system was morale and motivation based on the social dynamics of the human group, the "Regiment"… The British were methodical, but they were also intuitive and allowed scope for flexibility and variation in methods so as not to damp initiative'.[139] Wingate's aim with the Chindits was to fight as much like the enemy as possible, with both sides exploiting the advantages of using guerrilla tactics in the jungle conditions; he had done much the same

thing previously in Palestine. This was 'a mode of warfare not easily learnt except by those who are willing to dispense with certain deep-rooted conceptions of war';[140] the experience of World War Two in the European theatre had overshadowed much of the earlier small wars experience in the British army, and many soldiers were very much in the conventional war mindset. The fighting in Burma, however, was very different to the European theatre of war, and was far more similar to the conditions and the way of fighting that would be encountered in Malaya some years later, where many of the Chindit techniques would be appropriate. Tactically, this campaign (and especially the Chindit Special Forces operations) was very useful for the development of the British army's approach to small wars (provided that the lessons could be transmitted and applied in the future) and the methods used could be relevant to many of the future counterinsurgency conflicts. It was, however, very different to many of the past and future small wars that the British army was involved in: it was part of a larger, conventional war, which meant that elements of the distinctive British approach to small wars were less relevant. 'Hearts and minds' were not considered, the political aim was not really of interest to the leaders on the ground, and cooperation with the civil authorities and police forces was not relevant to success in the wider conflict.

Wingate as a leader was controversial, unorthodox, and has been described by his colleague Bernard Fergusson as being both inspiring and abhorrent.[141] Many of his ideas, and his ethos, however, showed an insight into the best way of conducting small wars. Of great importance to getting this approach accepted and internalised was the support of his followers, in particular his immediate subordinates. Two of these were Major Michael Calvert and Brigadier Bernard Fergusson. Calvert was running the Bush Warfare School in Burma before joining the Chindits, and it soon became clear that he had the same mindset as Wingate – reckless, contentious, eccentric, but also forward-thinking and innovative. He was willing to experiment with new techniques and methods, which shows his qualities as another 'learning leader'. Calvert then went on to command troops in the Malaya conflict (discussed in Chapter 3), where he was instrumental in both the SAS and Malayan Scouts. He openly acknowledged that he owed his swift promotion to

Wingate.[142] Bernard Fergusson also had a similar ethos, and he went on to command forces in the post-war operation in Palestine (see later), where he had mixed success. Finally, Robert Thompson, famous for his thinking on small wars and counterinsurgency in both Malaya and Vietnam, was a Chindit RAF liaison officer – undoubtedly this early experience of small wars techniques had a great influence on his views. This all shows how important *continuity* is for developing an effective approach to small wars, and particularly in reinforcing the internalisation of a small wars mindset, which leads to the evolution of a small wars culture.

As well as the support of dedicated followers, Wingate had the support of senior military figures, which was very important for the acceptance of his ideas. Both Wavell and Mountbatten, and ultimately Churchill, were supporters of Wingate and his unorthodox ideas, and even Slim, who was more of a traditionalist and was highly critical of the Chindits, said after Wingate's death, '[he] had clear vision. He could also impart his belief to others. Above all, he could adapt to his own purpose the ideas, practices and techniques of others once he was satisfied of their soundness'.[143] Mountbatten wrote after World War Two, 'It was the hardest duty in my life to agree to give the order to break up the Chindits. But now that the whole army is Chindit-minded there is no need for the Chindits. We are all Chindits now'.[144] Given the experience in Palestine over the coming years this was perhaps overly optimistic about the extent of learning that had taken place (they certainly weren't all Chindit-minded there), but it does demonstrate the degree of adaptation, especially of the *mindset* of soldiers in the British army, to focus more on small wars approaches. These two themes, of senior support and junior followers, reflect Stephen Rosen's aforementioned ideas on the reasons for military learning and innovation. He suggests the advancement of new ideas is mainly dependent on senior military figures who have strategies for innovation, who then create new promotional pathways for their subordinates to continue their thinking, while being backed by more senior political (and in this case military) figures. This is precisely what was happening during the Chindit operations. Wingate, for example, was supporting and pushing forward key officers who thought and acted like him, and

agreed with his approach and ethos, while being backed by key senior individuals such as Wavell, Mountbatten and Churchill. Following this approach, in theory at least, his ideas *should* have become embedded within British army thinking.

Unfortunately, for numerous reasons, most of Wingate's innovation and learning was to be lost after the war (only being carried on by a few individuals such as Calvert, Fergusson and Thompson). For much of the training for later Chindit missions Wingate was ill, so that not all of his ideas were understood or applied, and following his death in an air crash in Burma in 1944 many of his ideas were again misinterpreted and incorrectly implemented, leading to failures and a negative view of the Chindits. For example, the force was greatly increased in size, which detracted from some of its innovative techniques, and it was also put forward as an end in itself, whereas Wingate had envisioned its use as a tool in a greater plan. The lack of continuity following his death, and the lack of formalisation and documentation of his concepts, had a hugely detrimental effect on the transmission and institutionalisation of his methods and his philosophy, which could have been so useful in future conflicts. David Rooney comments that 'Another drawback, stemming from his death in March 1944, was that no one else in top command positions really believed in the Chindits'.[145] His supporters in the senior leadership had moved on, and those who remained were decidedly anti-Chindit. The bad reputation that Wingate and the Chindits developed in the years after World War Two may also have contributed to fewer lessons being learned and taken forward than might otherwise have been the case. The Official History of the Far East campaign is not complimentary towards Wingate,[146] and this view of Wingate was transmitted into army training and education,[147] so the process of learning positive lessons from his experiences was all but lost. It was up to individual followers of Wingate to keep his approaches and his ethos alive.

Palestine, 1945–47

Following the end of World War Two, the unrest between the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine resurfaced. This insurgency,

however, was different to the pre-World War Two problems. It was the Jewish population this time who were the instigators, and much of the insurgency took place in an urban setting. British troops were again interposed between the two sides, and tried to 'hold the ring' impartially – but it was impossible. A clear political solution that the military and police could support was obviously required, but Britain's hands were tied, and no workable political solution could be found; this was compounded by a lack of both political and public appetite for a protracted counterinsurgency campaign. Therefore, a purely defensive policy had to be adopted, which was ineffective. There was little opportunity for initiative, innovation or flexibility in approach. Amidst provocation and acts of atrocity by the Jewish insurgents, the British forces found it very difficult not to commit reprisals in retaliation.

Tactically, the British army seemed almost to have taken a step backwards, with much of the learning from the previous 100 years of small wars campaigning, especially the Irish campaign, apparently lost. Large-scale cordon and search operations were still being used, despite it having been proved time and again that small-unit operations were more effective. This was unavoidable to a certain extent, because good intelligence was so scarce. Punitive actions against the local population again led to alienation and resentment; it would appear that little had been learnt in this respect since 1919, and there was a public outcry in Britain at the continued use of detention without trial. The principle of minimum force was stressed to all troops, for example, in training directives, and they were urged to avoid provoking the local population and be sensitive towards them, but this mindset was difficult to instil in reality, with soldiers being kidnapped and acts of terrorism being committed.[148] There was a complete lack of coordination between the army and the police, and confusion over the different roles of the two forces, in part due to a lack of understanding of the situation, and (again) the view that it was simply more civil unrest, rather than a full-blown insurgency. The police in fact were 'overworked, undermanned, isolated from the Jewish community, and penetrated, compromised and intimidated by the insurgents'.[149]

Innovation and initiative, however, were to be found in some areas. Bernard Fergusson, with experience of the Chindit campaign,

was Assistant Inspector-General of the Palestine Police force, and he attempted to revive Wingate's ideas on night squads, as previously used in Palestine, and his techniques of fighting the enemy in their own way, as developed in Burma. However, late 1940s Palestine was very different both to Burma and to the situation that Wingate had found ten years before. Fergusson's intended offensive approach implied fighting terrorism with terrorism, rather than using policing actions and gaining support of locals, using 'hearts and minds' tactics. He had permission to set up a force with leaders who had previous experience in 'terrorist' activities and operating behind enemy lines during World War Two (rather than police officers with experience of intelligence-gathering in Palestine, which perhaps would have been more appropriate), who would create teams with police personnel to operate at night in civilian clothing (although few of them could speak any Hebrew!),[150] to track down insurgents. However, a major failing was that they did not have clear objectives to work towards.[151] The squads also had little training; what they did have was conducted in the countryside (while the conflict was mainly urban), and they failed to keep their operation secret. They were eventually discredited by the Farran incident, where a squad leader was accused of murder and court-martialled. He was found not guilty, but any positive lessons from the use of these squads were overshadowed by controversy, and Fergusson's reputation was damaged forever. This case shows the difficulty of trying to apply specific tactics to a new situation which was not fully understood. The 'small wars ethos' was there, but the timing and nature of its application were ill-timed.

The British were effectively defeated in Palestine in 1948, when the issue was handed over to the United Nations. In terms of small wars thinking, the British army was not focused on internal security, with the conventional, World War Two mindset prevailing (along with the major downsizing of the armed forces after the end of World War Two, as there had been post-World War One). As General Bagnall noted later, 'having just finished fighting a world war, it was hardly surprising that the British army was intellectually, organisationally and professionally unprepared to conduct a subtle politically-orientated anti-terrorist campaign'.[152] This was compounded by a lack of understanding of

the situation, with the changing relationship between Britain and the colonies yet to be realised. The complex, politically driven situation was misinterpreted and mishandled by the British, although 'the political, strategic and economic factors which determined the course of events in Palestine, were largely outside the control of the British Government'.[153] Learning was impeded by external, political factors, and the British army could not utilise fully its approach to small wars, and therefore it did not have the opportunity to evolve. There was no definite political aim that the military action could support, civil–military cooperation was resisted, and gaining the support of the local population was hardly considered.

These factors are reflected in the leadership at the time, and this may have been the key to the lack of success in Palestine. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) was Montgomery, who had developed his own distinctive approach in the conventional battles of World War Two. He had strong views on the Palestine insurgency, and intervened personally in the campaign. He wanted the army to use more force to counter the guerrilla activity and coerce the population into cooperating with the authorities; however, he did not seem to understand the implications of an aggressive policy, and he derided efforts to coordinate civil and military measures.[154] Other military leaders did have different views, understood the complex political situation and saw the effect that the heavy-handed approach was having, but they were not supported by more senior commanders, and they did not have the opportunity for their voices to be heard. At lower levels of command, leaders such as Fergusson had an opportunity to continue the development of the distinctive British approach to small wars, but their misapplication of established principles meant that they were unsuccessful in furthering the evolution of the small wars approach and in effectively fostering small wars culture in the army.

Learning by Experience

> Historical experience has probably conditioned him [an officer] not to expect a flood of assistance from Britain – there was usually little to be spared – nor to look to some sacrosanct body of

> 'doctrine' for advice: there was none. Instead, he must make do, improvise if necessary, use his imagination and initiative, relying on the skills he and the officers and men of his unit have acquired in years of training. In short, he must adapt.[155]

From the Victorian era until 1947, a legacy was established, based on a wealth of experience in imperial policing and small wars, which prepared the British army for the counterinsurgency operations they were to face in the following decades. Learning about small wars during this period was to some degree institutionalised (in formal and informal doctrine) and internalised (in actual operational practice), although these processes are difficult to trace in a linear manner – the British army appears to be good at learning and adapting *during* small wars, but poor at retaining this learning *between* conflicts. Different elements of the distinctive British approach to small wars emerged in these formative years, but they often had to be re-learned time and again. This all points to learning taking place at a shallow level but not at a deep level. Shallow (simple or single-loop) learning refers to the acquisition of knowledge and the learning of technical lessons, with the new knowledge being used if it is in the existing interests of the organisation and/or it fits with the current organisational culture. Deep (complex or double-loop) learning, on the other hand, is a far more complex process, whereby new knowledge is internalised and can lead to changes in organisational culture and interests.[156] This is summarised by Joseph Nye who states that

> Simple learning uses new information merely to adapt the means, without altering any deeper goals in the ends–means chain. The actor simply uses a different instrument to attain the same goal. Complex learning, by contrast, involves recognition of conflicts among means and goals in causally complicated situations, and leads to new priorities and trade-offs.[157]

Tactically, at a shallow level, the British army had developed over a century a distinctive approach to these small wars, with the evolution of methods such as the use of small units and flying columns, and

the recognition of importance of intelligence and working with the press. Junior ranks had become accustomed to bearing a great deal of responsibility, and the qualities of initiative, innovation and flexibility were emphasised. Tactical behaviour such as the use of small groups and mobile columns, was internalised very early on, by Sir Garnet Wolseley and in the South African War. However, it was not institutionalised even informally until Gwynn's 1934 *Imperial Policing*. The importance of intelligence was also internalised by Wolseley and in the South African War, and was informally institutionalised in Callwell's *Small Wars*, although it did not appear in formal doctrine until the 1937 version of *Duties in Aid of the Civil Power*.

Certain guiding principles had also developed during this time at a deeper, more institutional level. The minimum force principle, particularly after Amritsar, was now the foundation of the British 'way' in small wars, and cases of extreme violence were increasingly seen as being outside the bounds of acceptable behaviour. The formalisation of the principle in doctrine took longer, however, with *Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* articulating it in 1929 and Gwynn stating it in 1934. Other aspects, such as civil–military–police coordination and 'hearts and minds', had not yet become embedded as key tenets of the British army's small wars ethos. While Roberts and Kitchener hinted at the need for police cooperation and were focused on a political settlement rather than a military 'victory', these ideas did not stand the test of time in that they were not institutionalised or formalised and embedded. Initial efforts at 'hearts and minds' techniques were attempted in the inter-war years, but they too were not formalised or carried forward as best practice. The integration of military action in support of broader political aims, while seen to be important, was in practice not yet being carried out effectively. The British army's characteristic approach to small wars was evolving and gradually becoming transmitted and embedded, particularly at the tactical level, but the emerging 'small wars culture' was not yet internalised in the minds of soldiers.

The role of leadership in imperial policing has been traced in this chapter, and its influence on the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars and the emergence of a small wars culture has

been drawn out in two key areas. Firstly, the importance of continuity of experience has been demonstrated, and the chapter has shown that interruptions to the small wars experiences, such as the First and Second World Wars, can disturb the organisational learning process and disrupt the institutionalisation of approaches and methods (as shown by reference to Downie's organisational learning cycle). Military leaders who may have had innovative ideas on small wars rapidly found that their conventional war experiences had 'pushed out' their inventive thinking, and lessons were not carried forward. As noted by Ian Hamilton (whose small wars experience was overshadowed by the Dardanelles Campaign in World War One)

> we transmit so infinitesimally little that the common stock of traditional wisdom is hardly greater today than it was in the time of Alexander. It would appear indeed as if, in military circles, the art of learning by experience did not exist.[158]

For the small wars culture to become embedded there needed to be a continuity of experience without major interruptions; experience and continuity of service enabled the British approach to develop (rather than specific, formal doctrine and training), but the two conventional wars interrupted the organisational learning process, and leaders could not continue their role in the transmission of the distinctive approach to small wars.

Secondly, it has been demonstrated that effective small wars leaders need extensive support, both from senior figures and from their subordinates, if their methods and ideas are to be taken forward and embedded in military operations and practice. This is in accord with Stephen Rosen's views on the reasons for military innovation and learning, and also with Edgar Schein's ideas on how leaders embed and transmit culture.[159] Kitchener, for example, had the backing of Lord Roberts and the support of commanders such as Ian Hamilton during the South African War, which enabled certain techniques to be developed and operationalised. Both Wolseley and Roberts had their 'rings' of loyal followers, who supported their ideas and were of the same mindset. And later, Orde Wingate, despite his eccentricities, had the support

of both senior military and political figures (Wavell, Mountbatten, Churchill), and subordinates (Calvert, Fergusson, Thompson). These support mechanisms were very important for the practical application of small wars principles, and for the transmission of ideas from one conflict to the next, so that organisational learning was not lost or discontinued. This was especially important during this period since formal learning was interrupted by the two major conventional wars, and the focus of politicians and the military at the time was on these wars. These more informal support networks were therefore key to championing small wars concepts more widely and ensuring that some learning was disseminated more broadly.

The British army in 1947 was left with a legacy from a century of small wars, and leadership played an important part in putting in place and transmitting this legacy. In terms of leadership and innovation, Hamilton sums up the qualities of a commander: 'the bad general breaks the rules and can't mend them. The ordinary general takes the rules as he finds them. The extraordinary General creates rules'.[160] The next chapters introduce the three major small wars in the period after 1947 and ask whether and how 'extraordinary' leaders continued to innovate and create 'rules' for small wars, and what role they played in the institutionalisation and internalisation of the British army's unique approach to small wars.

CHAPTER 3

THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY, 1948–60

> Dear Lyttelton,
> Malaya. We must have a plan. Secondly, we must have a man. When we have a plan and a man, we shall succeed: not otherwise.
>
> Yours sincerely,
> Montgomery (F. M.)[1]

> ... the Malayan campaign demonstrates the fundamental role of leadership in inspiring an institution to embrace change: the course of the campaign changed radically during Briggs' tenure as Director of Operations and the progress thus enabled was accelerated in 1951–53, under the remarkable and inspired leadership of Templer.[2]

Between 1948 and 1960 British troops were involved in a counter-insurgency operation in Malaya, then a British colony. Communist elements of the ethnic Chinese population of Malaya[3] formed the Malayan Races Liberation Army (the MRLA – originally called the Malayan Peoples Anti British Army) and began an armed insurgency in an attempt to bring about a communist revolution and the removal of British control and European presence in Malaya. A State of Emergency was declared in June 1948, and Malayan, British

and other Commonwealth troops undertook a counterinsurgency campaign to defeat the rebellion and halt the spread of communism westwards. After a long but largely successful counterinsurgency campaign, Malaya was granted independence in 1957 through cooperation between the British and Malay governments. The insurgents had been fighting for 'colonial liberation', but now that had been granted peacefully with the consent and mutual understanding of the British, the Malay government and the Malay people, the main aim of the communist-inspired insurgency was invalidated and their cause was lost. The Malayan Emergency was declared over on 31 July 1960.

The Malayan Emergency can be seen to fall into four distinct phases. Figure 3.1 provides a timeline of which figures held which posts at which times during the Malayan Emergency. The first phase of the Emergency lasted from 1948 to 1950, and these early years did not go particularly well. The High Commissioner (initially Sir Edward Gent) and the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Malaya (General Sir Charles Boucher) viewed the insurgency merely as criminal 'bandit' activity (a common mistake in previous small wars) and hence did not focus on creating a coordinated, large-scale response to the increasing acts of violence by the Malay-Chinese communists. Stubbs describes the initial approach in Malaya as a policy of 'coercion and enforcement', which did not have the desired effect of defeating the insurgency.[4] In fact, it led to further alienation of the local population since it was essentially punitive, and had the opposite effect to that desired (as had happened in the South African War 50 years earlier and also in Ireland and Palestine). This initial approach focused on restoring law and order, and the government and military were slow to realise that the situation in Malaya was more than this, that it was an insurgency that would need to be countered by a coordinated, country-wide strategy with a clear, long-term goal. Sir Henry Gurney took over as High Commissioner in September 1948, and although he had a more progressive mindset than his predecessor, his strategies for defeating the insurgency were slow to be implemented, and still lacked coordination. During the first two years the government became increasingly isolated from the local population, especially




Figure 3.1 Timeline of figures and roles during the Malayan emergency

in the rural areas, the authorities had little intelligence which could be used to track down the insurgents, and when operations were mounted, the police, civil and military elements were disjointed and their roles, aims and overall goal were unclear. In short, little of the learning from previous small wars seemed to have been recalled and implemented in the early stages of this conflict, and the insurgents seemed to have the upper hand.

The second phase of the Malayan Emergency began in 1950, with the appointment of Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs as Director of Operations in 1950; prior to this there had not been a specific director of operations, which demonstrated that the conflict was not being taken seriously enough. It was thought that the 'bandits' could be defeated as part of 'business as usual', and that the campaign would not require any particular focus or effort. However, the creation of this post went a long way to starting to address these issues of coordination and command, and it was seen as an acknowledgement of the seriousness of the problem. Briggs served with Gurney until October 1951, when Sir Henry Gurney was killed in an ambush by the communist terrorists (CTs – the usual term for the insurgents in Malaya at the time); Briggs himself left Malaya shortly after that, in poor health. During their time working together, however, great progress was made towards putting in place a plan of action that had an integrated approach and objectives. Also key to the progression of the Emergency was a change in approach by the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) in September/October 1951; they issued directives to stop targeting the local population (since they realised that it was counterproductive), and focused attacks thereafter on security forces, the government and foreigners. During this period the Korean War broke out, which diverted British attention and resources away from Malaya but also caused the prices of tin and rubber to rise sharply, hence creating unexpected wealth in Malaya.

Following the death of Gurney and the departure of Briggs, the third phase started with the arrival of General Sir Gerald Templer as 'supremo' in February 1952. In an unprecedented move, the roles of High Commissioner and Director of Operations were combined, and Templer therefore had overall control of the government and civil

elements of the administration of Malaya, and also the army, police and other security forces that were fighting the insurgency.[5] Templer took many of the policies and proposals that Gurney and Briggs had initiated, and drove forward their implementation with vigour and dynamism. He is, of course, famous for his 'hearts and minds' approach towards the local population, discussed in more detail below. Until his departure in mid-1954, he worked tirelessly at countering the insurgency using a combination of political, civil, social, economic, military and police measures, especially with improved intelligence, and by the time he left Malaya the CTs were a shadow of their former selves. The other major development during this time was the change of government in Britain; Churchill was re-elected in October 1951, and from the time of Templer's arrival in Malaya the British government was able to communicate a clear agenda to the Malayan people of working towards an independent, self-governing nation, free from British rule.

The final and longest phase in the Malayan Emergency lasted from mid-1954 to 1960. After the departure of General Templer, the roles of High Commissioner and Director of Operations were again separated, since it was not deemed necessary for a 'supremo' to hold the role any longer. The counterinsurgency campaign had progressed significantly and the focus now moved to political and civil elements of preparing Malaya for independence, with the military and police primarily 'mopping up' the CTs, who in a weakened state had retreated deep into the jungle on the Thai border. The emphasis from 1954 to 1957 was on arranging and organising the political aspects of government for independence, which was granted on 31 August 1957. The British and Malay leaders worked together to promote self-government, democracy, elections at local and national levels, and social improvements. However, the few diehard communist insurgents who remained were still determined to continue their struggle, and the Emergency was not declared over until 1960. The CTs had become more and more elusive, avoiding contact with the security forces and living off meagre supplies in dense jungle. Vastly improved intelligence and psychological warfare operations by the British meant that there was now no hope of a communist victory in Malaya. When independence was granted, the main aim of the communist insurgency was lost, and it is

widely believed that the British and Malay government forces secured an important victory against insurgency and communism in South East Asia.

By 1945 the British army had established a legacy based on a wealth of experience in imperial policing and small wars, with a distinctive 'British approach' beginning to be internalised (through operational practice) and institutionalised (in doctrine) within the army. This characteristically British style that had started to evolve included aspects such as the principle of the minimum necessary use of force and the subordination of military activity to political aims, and tactical elements such as the use of small units, the importance of intelligence and the great responsibility placed on junior leaders. However, we saw at the end of Chapter 2 that, while the approach was evolving gradually, a 'small wars *culture*' was not yet fully embedded within the mindset of soldiers in the British army. It is this 'British approach' that will be explored further in this chapter, to analyse the role of leadership in the organisational learning process during the Malayan Emergency, and the relationship between military leadership and the evolution of the British army's 'small wars culture' during this period. Initially, this chapter explores the role of leadership in the transmission and embedding of culture, before investigating the qualities and characteristics of leadership involved (and their importance), and the conditions that were in place for the leaders, in terms of their levels of support and their continuity of experience. Finally, conclusions are drawn as to the extent of organisational adaptation and cultural evolution in the British army during the Malayan Emergency, and in particular the role that leadership played in this process.

The Role of Leadership in Cultural Evolution

Malaya is often described as a model counterinsurgency operation, in which all the elements of defeating such an insurgency came together and the British were successful in their approach to countering communist terrorism. Their past experiences of imperial policing and small wars meant that the British army had already developed a distinctive approach to these types of counterinsurgency operations. But how did

this British approach continue to evolve, and how did the British army's organisational culture develop during this conflict? In particular, how did the *leaders* influence the organisational learning process in Malaya, and how did they transmit and embed a particular 'small wars' organisational culture within the British army? As already discussed, elements of the British army's approach to small wars were beginning to evolve, but a 'small wars culture' had not had enough time to become embedded by the start of the Malayan Emergency. Edgar Schein states that '[the] dynamic processes of culture creation and management are the essence of leadership and make one realize that leadership and culture are two sides of the same coin'.[6] Following Schein's model on the embedding and transmission of culture by leaders,[7] as discussed in Chapter 1, it can be said that leaders maximise their role in transmitting and embedding a certain organisational culture by

- systematically paying attention to and controlling certain elements of the organisational approach;
- the way they react to critical incidents and crises;
- how they allocate scarce resources;
- what they put forward as a role model, what they teach, and how they allocate rewards.

In other words, in the context of military leaders involved in undertaking small wars, a certain approach and culture can be promoted by commanders through what they focus on, how they manage critical situations, what they channel resources into, and what they promote as the best practice approach. In this section I explore just this: did the leaders in Malaya transmit and embed the organisational culture that was emerging in previous conflicts, and if so, how? What did the leaders focus on and pay attention to? How did they react to critical incidents and crises? What did they promote, teach and put forward as best practice? Further below I consider the leadership at different points in the Malayan Emergency, and examine the influence it had in internalising (through operational practice) the emerging distinctive British approach to small wars, and the associated small wars culture

within the British army. Small wars doctrine is also explored in this section, in order to analyse the institutionalisation of the small wars culture.

Phase One: 1948–50

In the first phase of the Emergency, from 1948 to 1950, there appeared to be little understanding of the most appropriate way to address an insurgency, and not much of the learning from previous small wars seemed to be drawn on and implemented. In an interim training report from the Far East Land Forces (FARELF) training centre for September 1948 to January 1949, its commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Walker, comments on the poor quality of troops and their lack of basic skills, and observes that their training had fallen dramatically since operations in Burma only a few years earlier. Little of the learning from previous jungle operations had been passed on.[8] Military leaders such as Lieutenant General Boucher, GOC Malaya up to 1950, continued to advocate the use of large-scale sweeps – phrases such as 'thrashing about' and 'crashing around' in the jungle are often used to describe the early stages of the conflict – and they also found it difficult to give responsibility to junior ranks.[9] Even Briggs continued to advocate large sweeps initially, which was surprising given his experience in Burma.[10] Leaders in these early years of the conflict were still clinging to a conventional warfare mentality and culture (see also Annex B). Tactically, however, junior leaders on the ground were beginning to realise that a different approach was required, and they were 'learning how to fight and defeat the insurgents' through the use of small groups and tracking techniques.[11] However, since this approach was not being promoted by the military leaders, it was more of an ad hoc development; for it to become embedded in culture required the more senior leadership to champion it as the best way of conducting the counterinsurgency operation.

Since there was no Director of Operations at this stage, there was no-one in a role to focus specifically on the problems of countering the insurgency through coordinated means. Instead, the leaders who were in place focused in an uncoordinated fashion on the insurgents

as criminals and bandits, with the military not wanting to act in support of the police, and the colonial government showing little interest in dealing with the insurgency with a sense of urgency. There was also a real lack of intelligence information in the early years of the Emergency; intelligence-gathering was not coordinated, and there was little emphasis on interpreting it in order to target specific insurgent groups. This meant in turn that in the eyes of the security forces everyone was a suspect, resulting in feelings of distrust and resentment among the local population. This was a very similar situation to that at the beginning of the conflict in Northern Ireland in 1969: antagonism between police and army led to a lack of information and intelligence sharing; both the police and the army set up intelligence-gathering mechanisms, in competition with each other; there was a considerable lack of trust; and it took a long time for joint intelligence to be successful.[12] The collective punishment and deportation of the Chinese population in Malaya was counterproductive, and alienated the local population at a time when their support was crucial.[13] These early years of the Emergency were definitely not successful, and the same mistakes were made there as had been made in Ireland and Palestine previously. Accordingly, the British military culture that seemed to be emerging after all the small wars experience of the previous 100 years did not have much opportunity to evolve further.

One exception to this lack of progress was the attitude taken by Sir Henry Gurney, as High Commissioner: this was a civilian leadership role, however, rather than a military one. Gurney introduced financial rewards for surrendered insurgents; this demonstrated a higher degree of understanding of the situation, in that the wider campaign was not about killing an enemy or a military victory, but about proving that the government could offer more to the people than the communists could, and improving their way of life. He also brought in compulsory ID cards, which were effective in separating the insurgents from their popular support. Gurney initiated the resettlement programme that was to gain momentum in future years; the Chinese squatter population was removed from their land and relocated in purpose-built villages, protected with guards and barbed wire but also equipped with schools, clinics, social clubs and other elements of a progressive,

inclusive Malay infrastructure. This was forward-thinking on the part of Gurney, who realised that without the support of the local population the insurgents would find it increasingly difficult to sustain their campaign. At a press conference in 1950 Gurney noted that

> Regulations providing for the imposition of collective punishments in areas where active non-cooperation is encountered are also being issued. These must be applied with the very greatest care since they involve the objectionable principle of the punishment of the innocent. But as I have said in the past it is for the innocent to distinguish themselves from the guilty and under conditions existing in this country today, which are those of war in all but name, they are liable to suffer if they do not do so. I fully recognise that such measures are wholly ineffective unless they are balanced by constructive progress in the fields of social and economic improvement . . .[14]

Gurney was also in favour of using the army to wage an essentially political war, in support of the police and the civil authorities. This was very difficult to implement early on in the conflict,[15] since there was little coordination across the three elements and opinions differed regarding what role the military should have. Gurney had the right mindset for addressing this small war, but lacked the impetus to drive his solutions forward, and, as a civilian, he could not really influence the military and their organisational learning process. In this first phase, therefore, the actions taken by leaders to counter the insurgency were ineffective; few identified the causes of the failure to make progress against the insurgents, and they did not seek out more effective, alternative approaches.

Phase Two: 1950–52

The second phase of the Malayan Emergency, from 1950 to the end of 1951, was characterised by the arrival of Lieutenant General Briggs as Director of Operations. The introduction of this role brought some well-needed focus on seriously countering the growing insurgency, and

a figure who could act in a coordinating role for all the different elements involved. Briggs did recognise that different actions were required in order for the counterinsurgency campaign to be successful. He is remembered for the 'Briggs Plan', which laid out how the government was going to tackle the insurgency across the political, military, police and civil spheres, and started to bring out some consensus on alternative solutions for defeating the insurgency. Under the overall long-term aim of implementing proper civil government, its main elements were the formation of committees which brought together the army, police and civil elements of the administration at various levels, from national to local (with the army definitely in support of the police); the creation of an integrated intelligence committee, which brought together army and police intelligence; and the continuation of the resettlement (New Village) programme with an increased sense of urgency, to prevent the CTs receiving food and support from the local population.

From a military point of view, the process of resettling the vast Chinese population involved skills rarely required in conventional warfare situations; the soldiers needed to be tactful, understanding, patient and diplomatic, working together with others such as the police, Red Cross, doctors, social services, civil administrators and translators. These were small-wars skills that were to prove invaluable in many future conflicts, from Cyprus to Northern Ireland, and more recently in campaigns such as those in Bosnia and Afghanistan. Briggs also concentrated on decentralising the military decision-making process, and recognised the importance of junior leaders, as recounted by Harry Miller, a *Straits Times* journalist. Briggs is quoted as saying to him:

> They'll [senior commanders] have to reconcile themselves to war being fought by junior commanders down to lance-corporals who will have responsibility to make decisions on the spot if necessary. We've got to look for the communists now, send small patrols after them, harass them. Flexibility of operations in the jungle must be the keynote.[16]

Here was a military leader who was beginning to refocus the counterinsurgency effort on the triumvirate of civil–military–police; he

recognised and re-established many of the important elements of small wars campaigning that had been discovered in previous campaigns, but had unfortunately been lost. However, there was still more to be done: Lieutenant General Briggs seemed to be aware that the tempo of the counterinsurgency campaign needed to be increased, but lacked the influence to change the mindset of the administration. He was also aware that a coordinated intelligence machinery was still lacking, which was not helped by infighting within the police between former Palestinian and Malay officers, and personality clashes at the highest levels.[17] The minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting in November 1950 which Briggs attended show his frustration with the progress being made in Malaya. They state that efforts were falling 'far short of requirements', there was a lack of qualified administrators, deficiencies in the police, no sense of urgency, high insurgent morale, and low civilian morale. Recommendations were made to put Malaya on more of a war footing.[18]

In his brief time as Director of Operations between Briggs and Templer, General Lockhart also noted that a change of attitude was required by the government and authorities so that they were focused fully on the Emergency, with a sense of urgency, and with the full cooperation and coordination of all departments, and he also called for one overall commander in Malaya, a wish that would soon be granted.[19] Lockhart also commented in a memo to Field Marshal Slim on the lack of coordination in Malaya, and that there was no sense of urgency, no 'war-time mentality', no 'war-time tempo' or 'war-time methods'.[20] Speaking later, of the period after Briggs left Malaya and before he took over following the assassination of Sir Henry Gurney, Templer says that 'by then, Malaya lacked any sense of direction and there was a very deep-seated feeling of despair throughout the country'.[21] This was something that would be addressed by a change in leadership.

Phase Three: 1952–54

The most crucial element of the third phase of the Malayan Emergency, from 1952 to 1954, was the arrival of General Templer as a 'supremo' combining the roles of High Commissioner and Director of Operations.

Building on Gurney's and Briggs's fairly solid but relatively static foundations, he was given a directive on his arrival, which stressed working towards Malayan independence, promoting a united Malayan nation, citizenship, and economic balance, the restoration of law and order, removing barriers to progress and bringing freedom from fear.[22] Templer himself saw his major problems, from a political perspective, as being 'Organisation for and timing of elections at the various levels; land settlement and ownership; citizenship; education'.[23] His energetic approach, as will be seen in the next section, reinvigorated the counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya, and his emphasis on fighting the insurgency on all fronts (political, social, military, economic and so on) and the importance of a long-term political solution, made all the difference in turning the campaign around.[24] Templer epitomised organisational learning and recognised where the gaps in performance against the insurgents were and how they could be addressed. As noted by Noel Barber, '[Templer] never forgot that this was a civilians' war and was showing the greatest percipience in the field of politics; he not only galvanized a lumbering administration, but he had such charm and shrewdness that he quickly improved relations between the government and the Malay Sultans.'[25] In almost all of his press statements, he stresses the importance of all-encompassing solutions, and focuses on taking an holistic approach to defeating the communist insurgency in Malaya. For example, in June 1952 he said

> I should like it to be clearly understood that in Malaya we are conducting the campaign against Communism on all fronts. We are fighting not only on the military front, but on the political, social and economic fronts as well. In spite of the continuing drain on Malaya's resources which the Emergency entails we are making progress on all these fronts.

He places as much emphasis on social and economic aspects and local government as he does on military ones:

> The constructive side of our work may not appear as newsworthy as accounts of the work against the terrorists, but it is equally

> important. I should add also, that in the battle for the minds of the people, a considerably [sic] expansion and improvement in the channels through which information propaganda and knowledge are disseminated to them is required.[26]

And a month later, he reemphasised this: 'I have always stressed, as you know, that we must fight this business as much on the economic and spiritual sides as on the purely military one'.[27] Most of this particular statement focuses on economic, governmental and social issues rather than military ones, which reflects Templer's emphasis on political solutions and effective civil government, rather than 'winning' militarily. This is an important element of the emerging, distinctive British approach to small wars, to which Templer paid considerable attention in Malaya, thus helping to transmit and embed this organisational culture.[28]

Templer is also famously quoted as saying in November 1952 that 'the shooting side of the business is only 25% of the trouble and the other 75% lies in getting the people of this country behind us'.[29] Another important basic principle of the British approach in Malaya for Templer was the improvement of conditions for the local population, and the addressing of their legitimate grievances. Although it had been recognised in many previous small wars that alienating and punishing the population was counterproductive, the lack of specific intelligence in Malaya in the first few years meant that this was in fact exactly what happened. Although Templer did still use methods such as the collective punishment (food denial, strict curfews and so forth) of whole villages for not providing information on local insurgent groups (which in fact proved to be quite successful),[30] he also paid attention to reforming society and advancing development in the rural areas of Malaya, in order to show that the government could offer more than the communists, and to prepare them for independence. In his December 1952 press conference he stated that 'the population's greater feeling of security is due in part to our steady progress against the enemy and in part to the many reforms the Government has introduced'.[31] He also often discussed at length the importance of youth groups, adult literacy, courses in civics, education, elections

and citizenship.[32] Travelling the country and visiting local communities was an important part of Templer's approach, and he often went to see schools, police posts, mines, army units, plantations, shops and all other elements of society. While Gurney had often been seen as remote and removed from the population, Templer quickly became known to the locals, and made a real effort to understand the Malay people.[33] He also concentrated on improving the living conditions in the New Villages,[34] stressing local responsibility and ownership; this was definitely a modern, progressive attitude, and not the imperialist approach that the Malay people were used to from previous administrations. As a Brigadier Lambert noted to General Stockwell, GOC Malaya, in 1953

> The scheme to assist Villages and Schools in the neighbourhood of Kuala Lumpur began to be put into effect in November 1952. Its primary objective was to win the confidence of the people and to allay their suspicions of the Army in particular and of the Government, and to encourage co-operation between all races living or stationed in this Country.[35]

Templer himself notes that he was able to resettle so many people without losing their support because they could offer more (in the New Villages) than the Communists.[36] This was, of course, all part of his famous 'hearts and minds' approach,[37] which was to become such a key part of the British army's approach to small wars in the future, and which was emerging as an important element of the British army's small wars culture, which Templer was instrumental in transmitting and embedding.

General Templer introduced another major initiative in the battle against insurgency in Malaya. He established a process whereby areas of the country which had been free of insurgent activity were declared 'white', and restrictions that were imposed on that area, such as curfews and food rationing, were lifted. This gave an incentive to the local population, to distance themselves from the CTs, and to provide information to the government forces that would ensure that their area remained clear from insurgent activity.

Another of Templer's main areas of attention was on intelligence, which had been described in 1950 by Briggs as 'our "Achilles Heel" and worse than that of the bandits'.[38] Based on his past experience (which is discussed later) Templer recognised the importance of coordinated intelligence machinery, with a Special Branch centrally coordinating information-gathering and analysis, and passing it to the military to act on specifically. This more specific intelligence meant that smaller unit operations could be conducted, which were far more successful. As Templer said, 'Certainly the soldiers should have realised much earlier in the proceedings that "jungle bashing" on false or no information was a complete waste of time and energy ...'.[39] Very high rewards were also offered to surrendered enemy personnel (SEP), who were then used both to gather intelligence and also to lead the security forces back to the insurgent camps. This demonstrated that the approach in Malaya was not about killing the enemy but about sending a message and winning over the local population, leading to a more enduring solution. As Richard Stubbs noted

> Underpinning all Templer's actions was his personal philosophy about how to conduct the counter-guerrilla campaign ... First ... Templer believed that it was wrong to separate the peacetime activities of the Government from the Emergency activities ... Secondly, Templer considered the guerrilla war to be a battle for the hearts and minds of Malaya's population.[40]

In short, Templer always ensured that the army knew it was, and was comfortable with, operating in support of the civil authority and the police, and that the support of the local population was one of the most important parts of fighting a small war, along with good intelligence and a clear long-term political goal. Soldiers would have observed this approach from Templer – a military man but focusing on far more than the military – and have noted how well this approach worked in this counterinsurgency operation. By focusing on and paying attention to these crucial aspects of small wars, Templer provided a template for the evolving British approach to small wars, and the

organisational culture of the British army conducting small wars continued to develop. This was reflected in both the doctrinal guidance produced at the time, and in the training of soldiers in Malaya, which is discussed later.

Phase Four: 1954–60

The final years of the Emergency were focused far more on the political elements of the campaign, preparing Malaya for independence and establishing a functioning civil government. From a military point of view, the security forces pressed forward using the approach that Briggs and Templer had put in place in the preceding years. Once the onus was put on more junior leaders to take responsibility for conducting small-scale operations, with better intelligence, they too began to build on the years of tradition of conducting small wars, and adapted their methods accordingly. The 'mopping up' of the remaining communist insurgents, however, was not a quick or an easy task, and for the final six years of the Emergency progress was frustratingly slow, with the guerrillas pushed further into the jungle, making them more difficult to find, fight and defeat.[41] It was important in this final stage that both the High Commissioner (Sir Donald MacGillivray), and the Director of Operations (first Bourne then Bower), had worked with Templer, and understood his approach, supported it and continued it after his departure. This ensured that the organisational learning process was maintained and that the British army's approach to small wars continued to be internalised within the mindset and ethos of its soldiers.

Doctrine, Training and the Institutionalisation of Learning

In addition to being internalised through operational practice, the army's approach to small wars was also transmitted and embedded through written means. Edgar Schein proposes that one way that leaders transmit and embed culture is through what they teach and what they put forward as best practice;[42] this could be both practical

teaching, and doctrinal or academic teaching, which represents the institutionalisation of military culture.

So, in this context, what is doctrine? Doctrine is a guide to the manner in which military operations should be conducted, while providing room for initiative (which is a key aspect of the British way in warfare). One of the most useful definitions of doctrine is that which NATO currently uses: 'fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative, but requires judgement in application'.[43] In short, 'doctrine is the bridge between thought and action. It interprets the higher conceptualisation of war, embodied in strategic theories and operational plans, into working guidelines for action'.[44] Military doctrine is seen to be guidance on how to think about operations, not a prescriptive list of instructions on how to conduct them, and should allow for flexibility and adaptability. In terms of doctrine as a representation of organisational culture, Schein makes an important point in noting that at the most visible level, an organisation's documentation epitomises 'the very tangible overt manifestations [of culture] that one can see and feel'.[45] In the military, doctrine is one of these observable cultural artefacts, which articulates the army's beliefs and values, along with its ethos and guiding principles, in this case for small wars. Values and norms are perpetuated through these cultural artefacts (such as doctrine), and leaders have an important role to play in this process; they have a responsibility for driving forwards what is considered to be best practice, by focusing on certain key elements and through role modelling, and they are influential in what is considered to be appropriate doctrine.

Generic Doctrine for Small Wars, 1948–60

In Chapter 2, the British army's doctrine for small wars was explored up to 1945. Informal doctrine, such as Callwell's *Small Wars* (1912) and Gwynne's *Imperial Policing* (1934), had been written over the years, reflecting the British army's experience in colonial internal security roles; however, there was a dearth of official doctrine for small wars above the tactical level. In 1949 (early on in the Malayan Emergency), the existing official formal pamphlets *Notes on Imperial Policing* and

Duties in Aid of the Civil Power (covered in Chapter 2) were combined into *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power*, which covered the 'maintenance or restoration of internal peace in British Colonial dependencies or in an occupied country' and the 'restoration of law and order by military means when other methods have failed'.[46] The emphasis in this pamphlet was on

- the importance of working with the civilian and police authorities: 'there must be a readiness to see and respect the advice of civil and police authorities. The establishment of mutual confidence between the civil, the police and the military authorities at all levels is of the first importance';[47]
- understanding the local situation: 'Loyal law-abiding elements of the population must receive the consideration which is due to them: particularly when they are wavering, for too much strain might drive them to join the extremists';[48]
- not using more force than is necessary: 'no more force shall be applied than the situation demands', the 'attainment of the aim with the minimum use of force'.[49]

This reflects a degree of organisational learning from earlier conflicts and internal security operations, and represents the evolving small wars culture. These principles and values were particularly relevant in Malaya, where cooperation between the triumvirate, and 'hearts and minds' methods, were so important. That this 1949 document states them clearly as best practice ties in with the leadership improvements in Malaya that led to the more successful conduct of the campaign, which in turn embedded these values further into the culture of the British army at the time.

Four fundamental principles that the commander should follow were also listed in this doctrine:

- necessity (justification);
- prevention (not coercion or punishment);
- minimum force (with an immediate aim);
- impartiality (within the law).[50]

Other fundamental tenets were also articulated; these were to understand the following:

- the relationship with the civil government;
- the background to the unrest;
- who the dissident elements are;
- the local topography and the importance of security.[51]

The importance of having sound intelligence was emphasised, as was the necessity for daily conferences between military, civilian and police commanders.[52] Other aspects of the British approach to small wars were evident: the point is made that 'outrages by one side or another will sorely try their [the commanders'] impartiality, but they must remain impartial';[53] and aspects of dealing with the media were also covered in a section on 'Relations with the Press', where it was emphasised that not only the public relations officers, but also the senior commander, should liaise with the press, and all troops should know how to handle the media – 'great harm might quickly be done by an unwise, unimaginative and ignorant handling of the press'.[54] It is clear to see how relevant these principles were to the Malaya campaign, and this formal doctrine, along with the promotion of these principles as best practice by the military leadership in Malaya, would surely have embedded these small wars values and methods within the ethos of the soldiers there.

The cycle of learning about small wars, and the further institutionalisation of this learning in doctrine, is evident as the decade progressed. All three conflicts (Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus) were under way concurrently in 1955 and 1956, conflict-specific tactical level pamphlets had been produced by 1954 for both the Malaya and Kenya campaigns (see later), and in 1956, the formal small wars doctrine, *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power*, was superseded by *Keeping the Peace (Duties in Aid of the Civil Power)*, which drew on the Malaya (and Kenya) campaigns (although it was remarkably similar to the previous, 1949 version). Much of the earlier doctrine had been proven valid by the practical experience gained since 1949, and the existing principles of necessity, prevention, minimum force and

impartiality were still stressed.[55] The focus had shifted slightly to reflect learning from recent campaigns, with more made of the importance of civilian oversight ('the primary duty of preserving law and order rests with the civil authority. A commander should therefore in all cases where it is practicable place himself under the direction of the civil authority')[56] and a greater emphasis on decolonisation and self-government as overarching objectives.

It is interesting to note that collective punishment is presented as a permissible and indeed desirable course of action, as is food denial/control and the use of curfews,[57] but it is stressed that 'it must be made clear to everyone, that any inconvenience or hardship caused to local inhabitants are not being inflicted with punitive intent, but that they are a necessity in order to be able to root out bad elements'.[58] It can of course be debated whether this is merely paying lip service to increasing ethical and moral concerns, or whether it is a practical and effective approach. However, it is evident that this updated doctrine represents a clear institutionalisation of the evolving approach to small wars and the associated organisational values and culture. In terms of the relevance of this updated doctrine to the ongoing conflict in Malaya, the increased emphasis on political solutions and working together with the civil authorities is particularly telling, since this was exactly what was being learnt and implemented on the ground. The small wars culture was being transmitted and embedded, internalised in operational practice and institutionalised in doctrine.

Generic Military Education

Culture is something taught to members of a group as the correct way to approach the problems that they face. Doctrine, which represents an institutionalisation of evolving organisational culture, was also disseminated throughout the army via training and education. Attending the Army Staff College at Camberley was an important step in the career development of many officers, and what they learnt there was influential for the continued development of their military ethos. As early as 1950, notes from a conference held by the GOC Malaya were

distributed to training establishments, including the Staff College (and the School of Infantry), by the Director General of Military Training.[59] Although still in the early, less successful stage of the conflict, this conference was a means 'whereby knowledge gained by experience of actual operations could be pooled for the benefit of all',[60] and it covered areas such as the importance of intelligence and information, working with the police, and developing local knowledge. Mike Calvert (discussed in Chapter 2, and mentioned later in this chapter also) spoke at this conference, about the value of small patrols and other jungle tactics, such as well thought out and careful patrolling, and ambushes. The conference continued with a discussion on implementing the Briggs plan, including elements such as the value of cooperation with the civil authorities, knowing the local people and cooperating with the police. The conference notes conclude with the GOC emphasising the need for 'perseverance, persistence and patience' in conducting operations in Malaya.[61] The distribution of these conference notes from Malaya to the army's educational establishments is one method by which the evolving small wars principles were being transmitted from operations (where they were being developed) to the wider army.

The 1950 staff course in general, however, was very much focused on conventional warfare. The Military History section of the course was based around the Napoleonic Wars, the American Civil War, the Boer War to World War One (1898–1918), and World War Two. However, the 'Boer War to World War One' element focused on the Russo-Japanese war and World War One, and nothing in the reading list, and only two books in the bibliography, covered the South African War (along with biographies of Lords Wolseley, Roberts and Kitchener), with no coverage of any events between the two World Wars.[62] On one hand this is not surprising given the recent experience of World War Two and the outbreak of the Cold War, but on the other it is slightly unusual given the strong history of imperial policing by the British army. A section of the course was also spent on jungle warfare, with two hours of discussions and a two-day exercise, based on Burma and the South West Pacific, against a Japanese enemy.[63] This section does seem to be useful to a certain extent (commenting on how there are no fronts in jungle warfare, and the importance of junior leaders and initiative), but was very brief,

and inappropriate in places (noting the effectiveness of tanks in the jungle, undertaking standard outflanking moves, and confining movement to tracks).[64] The tactical exercise appears superficial, based on calculating the number of pack animals required for certain operations.

The Internal Security (IS) part of the course was four days long, comprising a 45-minute demonstration on the dispersal of an unlawful assembly (based on the Amritsar incident, covered in Chapter 2); a one-hour lecture on Malaya; an hour-and-a-half syndicate discussion; a lecture on IS operations in Palestine; and a day-and-a-half exercise (based on a breakdown of civil order in the West Indies). A positive point to note is that *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* (the 1949 doctrine discussed earlier) was issued to all students, thus providing a link between doctrine and education.[65] One element of the British approach to small wars was made clear: the Introduction to Internal Security and Civil Defence notes for students clearly defines the principle of minimum force, as 'no more force is used than is absolutely necessary to achieve the object, which force must vary according to the circumstances of each particular case [sic]',[66] and this principle is also stressed in the directing staff (DS) notes on the Imperial Policing doctrine. However, some short-sightedness is demonstrated by the directing staff, in terms of making the most of the lessons learnt process, since their notes say that

> Students will be to some extent prejudiced by their own personal experiences of IS ops, eg, PALESTINE and MALAYA. Please emphasise that every country in which these ops have taken place has its own particular problems, which may NOT apply elsewhere. All are intensely interesting, but the aim of the Staff College instr is to teach gen principles only.[67]

Student feedback on this course noted that, although they thought too much time was allocated to the exercise on Internal Security, they did suggest that 'the ex [sic] should include a problem on the IS aspects of guerrilla attacks'. The staff college did not accept this suggestion, saying

> Not agreed. Our aim in this Ex is to examine and discuss typical IS problems within the Commonwealth. Defence against Guerrilla

> attacks, as in Malaya today, is not typical of IS generally, but special and peculiar to the country and the conditions …[68]

The Assistant Commandant's Conference did, however, concur that the Internal Security section did need to be more relevant, saying that a 'more topical lecture on IS overseas [is] to be substituted for "Internal Security in Palestine" '.[69] Out of 19 volumes of records for the 1950 staff course, half of one volume is on internal security operations, and a quarter of another is on jungle warfare, which shows a lack of emphasis on 'small wars' in military education at this time.

The staff course did not change much over the next five years. The Cold War had of course progressed (with the advent of the H-bomb), but a majority of the 1955 course was, predictably, devoted to non-nuclear but conventional warfare. The Military History part of the course remained as it was in 1950, and the Jungle Warfare section was still based on Burma. However, by 1955 an important addition had been made to this section: an appendix was included on 'Anti-Guerrilla Operations', which was based on notes from HQ Malaya. This addendum contained important notes on army/police cooperation and intelligence (at all levels), isolating the guerrilla from the population, and obtaining information from the local population, along with noting that the guerrilla as an opponent was different to the Japanese (in terms of being an insurgent, avoiding battle and attacking civilians).[70] Principles of Anti-Guerrilla Operations are also articulated:

(a) To win for ourselves the cooperation of the civilian population and thus deny it to the guerrillas
(b) To prevent supplies of arms, ammunition, food and medical supplies from reaching the guerrillas
(c) To set up an efficient intelligence system with a widespread net to give us information on guerrilla hideouts, their movements and their control organisations
(d) To take active military measures to rout out the guerrillas, keep them hunted until they are brought to bay and killed.[71]

Unfortunately, there are no directing staff notes on this appendix, so it is not known whether it was actually discussed, or merely handed out to students and 'filed'. However, these notes do provide evidence of an important link between the evolution of methods and principles in practice during campaigns (being driven by leaders), the development of doctrine, and broader military education.

The Internal Security part of the 1955 course had been updated to include a lecture on Kenya and a paper on Malaya (and the 1949 Imperial Policing doctrine was still issued), but the same amount of time was spent on IS as had been in 1950, and there was no opportunity to go into any detail on either campaign.[72] The principle of minimum force was again emphasised, and the paper on Malaya (1953/54), included as an appendix, showed lessons being passed on from operational practice, in stating that

> Although it is on the 'shooting war' that public attention is normally focused, it must not be forgotten that, side by side with the anti terrorist operations in Malaya, an equally great, or greater, though less spectacular, battle is being fought for the hearts and minds of the people of the country. These two battles inevitably impinge on one another and, in this peculiar type of warfare, operations can not be regarded as a purely military concern. All operations inevitably become affairs in which the Police and Civil Administration are involved and have their contribution to make in addition to the soldiers.[73]

It is also noted that the Emergency Regulations should be used with discretion and relaxed wherever possible, since the opposition will exploit the discontent caused by heavy restrictions. It is explained that hearts and minds can be won by working towards self-government, improving conditions and extolling the merits of the government. Finally, 'The Principles' of internal security operations are articulated, which cover the coordination between the triumvirate of civil–military–police, the importance of intelligence, and winning hearts and minds. [74] Unfortunately, students are again warned not to be prejudiced by their own recent experiences of small

wars, and the directing staff are warned to 'keep discussions away from these two theatres'.[75]

In an interesting link between operations, doctrine and education, it is stated in the notes for the directing staff that

> The pamphlet IMPERIAL POLICING and DUTIES IN AID OF THE CIVIL POWER is still the official guide to IS, and covers fully most of its aspects. Certain policies and methods not covered in the pamphlet have been employed recently in MALAYA and KENYA, but as yet they are not accepted as official doctrine, which should be followed in the many and varied IS situations met with throughout the world.[76]

Of course, as discussed earlier, this doctrine was replaced the following year, having drawn on the experiences in both Malaya and Kenya. In general, however, there was little linkage between the anti-guerrilla operations section of the jungle warfare part of the course, and the anti-terrorist operations element of the internal security component.

By the end of 1955, the army had realised that the amount of time spent on educating soldiers (and especially officers at the Staff College) about counterinsurgency and imperial policing should be greatly increased. The C-in-C East Africa, who was then occupied against the Mau Mau in Kenya (see Chapter 4), recommended that

> staff officers should be trained to co-operate with and understand the problems of colonial administration and police, and that far more time should be given at The Staff College, Joint Services Staff College and the Imperial Defence College to preparing officers for colonial type operations. In particular the lessons of KOREA, MALAYA and KENYA should be studied.[77]

The Commandant of the Staff College received these recommendations and acted on them – he wrote to the Under Secretary of State at the War Office saying that

> The 1955 Staff College Course contained very little instruction on this subject [army requirements for Imperial Policing

> Operations]. As a result of recent revisions the 1956 course contains considerably more. The breakdown of instruction on this subject is given at Annex [sic], and amounts to a total of 41½ hours . . .
>
> The importance of these types of operations are fully appreciated, and the syllabus now planned is designed to give students a thorough grounding in the problems and methods of dealing with them.[78]

The enclosed annex showed that along with discussions and lectures on duties in aid of the civil power, guerrilla warfare, psychological warfare, Malaya, Kenya, and press relations, exercises would also be held covering five and a half hours based on Cyprus, and eight hours on both Kenya and Malaya.[79] This demonstrates the concrete link between operations (where small wars leaders were transmitting methods and practices), the developing small wars doctrine (discussed above), and education within the broader military establishment.

In addition to this, the details of the 1957 staff course provide an insight into the focus on small wars taken by the military establishment. Despite an understandable emphasis on the Cold War and conventional warfare at the time, coverage of the decolonisation counterinsurgency operations, and imperial policing in general, was comprehensive. The third stage of the course, 'Cold War 3', covered imperial policing when a State of Emergency had been declared, for example, in Malaya, and again stressed some of the key tenets of small wars, such as civil–military–police cooperation, the importance of intelligence, and the 'battle of hearts and minds'.[80] Exercise DRUM BEAT was based on the situation in Kenya in 1956, and its 'main lessons' were as follows:

(a) Importance of intelligence and the need for good cooperation between military and police systems.
(b) Importance of proper relations at all levels between administration, police and military.
(c) Importance of methodical and realistic training before and during periods of operations.[81]

This document also notes that the Mau Mau handbook (which is described in Chapter 4), was to be distributed to all students, which shows the transmission of conflict-specific doctrine to a broader military audience. Exercise ORANG UTAN was based on the Malaya campaign, and aimed to give the students an idea of the problems of jungle warfare and how counterinsurgency operations were to be conducted there (for example working with the local police and home guard).[82] Another piece of knowledge transfer can be demonstrated by the book *Guerilla Warfare* written by C. N. M. Blair in 1957. The Director General of Military Training, Lieutenant General Cassels (who went on to become Director of Operations in Malaya in 1957, and CGS in 1965) wrote in his foreword to this book: 'I commend it to the attention of all officers'.[83] Despite mainly being about the use of guerrilla forces by allied forces in conflicts (such as in Yugoslavia in World War Two), it also provided an overview of lessons learnt during the early stages of the Malayan campaign (such as the value of good intelligence, and working with the police).

By 1958 the staff course had developed along with world events. The Internal Security part of the course now lasted nine days, with further coverage of the campaigns in Cyprus and Algeria (along with Malaya), and the focus on Kenya was reduced (the lecture on Mau Mau was retained but the exercise DRUM BEAT was dropped). The link between doctrine and education is again clear, as the Internal Security programme directs that the new, updated manual *Keeping the Peace* (as discussed earlier) should be brought to all discussions and exercises on the IS course.[84] It is referred to throughout the course notes and students are told to read the entire manual, with certain sections in particular being highlighted for greater attention. The course notes also outline the aims of both communist- and nationalist-inspired revolts and revolutions, and highlight that, although every situation is different, 'experience has shown that certain principles remain constant throughout all of them. A common doctrine for training, command and control and conduct of operations had emerged.'[85] The notes comprehensively cover these principles, including the importance of junior leadership, intelligence gaining the support of the local population, and close cooperation between the army, police and civil authorities.

The 'peaceable' elements of internal security are also detailed, which include maintaining good relations with the local population and military assistance to restore essential services, and the change from 'jungle bashing' to patience and acting on good information.[86]

Three annexes were included, on Cyprus, Malaya and Kenya respectively, and students were given written exercises to do on the pattern of revolutionary war, to be illustrated with reference to those three cases, with another question specifically on working with a local police force. There was also another question that the directing staff were encouraged to ask students to discuss, which covered cooperation between the triumvirate and the organisation of command and control. Exercise BISHOP'S MOVE, based on Cyprus, was three days long and demonstrated an urban operation where civil–military–police cooperation at all levels was strongly emphasised; exercise ORANG UTAN was updated, and students were – at last – asked to draw on their experiences in Malaya in conducting the assignment.

This all shows a significant degree of learning from experience, and the concrete relationships between the 'best practice' that leaders were transmitting on operations, the evolving small wars doctrine, and military education across the army as a whole. At the end of the year, the feedback reflected recent developments – it was suggested that the Cyprus-based exercise be updated to reflect the current situation with more emphasis on 'the unity of the Civil Administration, the Police and the Services and on the urgency of operations'.[87] A new requirement was also expressed, proposing that

> Students should have an intimate knowledge of the different techniques involved in 'Keeping the Peace' in various political situations and in the different countries where trouble may occur. They must also acquire a sound background knowledge of the Communist techniques in subversion so that they will be able to plan in advance the necessary type and scale of treatment required to prevent disorders from occurring or to quell them when they occur. This will require an understanding of the way in which psychological warfare can be used to help solve this problem. A study should also be made as far as available time

> on the course will permit of the history, economics and organisations of the countries in which cold war operations are likely to occur.[88]

By 1960 the Internal Security course was 11 days long, and an entire volume of records is devoted to it. Much remained as it was in 1958, with exercises on Cyprus and Malaya, and annexes on these campaigns, plus the Mau Mau conflict in Kenya, and consistent references to the *Keeping the Peace* doctrine. In addition, exercises were included on undertaking operations in aid of the civil power in a large town (dealing with riots and the like), namely Hong Kong, and French IS operations. Again, principles developed from experience are articulated, such as cooperation between the triumvirate and joint planning, having a sound intelligence network, winning public confidence, employing flexible methods, and the importance of junior leadership.[89] Another student question highlights the increasing emphasis placed on winning hearts and minds, in asking, 'It is often said that "the BR [British] soldier is Britain's finest ambassador." In the context of IS ops explain how this can be exploited'. The notes accompanying this question stress that a soldier's 'instinctive kindness and decency' can win over locals and be 'a major factor in the battle for "hearts and minds of the people" ', and that soldiers should get to know the local population, to foster friendships and confidence.[90]

This section highlights that the principles being taught at the staff college were also being developed in practice during these campaigns (all three were under way concurrently in the period 1955–6, as shown in Annex A), and were in addition included in the doctrinal guidance of the time; there was a cyclical relationship of cultural institutionalisation and internalisation between these three elements, driven by the military leadership.

Conflict-Specific Doctrine

In addition to the generic doctrine of the time, even though in Malaya 'learning was transmitted more by individuals than by official literature',[91] the Emergency also produced conflict-specific doctrine,

in the form of the manual *The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya* (*ATOM* hereafter). *ATOM* was published in 1952, 1954 and 1958, and in Templer's foreword to the first edition he clearly states the aim of the manual – to collate and communicate the wealth of knowledge on and experience in jungle fighting gathered at the FARELF training centre.[92] Chapter 1 of *ATOM* provides an introduction to geography, climate, agriculture, industry and politics in Malaya, and there is another chapter on the nature of the CTs, their history and their organisation. Chapter 3 stresses the role of the army in support of the civil authority and the police – 'The deployment of military formations and units is based on the principle of Army/Police/Civil cooperation at all levels as embodied in the Briggs Plan'[93] – and the importance in counterinsurgency operations of separating the insurgent from his popular support – 'The most important factor in destroying the CT is to complete his isolation from the rest of the community. He must get no money, no food or clothing; no help of any sort'.[94]

Chapters 4 and 5 of *ATOM* also reflect the distinctive British approach to small wars. Chapter 4 gives exact details of the Emergency Regulations (i.e. legal aspects of the Emergency) and stresses the use of force as a last resort. Chapter 5 emphasises the different approach required in small wars, saying

> The normal platoon organisation was designed for operations against a first class enemy in a normal theatre of war. This organisation has to be adapted to suit the characteristics of the terrain and of the jungle operations. The CT are lightly equipped and can move very quickly. Our organisation and equipment must therefore be such as to confer maximum mobility.

This manual on conducting operations in the Malayan Emergency represents one of Schein's 'cultural artefacts' as I discussed earlier in Chapters 1 and 2; it is an intellectualisation of the British army's approach to small wars, which developed further during the Malayan Emergency. In terms of the leadership role in this process, *ATOM* was put forward as best practice by Templer and other leaders, and it was

communicated to soldiers as the most effective way of conducting a counterinsurgency operation.

Conflict-Specific Training

Part of this communication process was the dissemination of doctrine through training. Military training on the ground in Malaya improved greatly during the course of the Emergency; it was very poor initially, but gradually improved with, for example, pre-deployment courses based on jungle warfare. As discussed earlier, little learning from earlier jungle campaigns was drawn on at the start of the conflict. Local training was undertaken at the Far East Land Forces Training Centre, which was attended by British and Ghurkha officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), and the Malay police, and its new commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Walker, who had served in Burma during World War Two, was surprised and frustrated by the lack of appropriate skills demonstrated by the soldiers that were sent there. The interim training report from the Far East Land Forces training centre for September 1948 to January 1949 (early in the campaign) shows how poorly prepared the British army was for counterinsurgency and jungle operations. Walker pulls no punches in his assessment – he notes that

> On arrival a majority of students have remarkably little knowledge of minor tactics . . . when the standard of trg [sic] is compared to that of units in BURMA in 1944 and 1945, it is abundantly clear that we still have a very long way to go . . . an unfortunate term called "jungle bashing" has crept in. The qualities required of the real jungle fighter are not those of the elephant but rather of the poacher, gangster and cat-burglar . . .[95]

He also comments on the inability of troops to move at night, and of the formations for moving in thick jungle, along a track or in the open:

> Secs [sections] are far too bunched, too noisy and observation and alertness are poor. . . . Students, when formed into secs [sections] or pls [platoons], do not move in sufficient depth with the result

> that in the event of an ambush the whole sub-unit is trapped within the ambush area, manoeuvre is impossible and, therefore, a counter-attack cannot be launched.[96]

Walker goes on to say that 'Some offrs [sic], and many NCOs, will not decentralise' and that they are too lazy to move properly through the jungle, instead attempting to move in the open, force their way through the jungle, or move along paths, which takes away the element of secrecy and surprise. The effectiveness of small patrols is also stressed, and Walker says that they need to be used far more often. Furthermore, weaknesses in planning and briefing are identified, and he concludes by saying

> Many students have stated that, on return to their units, the commitments are so numerous and heavy, that it is impossible to pass on their knowledge. It is not known if units are running their own trg [sic] cadres, but if they are not, then the course at the FTC will achieve very little towards the common object.[97]

The half-yearly training report for the period 1 April to 30 September 1949 shows the lack of progress in the first phase of the conflict. Walker says that

> It is true to say that during the past twelve months there has been NO noticeable improvement in the standard of trg [sic]. The weaknesses mentioned [in previous reports] … and many more, are still apparent and have been brought to notice in the many Course reports that have been submitted.[98]

He reiterates the earlier point, saying that

> Although this school has trained 711 Offrs [sic] and NCOs in jungle warfare during the past twelve months, this effort has contributed little towards the common object, because Offrs [sic] & NCOs have not been given the opportunity to 'spread the gospel'.

Finally, he points to the 'real abysmal ignorance on the subject of jungle warfare'.[99]

All in all this was a pretty damning report on the state of tactical training of soldiers at the start of the Malayan Emergency; something had to be done, especially about the dissemination of knowledge gained on the course to the wider army in Malaya. Daniel Marston notes that between 1950 and 1952 far more was done on developing a better lessons-learned process in Malaya, and improving communication of training material by senior officers to the rest of the troops.[100] This situation is a good example of the cyclical and interwoven nature of training and the evolution of small wars methods; tactics and methods from a previous conflict, the Burma campaign in World War Two, were passed on via Walker to the training centre in Malaya, and then eventually filtered into operations. These were reinforced from above by effective small wars leadership in the form of Templer, once he arrived in theatre. Templer saw the jungle warfare school as a means of standardising performance and training,[101] and it helped to communicate and further embed his beliefs about the right way of conducting the campaign. It is also important to note that Templer asked Walker to write the aforementioned *ATOM* manual, which again shows the links between doctrine, training and operational practice.

A training course for the District War Executive Committee had also developed by 1952, and it stressed the importance of the civil–military–police triumvirate, cooperation and coordination between all the elements, understanding of each other's roles, and that the military is working in aid of the civil power; it stated that operations where everyone worked together were far more successful.[102] By 1955 a mechanism was in place in Malaya for troops to undergo a comprehensive process after finishing operations whereby they could undertake post-mortems of the recently completed missions and work on implementing lessons-learned.[103] Cloake notes also that

> Another early addition made by Gerald [Templer] to the D[irector] of Ops [Operations] Staff was a team to conduct operational research, to analyse incidents and contacts and extract from them not only statistics and patterns, but lessons to be applied in future operations, large or small.[104]

This section highlights the importance of training for making the link between the development of doctrine based on the ideas and methods of influential leaders, and the dissemination of that doctrine more widely among the troops involved in the campaign, thus aiding the evolution of a particular organisational culture, especially when coupled with the reinforcing of those principles at the Staff College.

Leadership and the Perpetuation of Culture in Malaya

I have looked at applying Edgar Schein's ideas on the role of leaders in embedding and transmitting organisational culture, to see if and how this was done in the Malayan Emergency. Schein observes that leaders can be instrumental in this process through what they focus on and pay attention to, how they react to critical incidents, and what they teach and put forward as best practice. In the early stages of the conflict leaders reacted inappropriately to the insurgency, advocating approaches that were not going to be successful. However, as the conflict progressed, new leaders came along who focused on methods which were more successful and built on the approach that had emerged in the previous years of imperial policing and small wars. The Briggs and Templer years of the Emergency saw them react to critical incidents in a coordinated manner, concentrating on political aims, military support to the civil authority, intelligence and 'hearts and minds'. That this approach was put forward by them as best practice meant that it became embedded within the British army psyche and it continued to be internalised as the British army's small wars culture evolved. In the following section I explore the personal characteristics of some of the key military leaders in Malaya, and examine the relationship between leadership charisma and organisational cultural evolution.

Charismatic Leadership

Here I look at the qualities and characteristics of some of the leaders in Malaya, and how the possession of these qualities influenced the evolution of the British army's 'way' in small wars. What distinctive

characteristics did these leaders have? Did having these qualities influence the embedding and transmission of a particular organisational culture within the British army during the Malayan Emergency? As discussed in Chapter 1, writers on organisational behaviour, culture and leadership have pointed to the quality of *charisma* as being of crucial importance to the success of leaders in a particular organisation. Charisma is widely recognised as a quality that sets good leaders apart from bad or average ones, and which differentiates leadership from management. According to Weber, the personal qualities of a leader which mean he is influential over others are 'charisma',[105] and Edgar Schein says this about the importance of charisma in transmitting basic principles:

> The simplest explanation of how leaders get their message across is through charisma, in that one of the main elements of that mysterious quality is undoubtedly the leader's ability to communicate major assumptions and values in a vivid and clear manner.[106]

Roger Bennett says that 'transformational leaders have charisma, vision and empathy with subordinates' needs. A charismatic leader is one who is perceived by subordinates as possessing extraordinary powers, characteristics and abilities, and who can inspire loyalty and enthusiasm among those who are led'.[107] A leader who is successful in transmitting and embedding organisational culture and in perpetuating the organisational learning process will, according to existing models, invariably be a charismatic one. The primary characteristics of a charismatic leader include sharing a sense of common purpose with his followers, being highly influential with superiors, peers and subordinates, and being supremely confident, which gives others a sense of competence and good judgement. In Schein's view a charismatic leader will communicate the assumptions and values of the group or organisation vividly and clearly. But what does charismatic leadership look like in the context of the British army conducting small wars, and what were the qualities of the leaders in Malaya who were successful in transmitting and embedding the 'small wars culture'?

In the early years of the conflict, little progress was made, and the approach was disjointed and uncoordinated. One of the main criticisms of this period was the lack of a sense of urgency, especially among the civil administration. The military leaders may well have been competent, but they were working in isolation, separated from the police and civil authorities and lacked a common goal. The country was not on a 'war footing', and they were not in a position to persuade or influence the other parties or the outcome of the Emergency. Only with the arrival of Briggs as Director of Operations did matters begin to improve, as he set out his Plan for countering the insurgency. Briggs was in a far more influential position, and had a far greater sense of vision of what was required to defeat the insurgency on all fronts. Within a week of his arrival in Malaya, after consulting with subordinates and with people who had been in the country over the last two years, he outlined the 'Briggs Plan', which went a long way in inspiring confidence in his approach.[108] There was still an element missing, however: the urgency was still not there, and neither Briggs nor Gurney appeared to have the *personality* to drive the counterinsurgency operation forwards with the necessary vigour.

The arrival of General Templer in the role of 'supremo' did seem to change matters. While the achievements of Gurney and Briggs are often understated, and those of Templer overplayed, it looked as if something in his character brought a new sense of urgency to the Emergency.[109] His belief in an holistic approach and that the daily business of running a country and the Emergency were intertwined gave all the actors involved a common goal. As he said, 'any idea that the business of normal civil government and the business of the Emergency are two separate entities must be killed for good and all. The two activities are completely and utterly interrelated'.[110] But there was also something in his personality, characteristics of his personal leadership approach, that made him more influential and inspired enthusiasm in his subordinates. The most fitting word to describe Templer is *dynamic*, and it is used by many of the authors on Malaya when illustrating his leadership style. Noel Barber describes him as unconventional but with immense energy, and says 'he was merciless to anyone who smacked of old-time colonialism'.[111] Templer was

forward-thinking, and focused on preparing the country for independence as the primary goal, towards which all parties involved in the conflict could work together. He was 'a brilliant, magnanimous soldier who had astonished many doubters by becoming an even greater statesman; a man who knew it was always more difficult to win the peace than the war'.[112] Templer's biographer says of him, 'He was not only an energizing, inspiring, hard-working, charismatic personality, but also a brilliant and effective staff officer.'[113] Of course, he was no saint, and is described as also being 'original, impatient and eager, intolerant of others' shortcomings and as much a driver as a leader',[114] but it was his personal style that attracted attention; he had boundless energy, was direct, brisk, with a sense of purpose. He 'meant business';[115] in short, he energised the situation and inspired others to follow his example and approach.

For example, Templer spent much of his time touring the country, seeing the situation for himself and delegating tasks to the local level.[116] This approach generated mutual trust and respect, and communicated the common goals, approach and principles to soldiers, policemen, civil servants and locals. He also gave the impression of being competent and having the necessary skills for the job (based on his previous roles, which are discussed later); 'he did not fit the popular idea of a military strong man. But he had the brain, the character, and the experience for the job'.[117] An appreciation of the situation in Malaya in September 1952, which formed part of a FARELF situation report, stated the improvements evident since Templer took over in the dual role of High Commissioner and Director of Operations. There had been more contacts with the insurgents, more insurgent casualties, fewer security force casualties, better information from the public, increased food denial and more surrenders. Processes had been put in place to reorganise and retrain the police and intelligence services, and there was improved cooperation between police and army, increased rewards and security for informers, and much better propaganda. The reasons for this are clearly stated:

> The most important single factor has been the appointment of General Templer as High Commissioner and Director of

> Operations. By using the powers of this dual appointment and a strong personality, General Templer has given tremendous lift to morale throughout the Federation, and imbued the Security Forces and civil administration with a new spirit and the will to win. The foundation for the recent improvement is the Briggs Plan, which is aimed at resettling half a million Chinese squatters away from direct Communist influence. But it is General Templer who, by his tremendous energy and drive, is pushing this plan and attendant measures to their logical conclusion.[118]

Noel Barber sums Templer up succinctly:

> With dynamism [he] had implemented the Briggs Plan, consolidated the framework for democratic government, raised the morale of people who until his arrival had barely realized what the war was all about. By fighting for the hearts and minds of the people he had stimulated in them a will to win, so that by now the beginning of the end of the war was in sight.[119]

How did the characteristics and leadership style in Malaya influence the embedding and transmission of culture and the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars? Of the senior leaders during the Malayan Emergency, it was Templer who really displayed the characteristics of a charismatic leader. He created a sense of common purpose, was incredibly influential with superiors, peers and subordinates, and his confidence gave others a sense of competence and good judgement. Templer also had additional characteristics, which enabled him to push forward with an approach that was seen as being the right one. Perhaps these additional characteristics are specific to military leaders, who are not really covered by business leadership theorists (and small wars leadership qualities are not covered in any depth even by military leadership theorists, as discussed in Chapter 1). These are the qualities of tireless drive, energy and dynamism, which galvanised a complacent administration, instilled a sense of urgency, and drew together all the elements of the counterinsurgency effort into a comprehensive, coordinated solution. Edgar Schein notes that charisma is required for

leaders to get their message across, and for them to communicate their assumptions, values and basic principles in a way which will mean that they are accepted, embedded, transmitted and perpetuated throughout the organisation and over time:

> The power of charismatic leaders resides in their ability to form good relationships with others by providing what is wanted at the time … Followers identify with the charismatic leader, and applaud what the leader proclaims. The leader's power derives from the values which he or she symbolizes and expresses.[120]

In other words, charismatic leaders notice what is required and what the best approach will be, communicate that and encourage others to follow the same approach. That Templer possessed these qualities meant that his approach, which built on the existing distinctive British approach to small wars, was taken forward as best practice.

Enabling Conditions

Returning to the overall theme of how and when leaders influence the organisational learning process and the evolution of military organisational culture, I turn now to two enabling conditions that help leaders to be successful in transmitting and embedding a certain approach within the army – support networks and continuity of experience.

Support Networks

As pointed out in Chapter 2, effective small wars campaign commanders tend to require extensive support from senior figures for their methods and ideas to be taken forward and the small wars culture to be embedded in operational practice. This ties in with Stephen Rosen's views on military innovation and learning; he concludes that a major factor in the process of innovation is the influence of senior officers with political power in the service, who have a strategy for innovation (in reaction to a change in the security environment), who then establish new promotion pathways for like-minded subordinates to

follow.[121] Protection of these individuals as their careers progress is important, so the support of senior military (and political) figures for new ideas and approaches is vital. This section looks at the leadership in the Malayan Emergency and the support networks that were in place for the leaders there.

In terms of leadership, it has been demonstrated earlier that in some respects Briggs, and to a great extent Templer, were most influential in continuing the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars during the Malayan Emergency and operationalising the small wars culture. They both had more of a small wars mindset than earlier leaders in Malaya, and were fortunate in that their approach was supported by more senior military and political leaders. Briggs was privileged to have the support of Field Marshal Slim, who was by then the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Slim had been impressed by Briggs's conduct in Burma during World War Two and had subsequently pushed for Briggs to get the Director of Operations post in Malaya.[122] Gurney, in turn, was supported by Malcolm MacDonald, then the Commissioner-General for South East Asia, who was keen for the role of High Commissioner in Malaya to remain a civilian post.[123] However, Gurney was not liked by the Commander-in-Chief of the Far East Land Forces, General Sir John Harding,[124] which may have been one reason why progress in Malaya under Gurney remained slow. Gurney, for example, did realise that the military should act in support of the police, but this view was not popular with either Harding or Lieutenant General Boucher (GOC Malaya). It has been said that while General Harding realised the necessity of coordinating the civil–police–military triumvirate, he did not understand the intricacies of implementing such a solution in practice.[125]

When Churchill regained power in Britain in the 1951 election he was immediately interested in Malaya and how the situation there could be improved.[126] He sent Sir Oliver Lyttelton, the Colonial Secretary, to appraise the situation, and Churchill and Lyttelton decided that a 'supremo' combining the roles of High Commissioner and Director of Operations was required. Templer was summoned to meet with Churchill in Ottawa prior to his appointment in Malaya. They seemed to get on well; Churchill asked Templer to say if there was anything

he wanted, and Templer replied that he needed a written directive, stating the focus and objectives of his task there, to be used publicly to improve confidence. This was done: Templer got what he asked for. He also asked for, and got, a direct, confidential line of communication to Churchill and the Colonial Secretary. Templer said subsequently, 'I knew I had to have absolute backing – or the task wouldn't have been possible'.[127] Following the change in the British government, therefore, all the key players were focused on the same issues and of the same opinion as to how to proceed. Lyttelton put together a framework of how the counterinsurgency operation should proceed, which consisted of the following points:[128]

- overall direction of civil and military forces;
- reorganisation and retraining of police force;
- compulsory primary education;
- greater protection for resettlement villages;
- Home Guard reorganised and large numbers of Chinese recruited;
- removing the strain from the civil service;
- armoured vehicles for the police;
- more Chinese-speaking government officials;
- more appropriate weapons for planters and tin miners;
- review of propaganda campaign.

General Templer was subsequently appointed, and it was clear that his ideas on the way forward tied in perfectly with Lyttelton's and those of the government. Lyttelton said that 'In a few months I had almost dismissed Malaya from its place in my mind amidst the danger spots. My role had become simple: it was to back him [Templer] up and support him'.[129] This meant that a successful approach, supported by senior political figures, could be developed and implemented on the ground. This is consistent with existing views on military innovation, in that civilian intervention in the process was effective to the extent that it supported and protected the officers involved.[130] Lieutenant General Sir Hugh Stockwell, GOC Malaya since 1952, also supported Templer's approach; in a précis of the situation in Malaya written in October 1953, he states that 'any appreciation of the situation in Malaya is

necessarily incomplete unless it is made on an inter service/Police/Civil basis', and that 'intelligence is the greatest single factor in producing success'.[131] As Deborah Avant notes, the civilian leaders in Malaya endorsed the innovative approach taken by the military leaders, especially Templer, whose full support from Churchill was 'instrumental in facilitating a more successful counterinsurgency doctrine'.[132]

In terms of support and continuity of mindset and approach between the leaders and their subordinates in Malaya, some individuals stand out. Robert Thompson, who went on to become a leading counterinsurgency expert and British advisor to the USA in Vietnam, was a key civil servant in Malaya, and latterly worked there as Permanent Secretary for Defence. Thompson got on well with Briggs and Templer; they were similar in personality and agreed on the fundamentals of countering the insurgency. It was Thompson who liaised with Briggs and drew up his approach and objectives, which became the Briggs Plan.[133] Both Templer and Thompson realised the need for greatly improved intelligence (which they had both focused on in previous roles), demonstrating again the importance of having a similar outlook and agreeing on the best approach. Thompson recognised the importance of working towards a political solution,[134] and thus his views were in accord with Templer's. Thompson's later book on counterinsurgency techniques became a key text, and his work was seminal in institutionalising the distinctive British approach to small wars. Another leader in Malaya supported by like-minded subordinates was Lieutenant General Walter Walker, who was Commandant of the FARELF Training Centre early in the conflict, before moving on to command the Ghurkhas in Malaya for much of the emergency. His previous experiences (discussed in the next section) meant he agreed with the approach that Briggs and Templer were taking in Malaya; he tried to change the methods and mindsets of his soldiers so that they had more of a jungle warfare, counterinsurgency-based approach, and he supported Templer in drafting the *Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya* manual (see p. 111).[135] Finally, a link to the previous chapter can be found in Mike Calvert. In his autobiography, he claims to have advised Generals Urquhart (GOC Malaya), Harding (C-in-C Far East) and Briggs.[136] Calvert contributed to the Briggs Plan (especially resettlement) and he stressed the need for

'one man, with one plan and with the power to carry it out' – he recommended that Templer was this man.[137] This support of the leadership in Malaya from forward thinking and influential subordinates meant that the leaders' views and values could be more easily transmitted and embedded within the army.[138]

In sum, Briggs with his Plan, and Templer as 'supremo', were both senior officers with political power. They both created strategies for innovation and learning, as a response to the changing security situation on the ground in Malaya. They were supported in their approach by like-minded superiors (and also by some supportive subordinates), which meant that their ideas could be championed and thus their small wars culture could be transmitted and embedded within the operational practice of the army. Having the support of senior personalities, such as the CIGS and the Colonial Secretary, would have been very important for the wider championing of the evolving concepts on the most effective way of conducting these small wars. These senior support networks are important for reinforcing the army's small wars culture, as military heads and politicians are seen to be promoting a certain 'way' of doing small wars, and therefore disseminating and further embedding this culture.[139] That this network of support was in place and helped with the development of a successful approach to countering the insurgency had much to do with the continuity of experience of the people involved.

Continuity of Experience

In this final section I explore another requisite condition for leaders to be successful in transmitting and embedding a certain approach within the army, and test the notion that leaders need to have continuity of past experience in order for the learning process to be successful and for the British army's approach to small wars to evolve. It was shown in Chapter 2 that interruptions to the learning process cause ideas to be forgotten and successful techniques to be lost, and that continuity of experience, especially among the leaders of conflicts, is necessary for approaches and methods to be internalised and institutionalised. This is now explored for the case of the Malayan Emergency.

The Malayan Emergency began in 1948, only three years after the end of World War Two. Although the British army had been involved in the 'small war' in Palestine in the intervening years, most of the soldiers and officers initially sent to Malaya were either national servicemen with no experience of conflict, or had fought only conventional warfare during World War Two. Consequently there had been a high turnover of personnel, which prevented knowledge from being built up and passed on effectively. Training for these soldiers was brief and based on conventional warfare – training in the snow to practice fighting in the Cold War against the Russians – and they felt underprepared and misinformed about the onset of the Emergency in Malaya.[140] Lieutenant General Boucher, GOC Malaya at the beginning of the Emergency and in charge of the military effort there for the first two years, is a case in point. As noted by Donald Mackay, 'His previous experience had been entirely of warfare in Europe, a characteristic that he shared with nearly all his senior commanders, and one which would condition tactics and plans for many months to come'.[141] Boucher continued with ineffective large sweeps through the jungle (which the guerrillas could simply hide from), and he thought that 'force was synonymous with power, with victory'.[142] Richard Clutterbuck notes how

> Initially, because of their previous training and experience, senior army officers were inclined to launch their units into the jungle in battalion strength – either in giant encirclement operations when a camp was known to be in the area, or in wide sweeps based on no information at all. Neither of these types of operation had any success. The predilection of some army officers for major operations seems incurable.[143]

Mackay sums up General Boucher's ineffective approach: 'true to the well-established British tradition of fighting a war with the weapons, strategy and tactics of the last, General Boucher embarked on a series of futile large-scale operations which achieved virtually nothing worthwhile'.[144] As a leader, Boucher had no recent small wars experience, and did not possess the correct mindset or elements of the 'small

wars culture' that were necessary for defeating the insurgency in the broadest sense.

Sir Henry Gurney's arrival as High Commissioner did provide some small wars experience to the senior leaders in Malaya, since he had been Chief Secretary in Palestine during the last two years of the British Mandate (1946–48), and therefore had experience of politics in difficult times. Militarily, however, it was not until the arrival of Lieutenant General Briggs that a small wars ethos began to be developed in Malaya. Briggs had direct experience of jungle warfare from Burma in World War Two, and understood that it was a different environment to that found in conventional warfare. He had spent most of his army life in Asia,[145] and was a veteran of the 1930–32 Burma revolt. He therefore had experience of civil–military cooperation, and as Mackay notes, 'drawing on his own experience in Burma he emphasised the vital need to make the more loyal elements of the Chinese community feel secure, "inducing them to provide us with information and a means of putting out our own propaganda" '.[146] However, as shown earlier, Briggs's prior experience did not come together with the necessary degree of personal charisma for his approach and values to be completely internalised in the approach of the British army in Malaya.

General Templer's military background and experience makes it clear why he could focus on the broader solutions in Malaya, and pull together all the elements of the counterinsurgency campaign. Prior to World War Two, he had served in Palestine as a major with the Queen's Lancashire Regiment (the Loyals), which was a complex political and military conflict. Before that he had served in desert operations in the Arab Rebellion in Mesopotamia in 1920, and undertook crowd control during Egyptian riots a year later, all of this being about re-establishing law and order and dealing with communal hatred. In his earlier career he had therefore 'learned how to combine political and military leadership to achieve political and military goals'.[147] Although he served in the conventional campaigns in North Africa and Italy during the War, his post-war role as Director of the Military Government in the British Zone in Germany prepared him greatly for his dual political and military role in Malaya. In Germany he gained experience of restoring order, rebuilding society, providing basic services to the local

population and promoting democracy. In other words, he was dealing not only with military solutions but also with broad economic, political, social and cultural ones. As Templer himself said, 'We covered every activity – food, agriculture, fisheries, coal from the Ruhr . . . steel, education, public health, medical services, religious affairs, midwifery, the Press, civil police, trade unions, politics – you name it, we had to do something about it'.[148] He rebuilt the civil administration and local government based on the *German* system, that is, giving ownership of the long-term solution back to the local population, which was an effective philosophy to take forward to Malaya.

After this post, Templer held an equally important position, as Director of Military Intelligence in the War Office, which again equipped him with a mindset that was suited to small wars; he was aware from the start of the importance of intelligence, and of the support of the local population, and it meant that in Malaya he focused significantly on improving the intelligence function, which improved the situation greatly. After that post he became Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, which educated him further in politics, and the ways of politicians. Of those past experiences, working in Germany and as Director of Intelligence, Templer said that

> those two periods – Germany and Whitehall – enabled me to tackle what was to come in Malaya with at least a measure of confidence. So I wasn't afraid of any of the problems which would obviously present themselves, because of my politico-military background. Whether I would, in fact, be able to solve them was another matter.[149]

As Stubbs comments, 'It was out of this set of experiences that Templer was able to establish basic principles from which to approach his new role as High Commissioner and Director of Operations'.[150] Therefore Templer's long history of experience in relevant posts, coupled with his charismatic personality, meant that he could be highly influential in the evolution of a distinctive approach to small wars for the British army.

Tying in with the previous section, it is also interesting to note how the subordinate and senior supporters of the leaders in Malaya

also had a certain amount of continuity of experience, which helped to internalise their approach in culture. The four Chiefs of the Imperial General Staff during the Malayan Emergency were Field Marshals Slim, Harding, Templer and Festing (see Figure 3.1). Slim, of course, is renowned for his part in the Burma campaign in World War Two, and had extensive knowledge of the intricacies of jungle warfare. While he was in office the Commander-in-Chief of the FARELF was Harding, who then went on to become CIGS. Harding therefore had gained a great deal of experience in South East Asia and the campaign in Malaya must have been in the forefront of his thinking. Of course, while Harding was CIGS, Templer held the 'supremo' role in Malaya before becoming CIGS himself, again demonstrating the importance of continuity of experience for retaining a focus on counterinsurgency operations and the methods of conducting them. Finally, towards the end of the conflict, General Festing (also a veteran of the Burma campaign) was C-in-C FARELF from 1956 to 1958 before becoming CIGS in 1959.[151] Although the Burma campaign in World War Two and jungle warfare were not necessarily small wars in the sense of counterinsurgency operations, they did require a mindset different from that required for conventional, European warfare, and many of the methods and tactics used in the campaigns in the Far East were to be especially relevant in future counterinsurgency operations. This demonstrates that to have the support of senior leaders, and for those leaders to have some continuity of experience in 'small wars', are conditions that are interrelated, and both were important in the evolution of a specific British approach to counterinsurgency operations and in the transmission of a certain military organisational culture within the British army at that time.

The aforementioned subordinates who gave their support to the leaders in Malaya also drew on their past experiences to develop ideas on small wars, leading to the evolution of basic principles and assumptions about the way they should be conducted. As discussed in Chapter 2, Robert Thompson had been an RAF liaison officer with the Chindits in the Burma campaign in World War Two, and described Orde Wingate as having 'a profound influence on me for the rest of my life';[152] he understood the approaches that would and

would not work in the jungle. His experience in covert operations meant the importance of good intelligence formed a key part of his mindset, so that he and Templer automatically agreed on one of the most important aspects of the British approach in Malaya. Lieutenant Colonel Walker had served on the North-West Frontier before the war, and in Burma during the war, and also appreciated the differences between this environment and conventional, European warfare. In the early stages of the conflict Walker was one of the few soldiers who attempted to use small wars methods learnt in Burma to fight the guerrillas. He established 'Ferret Force' using former World War Two Special Operations Executive troops with experience of jungle warfare (from Force 136), and these small units used natives and trackers, lived off the land and spent longer in the jungle than the regular forces, using the insurgents' tactics against them.[153] These are techniques and methods, and also a small wars mindset, that he internalised within the army while developing the FARELF Training Centre at the beginning of the Emergency. Walker's 'determined personal leadership' overcame the outdated attitude of more senior officers there who were stuck in their conventional warfare way of thinking, and 'the Jungle Warfare Training centre soon spurred the creation of more effective counterinsurgency doctrine and practice'.[154]

Lastly, Mike Calvert built on his SAS and Chindit experience to promote and transmit certain methods in Malaya. Calvert was frustrated in Malaya to find that many soldiers had little to no jungle experience, and were national servicemen who had fought in the conventional battles of World War Two; anyone with Chindit experience was retired or had left the army.[155] The same mistakes were made as had been initially in Burma, with soldiers not able to patrol quietly in small groups. According to Mike Calvert, a brigade commander said angrily in 1950, 'My regiment was raised and trained to fight in Europe and I am not going to change my organisation and training just to chase a few [insurgents] around South East Asia'.[156] This demonstrates the out-of-date mindset prevalent among many of the leaders in the early stages of the Emergency – thankfully this commander was sent home. Based on his Chindit adventures, recounted in Chapter 2, Calvert had extensive knowledge of jungle warfare and the small wars ethos, which

was important in having his ideas accepted. He re-established the SAS in Malaya using successful 'small wars' tactics, such as operating deep in the jungle in small groups, hunting down the CTs, their camps and their sources of supply. They survived for weeks and months rather than days in the jungle, and used successful tactics such as moving silently and hiding or destroying any trace of their movements.[157] Calvert also tried to encourage the troops to think and act independently, rather than relying on the more formal hierarchy for receiving orders; this was necessary in this type of warfare, and had been learnt in Burma previously.

The conditions that seem to be required for the successful transmission of a certain approach (leading to the continued evolution of a distinctive culture) are interrelated: charismatic leaders and their supportive seniors and subordinates are often more effective in instilling their ideas and driving the learning process when they have continuity of relevant experiences. This section has demonstrated the importance of continuity of experience, especially in leaders, for the success of the organisational learning process and the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars. As noted by David Ucko, 'While the institutional recollection of jungle warfare had dissipated by 1948, the British forces were helped by those individuals who had previous experience of this form of combat'.[158]

Cultural Evolution through Leadership in the Malayan Emergency

In this chapter I have examined the British army's involvement in the Malayan Emergency from the point of view of leadership, to explore the role that it played in the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars during this conflict. The learning process in Malaya fell into four phases. Initially, the military and political elements were uncoordinated, with a lack of urgency from the administration and the wrong approach being taken by the army. With the appointment of Lieutenant General Briggs as Director of Operations the counterinsurgency campaign began to achieve some focus, with the various elements starting to be drawn together under an overall plan. The third phase was

characterised by the arrival of General Templer in the role of 'supremo' (combining High Commissioner and Director of Operations), who energised the situation with his dynamism, and continued to implement the holistic, long-term solutions that had already been initiated. Finally, the last years of the Emergency were spent mopping up the guerrillas in the jungle, while focusing on establishing the civil administration and handing over to Malayan ownership, with independence granted in 1957, and the Emergency declared over in 1960.

The British army's approach to small wars continued to evolve during this conflict, often cited as one where the right methods and mindset led to unparalleled success. At the tactical level, techniques which had emerged in the years of imperial policing were developed further, such as the effectiveness of working in small units, mobility and flexibility, the reliance on infantry in these types of conflict, the importance of intelligence-driven operations, and the requirement for junior leaders to bear a considerable amount of responsibility (along with more technical aspects such as the evolution of air support, wireless communications, working in silence, use of tracking skills and so on). Donald Mackay comments that

> more than anything else, though, it was the quality of leadership that could lift a performance from the merely adequate to the excellent … What the army was doing … was developing a corps of tough-minded junior leaders who were fast becoming better guerrillas than their opponents.[159]

At a more conceptual level, the British army's approach also evolved based on its prior experiences in small wars. It was recognised that a political aim was required for success, along with a long-term outlook, driven by civil solutions rather than military ones. Intelligence was at the heart of the effective methods developed during the Emergency, which formed part of the famous 'hearts and minds' campaign; it was realised that gaining and retaining the support of the local population, and showing that the legitimate government had more to offer them than the guerrillas and Communism, were key to success. Finally, the bringing together of the military, police

and civil elements of the counterinsurgency campaign (the triumvirate) led ultimately to success across the military, civil, political, economic and social aspects of the campaign:[160] 'The ability of British Army leaders to think about counterinsurgency as a civil–military effort was crucial to the success of counterinsurgency in Malaya'.[161] Donald Mackay comments

> In fact, what was happening was not so much the invention of something blindingly new, but the recovery of skills and experience drawn by the British and Indian Armies from campaigns in the 'bush' throughout the Empire, going back to the middle of the nineteenth century … In the strange, rather informal way that the British Army so often goes about its professional business this expertise had never been formalised as doctrine, and officers had to rely on 'tribal memory' handed down from their seniors to supplement their own initiative.[162]

But what was the role of leadership in the evolution of this British approach to small wars during the Malayan Emergency? Various *external* elements contributed to British success in Malaya, such as the change of government in the UK, the associated decision to be far clearer about independence, and the MCP 1951 directives and change of approach, but the evolution of the British approach, the British small wars culture, can be seen to be influenced strongly by the leadership *within* the army at the time.[163] As Edgar Schein notes, visionary leadership is important 'in that the vision sometimes serves the function of providing the psychological safety that permits the organisation to move forward'[164] and this is what the British army did – move forward in its approach to small wars. Initially I looked at whether and how military leaders transmitted and embedded the British army's small wars culture. Using Schein's model, this section showed that at first the leaders in Malaya took the wrong approach and paid attention to the wrong things, with a conventional warfare mentality, and no coordination or sense of urgency. As the conflict developed, however, and new leaders were brought in, the focus returned to those successful elements of the British approach to small wars that had started

to develop in earlier years; Briggs and Templer continued to transmit and embed the British army's small wars culture by putting forward as best practice principles such as taking an holistic approach, having a long-term political aim and winning the hearts and minds of the people. This organisational learning process led to the internalisation of the evolving British approach to small wars in actual operational practice (and also the institutionalisation of these methods in formal and informal doctrine).

Then I looked at the qualities and characteristics of the leaders in Malaya and how these influenced the evolution of the British army's approach. Having seen that some leaders were more influential in developing the distinctive approach to small wars, their charismatic qualities were explored. Indeed, it was apparent that the more successful the leader, the more he possessed charismatic qualities, and hence had a greater ability to communicate basic principles throughout the organisation. General Templer was the epitome of charisma, and his dynamism, knowledge, influencing skills, conviction and confidence meant that his approach was accepted, followed and transmitted across the British army in Malaya, and subsequently embedded in British army culture. The third theme I considered was the conditions required for military leadership to be influential in the organisational learning process, particularly those conditions discussed in Chapter 2, namely having the support of senior leaders and the importance of continuity of experience in small wars leadership. Both Briggs and Templer were supported in their views and methods by senior military and political figures (for example, Slim and Churchill), and there was also a great deal of support from more junior leaders with a similar mindset (for example, Walker and Thompson). This support was important in the promotion and acceptance of the leaders' methods and the embedding of small wars culture in military operations and practice. Finally, in examining the past (and future) experience of the leaders in Malaya, it was seen that the leaders who enabled the transmission and embedding of the distinctive British approach, and the evolution of the small wars culture were those who already had a small wars mindset due to the type of conflicts they had previously fought. It is important for the learning cycle to be continued and not interrupted, and for leaders

to be chosen who can build on their own small wars ethos in order to embed this approach within the wider army.

So, we have seen that, as summarised by Schein

> if the group's survival is threatened because elements of its culture have become maladapted, it is ultimately the function of leadership to recognize and do something about the situation. It is in this sense that leadership and culture are conceptually intertwined.[165]

The British army's survival in Malaya in the early years (that is, its ability to defeat the insurgency) was indeed threatened because it had taken on a conventional warfare mindset and culture, and leadership was in fact required (in the form of Briggs, Templer and others) to recognise and act on the fact that a change of approach was required, to more of a 'small wars' mindset. This was a clear example of leadership, the organisational learning process and cultural evolution being 'conceptually intertwined', and also the practical way in which leadership can be influential in transmitting and embedding a particular organisational culture. Schein comments

> if cultures become dysfunctional, it is the unique function of leadership to perceive the functional and dysfunctional elements of the existing culture and to manage cultural evolution and change in such a way that the group can survive in a changing environment.[166]

There was a dysfunctional culture at the beginning of the Emergency, but as the leadership changed this was perceived, and leaders such as Briggs and Templer managed cultural evolution which led to 'group survival': 'Effective transformational leaders, it seems, are those who recognise the need for change, are willing to challenge the status quo, and have a wealth of experience of similar situations'.[167]

John Nagl notes that 'the British army, because of its traditional role as a colonial police force and the organizational culture that its history and the national culture created, was better able to learn

quickly and apply the lessons of counterinsurgency during the course of the Malayan Emergency'.[168] The British army's approach to small wars continued to evolve due to the learning process that took place during the Malayan Emergency, and (unlike in the examples covered in Chapter 2), a 'small wars culture' and ethos *did* become embedded within the soldiers: 'the impetus for innovation in Malaya came from the military leaders in charge of the conflict ... The innovations came at the hands of the military leaders in command of the emergency'.[169] The basic principles and values that emerged during the years of imperial policing were built upon, and the military leaders played a vital role in internalising, and institutionalising, these beliefs and assumptions about the best way to conduct small wars. In promoting certain methods as best practice, and communicating and teaching these methods widely, through a charismatic and dynamic approach, the leaders in Malaya were able to continue the evolution of the distinctive, and successful, British approach to small wars, and transmit and embed a small wars culture within the British army.

In answering the question of what is needed to be a 'learning leader as a culture manager', Schein draws out the qualities of perception and insight, motivation, emotional strength, the ability to change the cultural assumptions, the ability to create involvement and participation, and the ability to learn a new culture.[170] The next chapter explores this concept for the case of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya from 1952 to 1956, and discusses the involvement of the British army in that counterinsurgency campaign in order to investigate the role of leadership in the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars during that conflict.

CHAPTER 4


KENYA AND THE MAU MAU UPRISING, 1952–56

> An important aspect in the transfer of expertise and experience gained in other insurgencies to Kenya was the role of individuals.[1]

The British army's involvement in the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya was a key counterinsurgency campaign in the post-World War Two environment. The largest and most aggrieved tribe in Kenya during this period was the Kikuyu, and the impact of British imperial rule on their society was marked – British colonialists failed to understand the dynamics of Kikuyu society and tried to impose 'Western' styles of education, land ownership and religion on them. The most contested issue was that of land rights, with British settlers annexing land for their own use that the Kikuyu claimed had been theirs (although this claim is often challenged),[2] thereby alienating the tribal local population. From the early days of British rule, there was opposition from the Kikuyu, marked by occasional uprisings and a general feeling of unease. As this resentment of British rule increased, a clandestine organisation of Kikuyu called the Mau Mau formed,[3] where members (often under duress and from fear of reprisals) swore secret oaths to continue and increase their insurgency against British colonial rule, in order to destroy or remove British settlers from their land.[4] Julian Paget, writing in 1967, asserted the Kikuyu aim was 'to eliminate the whites in

the colony and establish an independent, Kikuyu-controlled Kenya'.[5] A state of emergency was declared by the British Governor of Kenya in October 1952, since the Mau Mau had created a public security threat that could not be contained merely by the police and civil powers. Although martial law was never declared,[6] the army was brought in to undertake a counterinsurgency campaign in order to quell the uprising, in which the Mau Mau was targeting both the white settlers and the non-Mau Mau Kikuyu who were loyal to the British.

The security forces involved in Kenya at the time were varied. The uprising saw the development of both the Kikuyu (home) Guard and the Kenya police (which was officered by UK nationals) and Kenya Police Reserve. Three types of army units were involved: the King's African Rifles; regular UK battalions; and the Territorial Army (used to reinforce the police and Kikuyu Guard). The British fielded 55,000 troops in total over the course of the conflict, although the total number did not exceed more than 10,000 at any one time.[7] For the regular British army, however, which was also engaged in Korea and Malaya in 1952, Kenya was seen very much as a sideshow.[8] As with the Malayan Emergency (see Chapter 3), the military campaign in Kenya can be considered in four phases (see Figure 4.1 for a timeline of which people held which posts at which times during the conflict).[9] The first phase, from October 1952 (when the State of Emergency was declared) to June 1953 (when General Erskine was appointed to direct the counterinsurgency effort), was characterised by a disjointed approach, a lack of intelligence, a defensive focus on the protection of the white settler population and excessive brutality by the security forces. The second phase lasted from June 1953 to April 1954, when an operational plan began to be formed, and General George ('Bobby') Erskine was appointed Commander of GHQ East Africa. The third phase was from April 1954 to January 1955, and was typified by the large-scale operation to search and clear Nairobi of insurgents (Operation ANVIL), and the 'villagisation' of the local population. The final phase, from January 1955 to November 1956 (which is when the military campaign effectively ended), saw the security forces taking their counterinsurgency campaign into the forests to eradicate the remaining Mau Mau insurgents. General Lathbury also took over from Erskine in May 1955, and this period was characterised



*1 December 1952–February 1953: Colonel Rimbault was appointed as the Governor's Personal Staff Officer.

*2 February 1953–April 1953: General Hinde was appointed as the Governor's Chief Staff Officer.

Figure 4.1 Timeline of figures and roles during the Kenya conflict

by the use of 'pseudo-gangs' to track and defeat the remaining Mau Mau insurgents. Control of operations was handed over to the police in May 1956.

Chapter 3 showed that during the 'small war' in Malaya, military leadership played an important part in the transmission and embedding of the British army's distinctive approach to counterinsurgency operations. This approach had evolved to include tactical-level methods such as the use of small groups and the importance of junior leaders, and higher-level principles including the importance of intelligence, civil–military–police cooperation, the significance of overarching political solutions, and the necessity of gaining the support of the people, though social and economic measures and 'hearts and minds' methods. This evolving small wars culture is now explored in the context of Kenya – how did this experience further influence the evolution of the British army's small wars culture, and how did military leaders shape this organisational learning process?

The Role of Leadership in Cultural Evolution

In the previous chapter we saw that effective leadership can be critical for the process of embedding and transmitting a specific approach and organisational culture within the army. In the context of military leaders involved in undertaking small wars, a certain approach and culture can be promoted by commanders through what they focus on, how they manage critical situations, what they channel resources into and what they promote as the best practice approach.[10] So how was the small wars culture that had already developed in the British army transmitted and embedded further by leaders during the Kenya conflict? I address this question by following the leaders through the four phases of the conflict (see also Figure 4.1) and exploring the areas that these leaders focused on and promoted.

Phase 1: October 1952–June 1953

After the initial declaration of the State of Emergency, there was little consideration of the conflict as an insurgency; as was the case

in previous small wars (as demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 3) the insurgents were seen merely as criminals and bandits. This is similar to the first phase of the Malayan Emergency, where the authorities thought that the problem could be handled as part of 'business as usual'. The Mau Mau insurgents, with their vicious attacks on both the white and loyal Kenyan populations, and primitive oathing system, were seen as nothing more than animals by many people, and many of their legitimate grievances were not recognised. It was particularly clear that Kenya was not viewed in the same context as the ongoing Malayan campaign or seen as an equivalent operation[11]; consequently there was at first a lack of focus on making a serious effort to counter the Mau Mau before the conflict escalated. This viewpoint was reflected in the decision not to appoint a Director of Operations; the creation of this role was supported by General Robertson (Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East Land Forces (MELF)) and General Cameron (GOC East Africa Command), but it was refused by the CIGS and the Colonial Secretary because it was not an equivalent emergency to that in Malaya.[12] Initially, therefore, Governor Baring was given a Personal Staff Officer in December 1952, Colonel Rimbault, who was replaced by Major General Hinde (who became Baring's Chief Staff Officer), in February 1953.

The first major operation was JOCK SCOTT in October 1952, during which local political leaders suspected of also being Mau Mau leaders were rounded up and detained. Unfortunately, this move actually pushed many local Kikuyu people further towards the insurgent movement. As the situation deteriorated, Hinde was finally elevated to the role of Director of Operations in April 1953. However, from a military perspective, there was little planning, poor intelligence and a static focus on defensive operations. Troop numbers were too low, and the burden of the initial counterinsurgency effort fell on the police, Kikuyu Guard and settler population. In general, then, 'Kenya moved sluggishly to adopt the emergency and intelligence structures that were proving so successful in Malaya'.[13] The Lancashire Fusiliers were the first troops to arrive from Britain, but they 'took up defensive positions "in aid of the police", and waited for something to

happen … when it did … they were caught napping'. The situation was also not helped by the high number of conscripted troops, who were 'raw, barely trained, reluctant young soldiers'.[14]

The uncompromising approach taken towards perceived 'banditry' in this initial phase led to what has been described as 'the most severe military repression', including the unrestricted use of weapons, and mass detention without trial.[15] Despite recent past experiences that attested to the positive impact of using minimum necessary force, troops (predominantly those made up from the white Kenyan population) and police in Kenya showed little such restraint and were strongly criticised for using 'outright brutality' in their suppression of the Mau Mau.[16] The view seemed generally to be that it was, to quote Frank Kitson (who had first-hand experience of the conflict), 'an outlandish campaign left over from the Victorian era, and one which had little to do with warfare or the modern world'.[17] There were regular reports of beatings, indiscriminate shootings, torture and summary executions. Despite this, there are also reports that it was predominantly the settler population, and especially the police, who were excessively brutal, and that 'regular units generally behaved with characteristic restraint'.[18] While the brutality in Kenya is a controversial topic, many agree with Mockaitis who notes that 'the government of Kenya, the Colonial Office, and the army strove to adhere to the principle of minimum force … Most of the excesses seem to have been committed by units hastily recruited from the local population, white and African, or by inadequately trained police recruits thrown into a difficult situation'.[19] Even though Hinde had recommended that 'social measures for the betterment of the inhabitants' were introduced along with restoring law and order,[20] any consideration of a 'hearts and minds' approach, like that which Templer was developing concurrently in Malaya, was at this time nonexistent. Initially, especially for the police, it was not a case of proving to the people that they could offer more than the Mau Mau, but more a case of making the Kikuyu more scared of them than of the Mau Mau.

During the first phase of the conflict there was little if any organisational learning; military leaders took little effective action and the reaction to events was slow and inappropriate. The leaders also did not

focus on how the conflict could be conducted differently and more effectively, and were not in a position to influence the performance of the security forces more broadly and the wider administration. Military leaders at this stage therefore had a pretty low profile, and operated mainly at the tactical level, with no overall plan for countering the growing insurgency. Hinde remained focused on supporting the police and protecting the settlers, and underestimated the nature of the insurgency. This was compounded by the lack of pursuit of long-term political objectives by the government. In this initial phase of the Kenya conflict, the British army's distinctive approach to small wars was not to the fore; the leaders did not focus on long term political solutions, the triumvirate of civil–military–police cooperation or gaining the support of the local population. The focus on the insurgents as merely criminal bandits meant that insufficient resources were channelled into the counterinsurgency campaign, and both tactics and strategy that had been proven to be best practice in previous small wars were ignored in favour of an approach which had little chance of success. The British army's 'small wars culture' therefore was not evident at this stage, and hence had little chance of being transmitted and embedded further.

Phase 2: June 1953–April 1954

As the insurgency worsened, the British government realised that stronger leadership from a military point of view was required. General Erskine was duly appointed and placed in command of all security forces in Kenya, including the police, but was not responsible for the governance of Kenya, which remained with the Governor, Sir Evelyn Baring.[21] Upon his arrival, Erskine found four major problems:

- an absence of offensive spirit;
- a need for a decision as to which areas should be given military treatment;
- a need for a clear definition of the powers of the soldier;
- a lack of forward planning.[22]

In response to these challenges, Erskine focused on certain elements which pulled the British army's approach in Kenya back towards the evolving small wars culture and behaviour. He set to work immediately on developing an offensive, operational plan (rather than following Hinde's emphasis on defensively protecting the settler population), which took the insurgency seriously, and he realised there might be legitimate grievances that would need to be addressed. He knew that 'counter-insurgency tactics were required, and there would have to be political concessions as well as military successes'.[23] In a letter to Field Marshal Harding, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), he wrote, 'Unless we deal with the fundamental causes which allowed Mau Mau to grow up and prosper we shall get further trouble in a different form'.[24] Erskine's well-planned campaign had three priorities:

(1) establishing the Kikuyu Guard as a defensive force, and the removal of Mau Mau cells that were coercing the loyal elements of the community;
(2) breaking up the cell structure to remove the supply and recruitment chain; and
(3) attacking the remaining forest gangs.[25]

This new approach meant both reorganising the troops so that they were better suited to fighting a counterinsurgency campaign, and also increasing troop numbers and concentration.[26]

Erskine initiated positive developments in the areas of intelligence, the triumvirate and discipline (the minimum necessary force philosophy). Although the intelligence picture did not develop considerably until the end of 1953, Erskine focused on improving the information available and also on strengthening the police force. In a lecture to the police college, he focused on the importance of a clear command set-up, a coordinated plan, legal considerations and intelligence.[27] In addition, the triumvirate (the joint operational system of civil–military–police control of the emergency) was also important to Erskine, who wrote that 'You have the military, the police and the civilians. You must have a structure of command which will bring all three Forces together

appropriately to deal with the situation'.[28] A committee system similar to that adopted in Malaya was introduced in Kenya (although the aggressive settler population created an additional level of friction), and operations were coordinated by a team comprising a government official, a senior policeman and a military officer.[29] This demonstrates the approach and methods that Erskine considered to be of the highest priority, which tied in with the existing 'small wars culture'. This approach filtered down through the troops. For example, the Royal East Kent Regiment ('the Buffs') realised they had

> the task of supplementing the overburdened police force. They had after all come as protectors, and at once close liaison was established with the police headquarters, platoons were detached to put police stations in a proper state of defence, and jeep patrols went out to visit all farms in the district.[30]

The Devonshire Regiment also concurred that cooperation of the triumvirate was both important and possible:

> The lesson had obviously been learnt from the Malayan Campaign, for at all levels, from Commander-in-Chief down to Company Commanders when detached from Battalion HQ, there was very close liaison between the Military Commander, the Police Commander and the Civil Administrator in the shape of Provincial and District Commissioners and District Officers. These three Commanders, at the various levels, met at least once a week to review events and plan future operations in their particular area, thus all planning was joint planning, though the Military Commander took overall command when any joint operation was carried out. This system was eventually brought to perfection though naturally the measure of its success depended to some extent on the personalities concerned.[31]

Following the brutality of the first stage of the conflict, Erskine was keen to get a firm grip on discipline across the security forces, and was said to be 'shocked and appalled' by the early excessive use of

force.[32] He had discovered a tendency to use force to extract information from prisoners, which he gave instructions to counter.[33] On 23 June 1953 he issued a directive to all army, police and other security forces in Kenya, in which he stressed 'I will not tolerate breaches of discipline leading to unfair treatment of anybody ... I therefore order that every officer of the police and Army, should stamp on at once any conduct which he would be ashamed to see used against his own people'.[34] Huw Bennett notes that 'in general the 23rd June order was obeyed by the Army thanks to tradition, discipline, awareness of the practical benefits of good conduct and the knowledge that parliament kept a close eye on the situation in Kenya'.[35] Many writers on the Kenya emergency believe that Erskine 'moved swiftly to tackle indiscipline in the military'[36] and 'did his best to keep the whole campaign in step with military ideals of restraint and self-discipline'.[37] Erskine also sought personal reassurances from all battalion commanders that their units were adhering to both the letter and the spirit of his directives. David Anderson notes how Erskine 'could, and did, bring about a sharp improvement in the behaviour of the army regiments'.[38]

After questions in the House of Commons and accusations in the press, Erskine and the British government together decided to carry out a wide-ranging inquiry into the conduct of the army as a whole.[39] He instigated the McLean Enquiry in June 1953 (following a criminal act of brutality by Captain Griffiths of the King's African Rifles, and subsequent court martial during which Griffiths was acquitted on a technicality). This looked into allegations of unacceptable practices including keeping scoreboards of Mau Mau kills, providing financial rewards for kills, the use of beating and torture, and the removal of the hands of dead Mau Mau for identification purposes (all of which had been highly publicised in the British press).[40] The enquiry concluded that there had been isolated cases of unacceptable behaviour but that it was not systemic, that is, there had been exceptions to the existing rule of following international law and using minimum necessary force. This inquiry 'played an important instructional role in reminding soldiers from all units exactly what was expected of them'[41] and sent a very strong message to the army about what was considered appropriate conduct in small wars, and what Erskine considered to be 'best practice', which concurred with

the long-standing (if not always adhered to) minimum force tradition. The military as an organisation understood that an extreme approach was counterproductive and hence it should not develop into part of the British army's ethos and culture. This focus on discipline and the use of the minimum amount of force necessary shows that Erskine was inculcated in the British army's approach to small wars, and recognised the appropriate approach for this type of conflict.[42]

He was, however, frustrated by the lack of a coherent long-term political policy (something that was out of his hands), which he realised would be essential for any lasting solution. In a letter to Field Marshal Harding, Erskine wrote

> Opinions are so divided in Kenya that it is most difficult to formulate any plan in a social, political or economic sense which would gain general acceptance. This, of course, is the Governor's concern and not mine, but it is vitally important to the whole campaign against Mau Mau.[43]

Time and again Erskine stressed the need for political reforms and for tackling the Kikuyu's legitimate grievances. However, he had little confidence that this would be done, and in a letter to his wife Erskine wrote that 'in my opinion they want a new set of civil servants and some decent police'.[44] He also continued to use large-scale sweeps (rather than smaller units) and collective punishment, methods that had been proven to be less successful and indeed controversial in previous conflicts. The sweeps were often ineffective in Kenya too, but were necessary at this stage of the conflict until the arrival of the troop reinforcements which would enable them to penetrate more deeply into the forest and mountains in smaller groups.

Thus, in this second phase of the counterinsurgency campaign in Kenya, Erskine concentrated on various elements of best practice that helped to reinforce and communicate the British army's approach to counterinsurgency operations, and hence its organisational culture and soldiers' ethos suited to small wars. However, some elements were not focused on, either because they were out of the control of military leadership, or out of necessity due to a lack of intelligence.

Phase 3: April 1954–January 1955

With Erskine now driving onwards with an offensive plan, the next major operation was to sweep Nairobi and detain suspected Mau Mau, since the capital was providing most of the infrastructure and support, logistics and food for the insurgents. Operation ANVIL began on 24 April 1954, and although it was a traditional cordon and search type of operation it was successful in breaking the supply chain to the insurgents in the forests (the link between the active and passive wings of Mau Mau). Erskine's focus during this phase was on continuing the improvement in cooperation between the civil–military–police elements of the counterinsurgency campaign, and on the further development of intelligence. ANVIL was controlled from a joint army, police and administration headquarters,[45] and the effective coordination of the triumvirate was to the fore of Erskine's thinking; in a talk to brigade and battalion commanders in December 1954 he said 'We must maintain most carefully the tripartite committee organisation – Administration, Police, Army'.[46] For soldiers working on a daily basis with local police and civilian authorities this would have no doubt reinforced their small wars ethos of civil–military cooperation. Operation ANVIL also led to an improvement in the intelligence picture during 1954. Those detained provided valuable information on the remaining insurgents, which in turn meant that Erskine could begin to use smaller units for tracking and searching the forests, which were far more effective.

The other major initiative during this phase was the 'villagisation' of the Kikuyu population, which began in earnest in June 1954. This was based on the largely successful process undertaken in Malaya, but in Kenya the approach was markedly different. Although the new villages did achieve some social improvements (for example the provision of schools and medical care), they were implemented far more strictly than in Malaya, and with much less of a focus on 'hearts and minds' and addressing legitimate grievances about living and social conditions. It was far more openly considered that the main aim of villagisation was to make the maintenance of law and order more practical and convenient. There was also a distinctive split between 'model villages' for those Kikuyu loyal to the government and 'punitive villages' for those

deemed to support the Mau Mau – these villages had very poor conditions and were not the focus of any development.[47] Detainees from the internment camps that had been established to hold suspected Mau Mau (particularly those held after Operation ANVIL) were 'filtered' back into society based on their perceived level of rehabilitation, which would determine which village they were returned to. This practice, while criticised in the years following the uprising, did have the desired effect of encouraging the Kikuyu to reject the Mau Mau movement, and despite its primitiveness this system did separate the population from the insurgents (a key counterinsurgency tenet).

There were some social elements to the campaign: land reforms and agricultural improvements were introduced, bans were lifted on the African population growing and trading coffee, and wages were raised.[48] However, the campaign as a whole was much more punitive than in Malaya. Even though, as Anderson points out, 'Erskine pushed forward any scheme that would give the Kikuyu an incentive to be loyal',[49] these schemes were by and large castigatory, demonstrating the penalties for supporting the Mau Mau rather than the benefits of supporting the government. This demonstrates that the 'hearts and minds' approach that Templer had successfully implemented in Malaya did *not* form a key part of the army's ethos in Kenya. In this respect, the military leaders there did not focus on this element of the British approach, and therefore it was not embedded or transmitted as a result of *this* counterinsurgency campaign.

The arrival of General Erskine brought with it a more offensive approach, a detailed plan and some constructive small wars thinking. Erskine quickly identified a gap in performance that needed to be addressed, and searched for and adopted alternative solutions, including an increased focus on intelligence, civil–military–police cooperation and discipline. However, there was a lack of agreement with the civil administration about a long-term approach and the importance of a political solution. Consensus could not be maintained between all parties involved in the conflict about how most effectively to end the conflict. Erskine also continued with some practices that went counter to the evolving small wars thinking and ethos (such as collective punishment, large-scale sweeps and the punitive nature of villagisation),

so there was a lack of consistency in approach. The solutions adopted in Kenya were not as widely accepted as they had been in Malaya, or so consistent with small wars thinking in a broader context.

Phase 4: January 1955–November 1956

The final phase of the campaign in Kenya saw General Lathbury take over from General Erskine as Commander GHQ East Africa (with the same remit as Erskine), in May 1955. Just before his departure, Erskine reiterated his belief that a political solution was required to effectively defeat the Mau Mau: 'I do not believe that bullets will finish the problem'.[50] He strongly believed in using the military in support of *political* aims, and was frustrated by the disjointed and unfocused approach taken by the administration, and the lack of influence that he had over the approach that they adopted.

From a military point of view, since the insurgents had now been driven deep into the forest areas, the focus was on using smaller groups to track down the remaining Mau Mau leaders, since the effectiveness of large sweeps was seen to be minimal,[51] and far better intelligence was being provided. Lathbury gave his full support to imaginative and alternative solutions; according to one soldier

> The charge of a bull became the stalk of a predator … His [Lathbury's] grasp of the changes that were necessary and the means for carrying them out was complete, thus transforming the campaign into its final shape and carrying it to a successful conclusion.[52]

While the police now started to take control in the Special Areas, which people could enter with permission, the army focused on the forests and Prohibited Areas, which no one was allowed to enter, isolating the insurgents from the population.[53] The major initiative that Lathbury championed was the use of Special Forces tactics and 'pseudo-gangs' to track and capture the remaining elusive Mau Mau. Lathbury said that the use of former insurgents to track down others 'should be given every possible support and encouragement'[54] – 'pseudo-gangs'

were small groups of Kikuyu (sometimes also containing British security forces disguised as Africans) led by former insurgents who were prepared to take the group back into the forests to the known locations of insurgent hideouts. These gangs were used to infiltrate Mau Mau groups, gather intelligence and guide patrols to destroy insurgent targets. This greatly improved the quality of intelligence that was received and led to increased success in the counterinsurgency campaign.[55]

Lathbury continued in the manner of Erskine, demonstrating a small wars ethos and communicating this to his troops; he focused on tried and tested counterinsurgency tactics such as silent movement, the use of trackers and small unit operations, and stressed the importance of intelligence, and training in forest warfare.[56] Social and economic improvements also began to take place during 1956, which helped to bring about the end to the insurgency and remove much of the scarce remaining support for the Mau Mau. The villages were improved, many restrictions on the Kikuyu population were lifted (land reform was initiated), and conditions also improved in urban areas (for example an increase in wages, the development of democratic processes, and so on).[57] These conditions, albeit tardy, were the beginning of the long-term political measures required to defeat the Mau Mau completely – one wonders whether, had there been a 'supremo' as there was in Malaya, these measures would have been implemented sooner, based on the existing small wars culture within the military of recognising the importance of the political objective and enduring solutions?

The military involvement in the campaign against the Mau Mau ended on 17 November 1956, when Lathbury handed over responsibility for internal security in Kenya to the police. In a letter to Templer, by now CIGS, he wrote that there were probably only two major Mau Mau leaders remaining, that the police could continue with the pseudo-gang method which would be the most successful for tracking them down, and that there was nothing more for the army to do.[58] It was largely because of Lathbury's approach in this final phase, which built on Erskine's earlier efforts based on sound small wars thinking, that the counterinsurgency campaign was brought to a successful conclusion.

Doctrine, Training and the Institutionalisation of Learning

As discussed previously, official and unofficial doctrine are means of teaching best practice to the army, both informally, and formally through training and education, and hence they are a way of transmitting and embedding a particular organisational culture, and of institutionalising learning and successful methods. The most recent doctrine at this point was the 1949 publication *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* (discussed in Chapter 3) and this is the doctrine that was relevant to commanders at the onset of the Mau Mau uprising. It reflects much of the learning that had taken place based on the small wars experiences of the British army in the preceding decades. It represents the ongoing formal institutionalisation of the small wars culture of the British army, and is a reflection of the organisational learning process. Although not necessarily followed in all cases,[59] those leaders with a strong small wars ethos such as Erskine and Lathbury appeared (from the behaviour they were demonstrating) to be keenly aware of the existing small wars principles and doctrine, such as the importance of the triumvirate, and winning over the local population. As discussed in Chapter 3, in 1956 *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* was superseded by *Keeping the Peace (Duties in Aid of the Civil Power)*, which drew on the Malaya (and *ATOM*) and Kenya campaigns, and reflected the ongoing learning process about the effective conduct of small wars. The Kenya campaign had also demonstrated the relevance of civilian oversight and eventual self-government in these decolonisation counterinsurgency operations, which was reflected in the updated doctrine. However, the campaign also highlighted the continued use of collective punishment in small wars, and this was echoed as acceptable practice in the 1956 doctrine.

In terms of broader military education, General Erskine also disseminated small wars doctrine when giving a lecture to the 1955 staff course at Camberley, in which he emphasised civil–military–police coordination, saying that 'For joint operational purposes it was necessary to have a command structure at all levels where combined action by civil, military and police could be organised', and that 'planning

by Committees is essential but command by Committees is fatal'.[60] He also stresses 'high class junior leadership', small unit patrols and the importance of intelligence, and that 'no more force than is necessary to achieve the object should be used'.[61] He demonstrated and disseminated his small wars mindset, in saying: 'In circumstances of this kind you have to be satisfied with indirect results such as an increase in surrenders, a drop in Mau Mau morale, prisoners' reports and similar evidence'.[62] In passing on this doctrine informally to army officers on the Staff Course (who, potentially, were future small wars leaders), Erskine as a leader was again helping to embed and transmit the British army's distinctive small wars culture throughout the organisation, via the broader education of army officers.

I noted in Chapter 3 that the Staff College increased its educational emphasis on small wars in 1956, following suggestions from the C-in-C East Africa based on his experiences of the campaign against the Mau Mau; from then on, further case studies on small wars were covered in the syllabus, including one based on the Kenya uprising. The 1957 course covered Exercise DRUM BEAT, the aim of which was to draw out lessons about the importance of intelligence and police/army cooperation in this regard, building good relationships between the civil authorities, police and military, and the importance of training before and during operations.[63] This is important for demonstrating that lessons from specific operations such as that against the Mau Mau in Kenya were being communicated back to the UK, and disseminated through officer education into the philosophy of the army (as well as complementing the generic doctrinal developments at the time).

At the tactical level, a pamphlet was produced in Kenya which was similar to, and drew heavily on, the *ATOM* document that was produced in Malaya (see Chapter 3). *A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations* was published in 1954, and Erskine reiterates in the foreword that this doctrine pamphlet is 'much more a book of ideas than a book of rules'.[64] Background is provided on the geography, topography and climate in Kenya and the organisation of the Mau Mau, and instructions are given for tracking, using war dogs, patrolling, ambushes, sweeps and air operations. Many of the methods and techniques that

the army had developed over time are stressed, such as the importance of junior leaders and the necessity for sound intelligence, while it is recognised that large-scale sweeps are rarely successful in forests.[65] This formal publication showed the institutionalisation of some elements of the British army's small wars culture based on both the Kenyan and Malayan experiences, but it remained at the *tactical* level. It is interesting to note as well that by 1957 this pamphlet was being distributed to the Staff College,[66] hence linking tactical-level methods from operations to the broader education of officers, and hence transmitting these techniques more widely across the army and helping to embed a small wars mindset within British troops.

Leadership and the Perpetuation of Culture in Kenya

Leadership did play an important role in embedding and transmitting the British army's small wars culture during the Kenya conflict, but only certain elements of the approach were reinforced. Other, negative elements persisted (such as collective punishment) even though they were consistently proven to be counterproductive. However, these approaches were often used through necessity rather than choice, either because of a lack of influence from military leaders on the broader context of the conflict, or because intelligence had not yet built up sufficiently for more precise methods to be used. In terms of the leaders' role in embedding and transmitting culture, Erskine and Lathbury did focus on and channel resources into many areas which enabled the British army's small wars culture to be strengthened (such as cooperation between the triumvirate of civil–military–police, the importance of intelligence, and the relevance of good discipline and the use of the minimum necessary force). However, other elements of the distinctive British approach were not adopted, such as a true 'hearts and minds' focus and an overall political objective (although not through want of trying!).

This conflict shows once more how effective counterinsurgency methods develop throughout the course of a conflict, as effective leaders are introduced, and as intelligence improves. The lack of learning *between* conflicts, between the experiences in Malaya and Kenya, is not

overly surprising. The Malayan Emergency began before the conflict in Kenya; however, Templer only took over the 'supremo' role there in 1952, when the Kenya insurgency was starting, and the Mau Mau were defeated (in 1956) before the end of the Emergency in Malaya (in 1960). Therefore, there was little opportunity for continuity of leadership or transmission of approach between the two conflicts, or 'pause for thought'. Troops did indeed serve in both conflicts, but with little time between to reflect on methods and approaches. As Heather notes, 'In studying the Kenya Emergency one is struck how many ideas about the conduct of the campaign arrived from Malaya ... but ... many of the mistakes made in Malaya were repeated at great cost in Kenya'.[67] The longer-term embedding of certain ways within military culture and the ethos of British soldiers, however, was significantly enabled by the concurrent experiences in these conflicts.

Charismatic Leadership

This section explores the characteristics of the military leaders in the context of the counterinsurgency conflict in Kenya, and explores whether and how these qualities enabled the acceptance, embedding, transmission and perpetuation of the British army's small wars culture throughout the organisation and over time, as they had done in Malaya.

As in Malaya, the first phase of the conflict in Kenya was characterised by ineffective leadership. Neither Rimbault nor Hinde demonstrated charismatic qualities; but since they did not have the authority or seniority to make a positive impression,[68] they had little opportunity to develop or demonstrate effective leadership qualities. However, neither was seen to be an effective coordinator,[69] and Hinde in particular came in for much criticism over his approach and personal leadership style. He was, according to Anderson, 'out of his depth both militarily and diplomatically' and had a 'cavalier and pro settler' attitude[70]; he had no sense of the legitimate grievances of the Kikuyu population, and undertook little planning, with a lack of energy and impetus. This point of view is borne out by more senior officers at the time; General Cameron was very disappointed with Hinde, and thought 'he doesn't

seem to be interested in operations and has not taken control of them ... Hinde is not supplying operational leadership and he is not fruitful of ideas. I find him conventional and slow'.[71] General Nicholson, the C-in-C of Middle East Land Forces, was also not positive about Hinde's abilities, and believed he was not exercising sufficient personal control; indeed, Nicholson identified an 'urgent need for inspired leadership at the highest levels'.[72] Given these remarks, it is not surprising that little progress was made in the first phase of the emergency, and that the distinctive British approach to small wars was scarcely evident. Even if they had adopted an appropriate approach, the early leaders did not demonstrate the dynamism, urgency and enthusiasm that would have enabled their methods and views to be embedded.

The arrival of General Erskine in a position of genuine responsibility marked the beginning of a determined counterinsurgency effort, and sent the message that the British were serious about defeating the Mau Mau. The Royal East Kent Regiment ('the Buffs'), serving in Kenya at the time, agreed, as they noted that the appointment of Erskine

> marked a Governmental upgrading in importance of the war against the Mau Mau, and no sooner had Erskine's smiling, beefy features been seen hurtling, with jeep escort ahead and dust cloud behind, past men of the Buffs than they were filled with fresh confidence that the days of the Mau Mau were numbered.[73]

His approach motivated the troops and gave them confidence, both in him as a leader and in themselves, that the insurgency could be defeated. Erskine is also described as having 'efficient calm and pragmatism',[74] and according to Townshend his 'weight and forcefulness made an impact'[75]; thus the values and methods that he advocated were more likely to be adopted due to his charismatic personality. Erskine was 'brisk and to the point in everything he said and did ... one could almost see the Regiments snap collectively to attention as Erskine sized up the situation'.[76] His 'energetic authority' and 'robust determination'[77] gave him that sense of purpose needed in a charismatic leader. His actions set an example and he was indeed dynamic. In a biographical note about Erskine, he is described as being a 'soldier

diplomat': 'the need has arisen more than ever, that our top ranking soldiers should be part diplomatic [sic] and part statesman'.[78] This was certainly true, as Templer had found in Malaya. In Kenya, however, although Erskine was influential, he was frustrated by his lack of control over political elements. Nonetheless, he understood small wars and what was required to win them, even though at times he could not implement these methods; whether exaggeration or not, an officer was certainly inspired by Erskine's leadership in Kenya, in saying that Erskine was 'greatly underrated … but as far as his understanding of counter-insurgency methods go, probably the most advanced commander we have ever produced'.[79]

Unfortunately, there are few details in the literature and archives about General Lathbury as a leader, or his characteristics. But we saw from the previous section that he demonstrated a strong small wars ethos in what he focused on and the methods that he chose to adopt. So as in Malaya, the leadership qualities of the key figures in Kenya were mixed. While Rimbault and Hinde were criticised (and were unable to influence), both Erskine and Lathbury did recognise what was required in Kenya to defeat the Mau Mau and win back the support of the people. They had many of the qualities necessary for, as Edgar Schein notes, communicating major assumptions and values in a clear and vivid manner.[80] Erskine did indeed have a sense of vision of what was required to end the conflict and stabilise Kenya in the long term, although he was often frustrated by his inability to implement this in conjunction with the civilian administration. He was also influential (see the next section) although again clashed with the local government on the long-term solutions for Kenya. His confident personality motivated the soldiers under his command and encouraged them to accept his small wars methods and ideas as best practice. In short, this was another dynamic, charismatic personality whose leadership qualities encouraged the further embedding of the army's small wars culture.

Support Networks

During the first phase of the conflict, when little progress was made, it is evident that there was little support for General Hinde and his

approach to the uprising. Generals Robertson and Cameron did not give their backing to his reactive and defensive approach, and, as discussed earlier, they thought him a poor leader whose methods were slow and uninspired.[81] They in turn did not take responsibility for the situation,[82] and it was up to the CIGS, Field Marshal Harding, to recognise the need for troop reinforcements.[83] Throughout the conflict there was also ongoing tension between Governor Baring (and the local administration), and the central British administration, in particular the military. Hinde was frustrated by the lack of support he was receiving from Baring, which is evident in this response from GHQ MELF to Hinde's appreciation of the situation and plan of action:

> I was disappointed to see that H. E. [His Excellency, i.e. Baring] has only commented verbally that he is in general agreement with ... [the plan]. What, of course, is wanted is for him to say which parts he does not agree with and, having amended it accordingly, he should give it his formal approval. It would then become his policy and the KENYA [sic] Government plan to which all would work.[84]

Baring, however, was also short of support in this first phase; in December 1952 he requested a full-time military Director of Operations, who could focus on defeating the Mau Mau, but the Colonial Secretary and the Chiefs of Staff turned this request down since the situation was not seen to be serious enough.[85] This all-round lack of support in the early stages from many senior military and political figures demonstrates how an inappropriate approach, compounded by a lack of backing from further up the chain of command, really hindered the resolution of the conflict and the practical application of small wars methods, and also held back the continuing evolution of an effective approach to small wars in general.

The arrival of General Erskine saw a change in the dynamics of support in Kenya, and the networks that were in place. Erskine and his methods had considerable support from the British government and from Harding, the CIGS. He did, however, encounter the same frustrations and difficulties as Hinde in working with the Governor and the

settler community (of whom Erskine had a strong dislike). The CIGS visited Kenya in February 1953 (while Hinde was still in charge), and having previously been the C-in-C of FARELF was frustrated that 'none of the lessons of Malaya seemed to have been learned, or indeed even been heard of'.[86] Harding, having realised that a more serious approach and additional troops were required, also recognised that 'in the military, police and the civil administration there was no firm grip and direction, no intelligence and little sense of urgency', and recommended the appointment of General Erskine to sort things out,[87] saying that

> All my own experience of operations in Malaya, confirmed by General Templer since, plus my knowledge of conditions in Kenya gained during my visit there last spring, have convinced me that it is at brigade level that the vital co-ordination of military, police and civil effort must be carried out.[88]

This intense interest in Kenya and support for Erskine and his methods demonstrates that, based on his past experience (see the next section), Harding had developed a small wars ethos and was intuitively promoting the British army's small wars culture and its operationalisation in the Kenya campaign. In addition, this interest of the CIGS (both Harding and Templer) in Kenya was important for the broader promotion of small wars concepts (as discussed in Chapter 3), since this senior position is central to both the upwards dissemination of military ideas to politicians and government, and the downward embedding of methods throughout the army.

According to Anthony Clayton, Erskine and Churchill had been friends for many years, and Churchill had taken a personal interest in his appointment to Kenya.[89] However, it was the backing Erskine received from the new Colonial Secretary, Sir Oliver Lyttelton (later Lord Chandos), that would be especially beneficial (as it had been to Templer in Malaya too). Lyttelton recognised the need for long-term political solutions to the problems in Kenya, and realised that there were legitimate grievances that would need to be addressed (which concurred with Erskine's view entirely.) Lyttelton and Erskine agreed on many of the tenets of these post-war counterinsurgency operations. On

colonial policy, Lyttelton said that 'The dominant theme of colonial policy had to be the careful and if possible gradual and orderly progress of the colonies towards self-government', and in Kenya he was strongly in favour of long-term solutions based on providing the local African population with a share in government (and had critical views on the role of the settler population in political reform).[90] Lyttelton's grasp of small wars notions is also demonstrated by his support and encouragement for the decision to streamline the decision-making process in March 1954, following a visit to appraise the situation. The committee system was reorganised, moving from a complex arrangement involving the Colony Emergency Committee which met once a fortnight, to a small and more efficient War Council which met twice a week.[91] This meant that Erskine had far more control over political decisions, and there was better civil–military–police coordination. The implications of this were, as David Anderson notes, that 'the new structure gave Erskine control: military policy could be coordinated with the police and other arms of the security forces on his terms'.[92] This was in agreement with Lyttelton, who said 'experience in Malaya had taught us that the frontiers between military, para-military, police and civil activities cannot be rigidly drawn, and some synthesis must be made'.[93]

While Lyttelton supported General Erskine and his approach, it was clear that there was a degree of tension between him (and the Colonial Office in London) and Governor Baring (and the Kenya administration). In a cautionary message in December 1952 Lyttelton wrote to Baring that

> I do not demur to sparing exceptional use of communal punishment but you should know that experience in Malaya which I have just discussed with General Templer strongly supports my view that its effectiveness is limited and the bitterness it induces in innocent people who have suffered from it often defeats what should be our primary purpose of persuading waverers to come out on our side and above all to volunteer information.[94]

Baring and Erskine also clashed on counterinsurgency methods in Kenya, and Anderson notes that they were 'never comfortable colleagues'.[95] Baring did not have Erskine's energy or dynamism, and

did not have the forward-thinking, modern attitude towards the colony that was shared by Erskine and Lyttelton. The strained relationship between the Governor and the military leader had a damaging impact on the effective resolution of the Kenya conflict; Erskine did not have the same authority as Templer in Malaya, and his attempts to implement small wars strategies such as long-term political solutions were often thwarted by the inappropriate approach of the civil administration.

Therefore, although the role of supportive *subordinates* was not as marked in Kenya as it was in Malaya, the role of like-minded *superiors* (such as the CIGS), with a similar ethos and mindset, was again very important in supporting the military leaders, in championing their methods, and in perpetuating the evolution of the British army's small wars culture and an effective counterinsurgency approach.[96] This support from senior leaders was indeed essential for enabling the campaign commanders to embed the British army's small wars culture in operational practice.

Continuity of Experience

In previous chapters I suggested that if the learning process for leaders is interrupted then ideas and methods can be forgotten, and are thus less likely to become internalised and institutionalised. Is it true in the case of Kenya that the leaders here also needed continuity of past experience in order for the learning process to be successful and for the British army's approach to small wars to evolve?

General Erskine gained conventional experience during World War Two, but he did have some 'irregular' experience which would have prepared him for Kenya and broadened his approach to unconventional warfare. In addition to extensive internal security experience in India before the war,[97] Erskine gained knowledge of diplomacy as head of the Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) Mission to Belgium,[98] and was familiar with the political nature of modern conflict having been in Egypt (the Canal Zone) prior to Kenya, dealing with anti-British demonstrations and rioting by the nationalist Wafd party, who were pushing for complete Egyptian independence. He also 'had

experience of urban terrorism, having served in Palestine at the time of the Jewish insurgency'.[99] Involvement in these conflicts where politics, diplomacy and the people were the focus, rather than conventional fighting, would have prepared Erskine well for the challenges of Kenya.[100]

I commented above on the support that Erskine received from the CIGS, Field Marshal Harding, and the importance of this backing. That Harding was understanding and supportive can be linked to his prior experiences, which would have given him the necessary mindset for recognising the best approach that should be taken to small wars. As Heather notes, 'At the most senior levels, experience in various emergencies was used to good advantage'.[101] In Malaya, Harding immediately viewed the problem – and solution – as being political rather than military, and understood that the support of the people was crucial.[102] His experience in Malaya as C-in-C FARELF was undoubtedly very important in inculcating a particular ethos and culture in him, which he helped to internalise within the British army through his encouragement of Erskine, and which would also be of great relevance in Cyprus (see Chapter 5).

It was not only the senior leaders whose past experiences were valuable in Kenya; the experiences of soldiers and regiments in general reflect the increasing focus on small wars in the years following World War Two. Heather points out that

> Several battalions served both Malaya and Kenya and doubtless applied their previous experience to the new environment. The career path for many junior Army officers started in Palestine or Malaya from where they moved through the counterinsurgency pipeline and some eventually became senior officers commanding in Northern Ireland in the 1970s.[103]

However, the first troops to arrive in Kenya from Britain, the 1st Battalion the Lancashire Fusiliers, were not prepared for counterinsurgency operations,[104] and the high proportion of national servicemen also meant that any learning from previous small wars had not necessarily been passed on. This initial lack of a small wars ethos in soldiers arriving in Kenya is another reason why the first

phase of the conflict was not hugely successful. As the conflict progressed, however, more soldiers arrived with experience from Malaya (1 King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, 1 Devonshire and 1 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers) and also Palestine (1 Black Watch).[105] These soldiers were able to adapt the more successful methods that had evolved in Malaya to the conditions in Kenya, which although different in terms of geography and cause, were similar in terms of requiring a counterinsurgency approach based on the support of the local population, civil–military–police coordination, intelligence and political solutions.

Cultural Evolution through Leadership in the Mau Mau Uprising

In this chapter I looked at the case of the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya in order to explore and analyse the role of leadership in the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars, and its associated organisational culture. The first phase of the conflict in Kenya was largely ineffective due to an underestimation of the nature of the problem and a lack of understanding of the grievances of the Kikuyu population. General Hinde as a leader was poor, relying on defensive tactics with little planning or focus on intelligence-gathering. The arrival of General Erskine in the second phase of the conflict marked a turning point in the small wars leadership there. He developed an offensive plan, and recognised the legitimate complaints of the Kikuyu. Erskine focused on intelligence, the triumvirate and discipline, and put forward these methods as best practice. He was, however, frustrated by the approach of the civil administration, Governor Baring and the settler community, and did not benefit from the same powers as Templer had had in Malaya.

The third phase of the conflict centred on Operation ANVIL (to clear Nairobi of insurgents) and the villagisation of the Kikuyu population; the positive elements of this stage were the emphasis on civil–military–police cooperation and intelligence-gathering. However, the British approach was let down by a lack of focus on hearts and minds and real social, economic and political improvements.

The final phase of the conflict was characterised by the replacement of Erskine by General Lathbury, who continued with effective small wars methods, and, due to greatly improved intelligence, was able to concentrate on using small groups and 'pseudo-gangs' to continue defeating the Mau Mau. As the conflict progressed, effective small wars leadership was demonstrated, and some elements of the distinctive British approach to these conflicts were reinforced and operationalised. This approach was also institutionalised as a 'cultural artefact' in the doctrine of the time. It is unsurprising that there was not a complete transfer of knowledge on counterinsurgency operations between Malaya and Kenya, since they occurred concurrently and Templer's success in Malaya came at the beginning of the conflict in Kenya.

The second section addressed the characteristics of the leaders involved in the conflict and how these influenced the evolution of culture. Charisma is a quality that can be used to communicate basic values and assumptions (i.e. culture) across an organisation and in a military context dynamism is essential for leaders to reinforce and embed certain methods and mindsets. In the first phase in Kenya, Hinde was sluggish and unenergetic, but the arrival of Erskine brought a new sense of urgency and dynamism. He was confident and determined, and understood what was required to resolve the conflict (from the viewpoint of a 'soldier-diplomat'). This strong approach, using some effective small wars methods, helped to internalise these practices within the British army. The third section tackled the conditions required for military leadership to be influential in the organisational learning process and the operationalisation of the small wars culture in the Kenyan context. Again the first phase of the conflict saw little support for Hinde, or for Baring, from the UK. This held back both the resolution of the conflict and the ongoing embedding of organisational culture in practice. But again things changed with the arrival of General Erskine – he received strong support for his approach from both the CIGS Harding and the Colonial Secretary, Lyttelton. However, he was held back in fully adopting effective small wars techniques by his difficult relationship with Governor Baring and the settlers. This section showed again

how important having supportive senior leaders can be (both for conflict resolution and the embedding of culture in military operations), and the consequences of a lack of support. Finally, this chapter looked at the experience of the leaders involved, and explored how relevant past small wars experience can lead to a more successful organisational learning process. It was shown how Erskine benefitted from prior experience in internal security and political/diplomatic roles, as did FM Harding, who gave his full support to Erskine. This supports the idea that continuity of past experience is important in order for the learning process to be successful and for the British army's approach to small wars to evolve.

In general, the conflict in Kenya supports the idea that military leaders influence the organisational learning process and the evolution of military organisational culture, but not as strongly as the Malayan case. Only some of the British army's distinctive approach to small wars was demonstrated, whereas other elements were not adopted. This means that the army's small wars culture was only embedded and transmitted in a limited fashion as a result of the Kenya Emergency. It is important to recognise that cultural development is often stimulated by reaction to negative events, as well as being reinforced by positive ones. The lack of success in certain areas in Kenya, and the excesses of brutality by some of the security forces, may have led to a process of learning from mistakes.

Appendix A: Erskine's Directive

Erskine's message to all security forces – 23rd June 1953[106]

It must be most clearly understood that the Security Forces under my command are disciplined forces who know how to behave in circumstances which are most distasteful.

I have the greatest confidence in the Army and Police to uphold their honour and integrity while dealing with the present situation.

I will not tolerate breaches of discipline leading to unfair treatment of anybody. We have a very difficult task and I have no intention of tying the hands of the Security Forces by orders and rules which make

it impossible for them to carry out their duty – I am practical soldier enough to know that mistakes can be made and nobody need fear my lack of support if the mistake is committed in good faith.

But I most strongly disapprove of "beating up" the inhabitants of this country just because they are the inhabitants. I hope this has not happened in the past and will not happen in the future. Any indiscipline of this kind would do great damage to the reputation of the Security Forces and make our task of settling MAU MAU much more difficult. I therefore order that every officer in the Police and the Army should stamp at once on any conduct which he would be ashamed to see used against his own people. I want to stand up for the Honour of the Security Forces with a clear conscience – I can only do that if I have absolutely loyal support and I rely on you to provide it.

Any complaints against the Police or Army which come from outside sources will be refereed to me immediately on receipt and will be investigated either by the Police or by the Army as the Attorney-General and I may, in consultation, direct. There will be full mutual cooperation between the Police and the Army in regard to all such investigations and in no circumstances will either deny information or assistance to the other.

CHAPTER 5

THE CYPRUS REVOLT, 1955–60

> . . . the experience gained in Malaya was nowhere summarized in a form available for reference. Cyprus, in turn, suffered from a lack of systematic collation of experience gained in Kenya.[1]
>
> . . . no new lessons were learnt, although some old ones were re-learnt. What was clear, however, was that if hard won experience was overlooked or disregarded, the penalty could be a heavy one.[2]

In 1955, the National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters (known as EOKA) began a campaign of insurgency in Cyprus (see Figure 5.1 for a timeline). While Britain had been focusing on the geo-strategic importance of Cyprus to the British Empire, the Greek Cypriot community in Cyprus (which made up four-fifths of the population) had grown increasingly unhappy with British rule, and began to push for *enosis*, union with mainland Greece. There was a build-up of civil disturbance and subversion during the early 1950s, and in 1955 a 'campaign of sabotage, civil disobedience and public disorder' was instigated,[3] led by the right-wing Colonel George Grivas (a retired Greek army colonel originally from Cyprus) and supported by the Greek Cypriot leader, Archbishop Makarios III. The situation was inflamed by political statements in Britain to the effect that Cyprus would never be granted independence from the Empire.[4] Frank Kitson's conclusion is that British resistance to *enosis* was approached in a 'resolute

and tactless' manner,[5] which would appear an accurate summation of the attitude at the time towards the Cypriot rebellion. The EOKA bombing campaign began on 1 April 1955, and Colonel Grivas subsequently escalated his rebellion into a combination of rural guerrilla warfare and urban terrorism, with some insurgents based in mountain groups and others infiltrating the towns. Following the first wave of violent attacks by EOKA, they began to target the troops and police on Cyprus (with both bombs and shootings), which led to street riots, and an increasing loss of control by the British. His aim, classically asymmetric and typical of insurgency campaigns, was to achieve *enosis* 'through a process of attrition by harassing, confusing and finally exasperating the British'.[6]

A counterinsurgency operation was initiated in order to end the EOKA uprising, and a new military Governor was installed in October 1955 in the shape of Field Marshal Harding, who had in recent years been involved in both Malaya (as C-in-C Far East Land Forces and CIGS) and Kenya (as CIGS), and had been hoping to retire from his position as CIGS before he was asked to govern in Cyprus. Harding declared a state of emergency in November 1955, which brought with it stricter legal procedures and in turn alienated the Greek Cypriots further; indeed, the majority were actually in favour of *enosis*. The political situation deteriorated in 1956 when Makarios refused to accept a British offer of partial independence and financial aid; negotiations broke down and he was removed from office by Harding and deported to the Seychelles in March. The insurgency increased in ferocity and British troops concentrated on protecting civilians and their property and, once again, detention and collective punishment were introduced.[7] The campaign in Cyprus was complicated by the fact that a large number of the EOKA insurgents were schoolchildren and youths, which made counterinsurgency operations especially difficult; as Lawrence Durrell notes, 'there was no quicker way of igniting the villager than by shooting a couple of schoolchildren during a riot'.[8] Troops were diverted away from Cyprus for the Suez crisis from July to December 1956, which meant that the EOKA insurgency could continue its offensive, but when the British troops returned in January 1957 they were able to step up the counterinsurgency operations again,




Figure 5.1 Timeline of figures and roles during the Cyprus Revolt

and sent EOKA back on the defensive, although the insurgents still retained a good deal of popular support.

An EOKA ceasefire from March 1957 until March 1958 enabled the insurgents to recuperate, but also saw an increase in the activity of a *Turkish* Cypriot insurgent group, along with the replacement of Field Marshal Harding with a civilian Governor, Sir Hugh Foot, on 3 November 1957.[9] By now, intercommunal violence between the Turkish and Greek communities had intensified, and the British were accused of tacitly backing the Turks (while also trying to keep the two communities apart), which caused further insurgent attacks and riots by EOKA; these were increasingly aimed at terrorising the civilian population, which proved counterproductive. The worst attacks against the British happened in October 1958, when the wife of a British soldier was murdered in the street by EOKA, and another seriously injured. This led to severe reprisals by British troops, who were subsequently criticised for their excessive force.

However, while Grivas continued leading the armed fight, a political compromise had been reached. Changes in the international arena between 1955 and 1959 meant that independence could be offered by Britain. At this later stage, after the Suez Crisis, Cyprus was seen as a key base but by 1959 British influence in the Middle East had waned and defence priorities had changed; the 1957 defence review by Duncan Sandys, the Minister of Defence, reprioritised the significance of Cyprus, and Britain was prepared to accept two Sovereign Base Areas on the island, while granting it independence. By December 1958 the Greek Cypriot aim of *enosis* was abandoned (primarily due to pressure from the Turkish community) in favour of accepting the offer of independence from Britain. Grivas was persuaded to end the EOKA campaign of violence and return to Greece, and accords were signed between Greece, Turkey and Britain in February 1959. The State of Emergency officially ended on 19 April 1959, and independence was granted on 16 August 1960 (along with the creation of the two Sovereign Base Areas, at Akrotiri and Dhekelia).[10] The conflict can therefore be divided into three phases, for the purposes of the forthcoming analysis: the pre-Harding phase; Harding's governorship; and Foot's governorship. As previously, I explore here the role of leadership

in the process of the evolution of the British army's small wars culture, but now for the case of the Cyprus emergency.

The Role of Leadership in Cultural Evolution

This first section looks at how British leaders in Cyprus transmitted and embedded the British army's small wars culture by analysing the three phases of the conflict and using Schein's model on the relationship between leadership and cultural evolution, which argues that leaders can promote and perpetuate a certain culture through what they focus on, how they manage critical situations, what they put resources into and what they promote as best practice.

Phase 1: April 1955–October 1955

As in Malaya and Kenya, the initial phase of the conflict in Cyprus was underestimated and badly handled by the British. The civilian authorities in Cyprus thought that the unrest could be handled as 'business as usual': 'they [the Government of Cyprus] had not anticipated cool, premeditated terrorism of the sort previously associated with Jewish extremists in Palestine'.[11] There was no sense of urgency, nor any focus on the revolt as a serious insurgency. The local Cypriots' legitimate grievances were ignored, which only served to fuel ill-feeling and resentment towards the British administration. In these initial few months, it became increasingly clear that, in particular, the local police forces were very badly prepared and that the intelligence picture was incredibly poor – the extent of ill-feeling amongst the Cypriot population had been badly misjudged and little preparation had been done in case an insurgency was to break out. Lawrence Durrell sums up the situation by saying that 'the state of our unpreparedness for any real crisis was frightening'.[12]

The poor police preparation and lack of intelligence on EOKA are of course interrelated. By 1955, the Cyprus police force had become partial (manned predominantly by Greek Cypriots), undisciplined and corrupt.[13] They were also poorly trained, paid and equipped, and remained on a peacetime footing, even though the situation in Cyprus

was worsening rapidly.[14] Language was also a problem, both in the police and the civil administration; arrogantly, very few policemen or government officers had ever studied Greek or Turkish. The British Director of Military Intelligence noted that

> So far as we could judge the past history of the administration in the island has been deplorable. Virtually no officials of the Colonial administration ever learnt Greek or Turkish and they had virtually no contact with the local population ... the Colonial officials lived a life entirely apart from the people they were there to govern. At the same time no steps were taken to establish a proper security system ...[15]

All this meant that information about EOKA and other insurgent groups was thin on the ground, especially since there was no police Special Branch. On a visit to Cyprus in 1955 Field Marshal Templer suggested some major police improvements, based on his recent experience in Malaya, and recommended specifically the establishment of a Special Branch, advice which was duly heeded.[16] However, by September 1956 the intelligence picture had deteriorated further, since 'members of the Special Branch itself were beginning to confine themselves to doing only their routine duty and were unwilling to "live dangerously" to obtain information'.[17] Harding himself said later that the Special Branch was 'reduced to impotence' by intimidation and low morale.[18]

This lack of accurate information on the insurgents had a negative effect on military operations, which were making very slow progress in their counterinsurgency campaign against EOKA. A soldier in the Parachute Regiment, Mike Gray, recalls that

> We carried out some very successful operations, but you didn't know where Grivas was, although you had an idea he might be in a certain area, and you had to work to a very largely orchestrated pattern which was above the battalion, it was brigade or larger. But our intelligence was not good – and if you haven't got intelligence you just founder.

He also comments that

> every campaign we go into we seem to start off with a blank sheet and then we build up intelligence. You might have thought, after all the experience we have had, that we would have gone in a bit better prepared, but we never have.[19]

Clearly lessons that could have been applied from the campaigns in Malaya and Kenya were not at this stage transmitted to Cyprus. Large-scale cordon and search operations were introduced, and soldiers were placed in a defensive, reactionary role; a soldier who served there commented that the situation resembled that in Malaya in 1950, with soldiers being used on static duties to guard police stations.[20]

In this first phase, leadership of the campaign (either by the Governor Sir Robert Armitage, or by the military and police) as a serious counter-insurgency effort was lacking. An example of this is given by Durrell, who recollects that a government official said, just before the start of the conflict, that the offer of a constitution for Cyprus would mean that the administration could 'get back to the job of just jogging along'.[21] He describes government officials as not having 'the faintest knowledge of the particular needs of the department concerned [in this case the Police], and certainly no imaginative grasp of the current urgency of our needs'.[22] The focus for these first few months was not on any of the existing, tried-and-tested counterinsurgency methods that had been evolving to date. None of the 'best practice' elements from Malaya and Kenya, or earlier conflicts, were put forward as an appropriate approach here. Field Marshal Harding, as CIGS, visited Cyprus in mid-July 1955, and, based on his knowledge of Malaya, recommended that a 'supremo' be appointed,[23] one single man who could run both the military and political campaigns, and bring fresh impetus to resolving the Cyprus problem. His recommendation was acted upon, and the choice of leader for this task was closer to home than he had anticipated!

Phase 2: October 1955–November 1957

As Templer took over from Harding as CIGS, the British government asked Harding to take on the role of Governor in Cyprus, prior to his

retirement. He was thought to be 'the ideal man to defeat Grivas',[24] with the experience and knowledge to combine military and political measures to bring about a resolution to the revolt. Harding had three key objectives on arrival in Cyprus: (1) putting the administration on a war footing, (2) beginning negotiations with Makarios and (3) going on the offensive against EOKA.[25] One of his first major decisions after arrival in October 1955 was to declare a State of Emergency, which took effect on 26 November. This brought with it the now familiar restrictions on the population of collective punishments, fines, curfews, censorship, and strict sentences (for example, for possession of weapons). Again, it seemed as though the population was being made to see that the government could be more intimidating than the insurgents.

Harding's aims were to restore law and order, implement social and economic reforms, improve the standard of living and discuss constitutional reforms.[26] However, he was constrained from the very start by not being able to give the Greek Cypriots the one thing they wanted – *enosis*. Nonetheless, he did focus seriously on the insurgency, stressing many of the elements that needed improving, based on his knowledge of small wars (such as the triumvirate and committee system, intelligence, the police and reinforcements for the army).[27] That said, he also retained certain methods that had been proven ineffective or counterproductive in previous small wars, and was held back by certain factors specific to Cyprus. These positive and negative elements of Harding's approach are discussed next.

Police and Intelligence

Harding realised that troops were acting in a policing role, and from November 1955 the army and the police attended a joint staff college.[28] There was, however, little love lost between the army and the police at this time, with one soldier saying 'we didn't have a lot of respect for any of the police out there'.[29] One of Harding's first priorities was therefore to strengthen the Cyprus police force, improve their morale and restore their professionalism.[30] This, in turn, would lead to an improvement in the intelligence picture, and also free up troops from static guard duties so they could operate more on the

offensive. However, Harding has been strongly criticised for ignoring local advice, and hastily increasing police numbers by recruiting more poorly trained Turkish Cypriots, which compounded the problem.[31] He did succeed in freeing up the military for more active duties but the long-term goal of improving the police force was impeded.

As already noted, before Harding's arrival, and for a time afterwards, information on EOKA was very poor: 'The greatest handicap to effective operations was the almost total absence of operational intelligence with the result that operations by the security forces tended to be limited to reaction to incidents'.[32] There was little coordination, collection or distribution of data between military and police intelligence. As Foley and Scobie observe, 'In the field ... the British were becoming increasingly aware that numbers were of small avail against an organization that could dissolve into, and draw strength from, the people. What was needed now was better intelligence'.[33] Harding reorganised the intelligence machinery and appointed a single overall Director of Intelligence, which paved the way for gradual improvements.[34] An additional intelligence coup came in June 1956 when troops looking for General Grivas discovered his diaries, which he had been forced to leave behind in his hurry to escape. Harding himself notes that by early 1957 the intelligence picture was greatly improved and that this was leading to greater success in tracking down EOKA members.[35] Dimitrakis concurs: 'as time passed, from 1956 onwards, the British acquired high-quality intelligence about EOKA's methods and operations. The main sources were voluminous EOKA confiscated documents, the diary of Georgios Grivas, the organisation's leader, and interrogations of arrested members'.[36] This improved intelligence meant that the army could be used more effectively in smaller groups, tracking down known EOKA members. As had been learned in previous conflicts, the link between good intelligence and success in the military sphere of a counterinsurgency campaign could not be overestimated; but yet again it was seen how slow the process of building up intelligence could be. Harding knew that it was best practice to focus on the police and intelligence since he was aware of the benefits that it would bring, but operationalising this approach took a considerable amount of time.

Civil–Military–Police Coordination

Another area that Harding focused on was improving coordination and cooperation between the civil–police–military elements of the campaign, in line with small wars 'best practice'. Along with the aforementioned introduction of a single Director of Intelligence, cooperation improved with the establishment of daily meetings between the civil–military–police commanders, and the division of the country into operational zones, which were supervised by a committee comprising a military officer, a senior policeman, and a civil commissioner.[37] This correlated with the overall direction of operations, which was overseen by the Cyprus Internal Security Committee, consisting of the Governor, Commissioner of Police, Director of Intelligence, the Colonial Secretary (and his deputy), the Commander of Cyprus District (army), the Air Officer Commanding Cyprus and the Flag Officer Middle East (navy).[38] As discussed, a joint Army Police Staff School was set up in November 1955; this was replaced in early 1957 by the Internal Security Training Centre, which aided the development of a joint approach, the transmission of counterinsurgency techniques, the pooling of ideas and the evolution of new methods.[39]

Harding's biography notes that 'a sense of urgency in all matters, but especially in those concerned with security, was to be inculcated into all branches of the administration',[40] and this move by Harding to integrate the different elements of the campaign enabled the campaign to be taken seriously and tackled in an organised manner. In an attempt to transmit his approach across the security forces, prior to his departure at the end of October 1957, Harding gave an address to the District Security Committees, in which he stressed his belief that

> it is of vital importance that you should preserve the high standard of understanding and co-operation and of good comradeship that you have built up here between the civil administration, the police and the armed forces … That, in my opinion, is the Ace of spades …[41]

Increased Troop Numbers

When Harding arrived in Cyprus the few troops were almost fully occupied with static guard duties and defensive operations, and were spread very thinly, many having to be held back in readiness for anti-riot duties. Hence another of his positive developments was to demand and be granted an immediate increase in the numbers of troops serving in the counterinsurgency operation on Cyprus. These additional units were to be used to 'destroy EOKA and re-establish law and order with the minimum delay'.[42] The ability of the military to operate to full capacity was also greatly affected by the Suez Crisis in July 1956. Harding estimated the loss of five units for the Suez campaign put the counterinsurgency operation back by two to three months, and meant that offensive operations were often not possible due to the reduction in troop numbers.[43] Fortunately, the return of troops from Suez in January 1957 meant that the fight could once again be taken to EOKA.

The high proportion of national servicemen was just as significant in Cyprus as it had been in Malaya and Kenya. While the small wars culture could be embedded and transmitted among the professional elements of the army by its leadership, it was very difficult to have any continuity of approach among soldiers who undertook only a basic amount of training and served in the army for only two years before returning to civilian life. Any learning from previous counterinsurgency conflicts was unlikely to be passed on through the National Service elements of the army. This can be demonstrated by a statement from Martin Bell (the journalist), who, when interviewed about his National Service in Cyprus, said 'I didn't have a clue about the politics of it all – I had no understanding whatsoever'.[44] Other interviews with national servicemen are insightful. Pat Baker recollects that he didn't know what the army was doing in Cyprus or who the enemy was, which led to a general mistrust of locals. Robert Gretton says that 'it was just alarming because we had no training about how to deal with rioting children, or any other sort of rioting people, for that matter'.[45]

'Hearts and Minds'

Field Marshal Harding had the right intentions in introducing social and economic reforms to Cyprus on his arrival. However, he was

always going to be fighting a losing battle, since the Greek Cypriots were calling not for a better standard of living from the British but for the severing of ties with Britain altogether and union with Greece. Nonetheless, this 'hearts and minds' approach by Harding, as had been seen in Malaya, does demonstrate a small wars mindset on his part. In November 1955 he introduced 'a comprehensive economic and social development plan' costing £38 million, in an attempt to appease the Cypriots and show them a decent alternative to *enosis*, which would cover improving the standard of living, providing full employment, developing the irrigation and power systems, and better roads, forests, and ports management.[46] The military was involved closely in these projects; for example, the Royal Engineers helped to improve local village infrastructures and the Royal Army Medical Corps conducted free clinics.[47]

Harding was certain that these methods to improve the lot of the locals would help to defeat the insurgency:

> I attach great importance to progress in the economic and social fields and have been working on plans to that end since my arrival … I have allocated half a million sterling from this year's revenue for rural development. I believe that by imaginative development and better publicity and propaganda we can do much to improve our position, divide the opposition and attract moderate opinion to our side.[48]

This was supported by a Foreign Office minute which said that 'The Governor feels that there are positive advantages in developing the educational system and the general standard of living in the island to a point which gives Cypriots a strong vested interest in retaining the British connection'.[49] However, this was proved to be overly optimistic. The main focus of the campaign in Cyprus was in fact in the political sphere and, as we shall see below, this is where it foundered.

Political Guidance and the 'Supremo' Role

The political element of the emergency in Cyprus was incredibly complex. Along with the police and military campaigns, Harding

was spending a great part of his time negotiating with Archbishop Makarios and trying to reach a lasting political settlement on which all actors could agree. The number of different actors with a stake in the Cyprus conflict was far more than in previous insurgencies; the views that had to be taken into account included those of the British government, the British Cyprus administration, the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots in addition to the national Greek and Turkish administrations themselves, and also the USA, the UN and NATO. Julian Paget notes that 'the Cyprus question was essentially a political issue, in which the military forces were acting in support of a political policy. Every military action had political implications, and there could seldom be any major decision that could be called "a purely military matter"'.[50] Harding was well aware that the solution would come from a political settlement rather than military victory, and of the range of actors involved in brokering a solution. In a telegram to the Secretary of State for the Colonies he emphasised that

> no matter how successful we may be against EOKA; no matter what happens to Radcliffe's proposals; there can be no real or lasting solution to the Cyprus problem without agreement between the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey on the question of self-determination and the future international status of the island. I am very much afraid that unless we seize this opportunity with both hands and go all out for a solution during the next few months the problem will drag on indefinitely and eventually become another Palestine.[51]

However this was easier said than done. As Roberts and Kitchener had experienced many years earlier in the South African War, and General Erskine in Kenya, Harding was frustrated by the approach of British politicians and civilian leaders, who were unable to offer any real incentives to the local population to turn their support away from EOKA. The British government was adamant that Cyprus as a whole was required as a base in the Middle East, rather than merely bases on Cyprus. Especially after the Suez Crisis, Britain was determined not to let go of Cyprus, which immediately left Harding fighting with one

arm behind his back. Even though 'for a considerable period Governor Harding had been warning that only the intercession of a credible political solution could prevent the recurrence of violence',[52] the position of the British government, compounded by the stubbornness of Makarios, meant that 'he [Harding] had nothing to offer – indeed he was cumbered by formulations so abounding in double negatives, in triple-dyed reservations, that anyone – not merely a Greek – might feel they had been designed to make a fool of him'.[53] Harding's patience eventually wore thin and in March 1956, after talks had broken down once again, he ordered the deportation of Makarios to the Seychelles.

On the basis of what had happened in Malaya and Kenya, it seemed at the outset to be the right choice to appoint a 'supremo' to control all aspects of the Emergency. However, was Harding in this case, in his dual military–political role, more of a hindrance than a help? Harding himself said:

> I came to Cyprus convinced that, although military measures might be essential towards creating the conditions for a just and lasting settlement, the basis for that settlement had to be found in the political field through negotiation and compromise.[54]

Despite this, he has been strongly criticised for maintaining primarily the mindset of a soldier and only adopting a political ethos as a secondary priority. In a letter to General Sir Richard O'Connor, Harding wrote that 'political progress is very dependent on increasing success against the terrorists'.[55] Given his small wars knowledge, ought he not to have realised it should be the other way round? Harding has also been criticised for not understanding Greek Cypriot susceptibilities (for example, the blanket ban on flying the Greek flag), and his detractors said he had a 'naïve trust in military methods and little grasp of politics'.[56]

Robert Holland is probably the most critical of Harding: 'His [Harding's] understanding always remained that of the soldier, and it was his greatest weakness in his new career that he could not alter his *métier*'.[57] In an address to the District Security Committees, just before leaving Cyprus, Harding said that the resolution of the Cyprus problem

'is an example of something that never can or will be done by security or military measures. It can only be done on the political side and with the participation and help … of the general public'.[58] Nonetheless, Holland remains convinced that 'Harding left, as he had arrived, a soldier first, and a politician second'. While Templer, for example, fully grasped the balance between political and military elements of counterinsurgency operations (in Malaya), 'Harding grasped this important truth only partially'.[59] Although, from a normative point of view, Harding did know that a focus on politics and political solutions was required, in practice he found it difficult to operationalise this approach in the demanding political conditions of Cyprus.

Collective Punishment and Brutality

Despite attempts at winning over local 'hearts and minds' through economic and social reforms, the security forces were criticised for using excessive force and brutal methods in Cyprus, as they had been in Kenya. In addition to this, collective punishments were enforced by Field Marshal Harding from the outset of the declaration of the State of Emergency, even though he had experience of the counterproductive nature of these methods from previous small wars. As in Kenya, such an approach was necessary at this stage, given the poor state of intelligence when Harding took over; smaller-scale, targeted operations could not be undertaken until the security forces had a better idea of who and where the insurgents were. Harding knew he was walking a tightrope; in April 1956 he said that

> Apart from their intrinsic justification, one of the results of the various measures such as collective fines, curfews and other restrictions that have recently been increased is the restoration of respect for authority. At the same time it is essential to hold a proper balance between such measures and the need to avoid unnecessarily antagonising the general public thereby creating a spiral of repression and popular resentment.[60]

Nonetheless, some of the measures taken seem extreme. In June 1956 a collective fine of £35,000 was issued to the residents of Limassol, for a

'complacent attitude towards terrorism'.[61] This again shows that, while Harding had a normative knowledge of correct small wars methods, in practice he could not implement these and resorted to an ineffective approach.

The principle of minimum force, now well established within the British army, was challenged by Grivas, who deliberately planned attacks which would lead to a disproportionate British response. As in Kenya, it is difficult to determine whether allegations of torture and human rights abuses in Cyprus were predominantly EOKA propaganda, whether they were isolated cases, or whether brutality was in fact widespread. Often the police and soldiers were operating in situations of extreme provocation (with their own families being targeted); however, that is not an excuse for a breakdown in professionalism, especially given that leaders were aware of the principle of minimum necessary force and the benefits which that approach could bring. After the State of Emergency was declared, all soldiers were issued with a copy of *Instructions to Individuals for Opening Fire in Cyprus*, an eight-point instruction booklet saying when lethal force could be used.[62] Some sources claim that it was predominantly the police who were excessively brutal, especially in interrogations, and others place the culpability more widely. One soldier said that 'if you were not careful your soldiers would emulate his [the Turkish policeman's] tactics and that would cut across all the ethics that you had been trying to reserve to make sure things were done as cleanly and within the law as possible'.[63] Nancy Crawshaw sums up the situation thus:

> Reputations varied with different regiments. The South Staffordshires were noted for the gentleness of their tactics in dispersing riots; the Royal Marine Commandos for their ability to get on with the villagers. The paratroopers, usually called upon to deal with the most critical situations, were associated with roughness in carrying out searches. The soldiers' reactions in any given incident were apt to be influenced by the degree of provocation and the number of casualties suffered by their units. The great majority of British soldiers carried out their duties under conditions of strain with exemplary patience and

> restraint: The security forces needed information quickly from a captured terrorist before the rest of the gang had time to get away. That rough handling took place when armed men were arrested was officially admitted as unavoidable, especially if they put up any defence.[64]

Charles Foley, a journalist in Cyprus at the time, concurs with Crawshaw, and says the newly arrived paratroopers 'descended on Nicosia like a Wyatt Earp posse bent on cleaning up Dodge City'. Harding 'followed up with a mild admonition', and from then on 'forceful methods were exceptional, on the whole'. Foley says 'the ordinary National Serviceman and policeman knew no more than Harding about the thousands of Greeks who were being interrogated day after day and night after night', but insists that those accused of torture were a minority of specially trained intelligence officials, both civilian and military.[65] From a leadership perspective, Harding conceded that 'good interrogation and the enforcement of legal punishment were very important aids to obtaining information'[66]; he brought in experts from Malaya and Kenya who had experience of intelligence and interrogation but it was often these people who were accused of using torture to extract information.[67] In early April 1956, two officers (an intelligence corps captain and a lieutenant from the Gordon Highlanders) were court-martialled and convicted of causing bodily harm during an interrogation.[68] Although this demonstrates an awareness of the importance of the minimum force principle and a willingness by leaders to punish those who went against it, in practice it was difficult to control interrogation methods across the board, especially when they were successful in obtaining actionable intelligence.[69]

Large-Scale Operations

Finally, Harding's principal focus continued to be on relatively large-scale cordon and search operations, primarily for reasons discussed above, in particular the only gradually improving intelligence picture, even though such operations had been proven to be counterproductive in the past. Major Cooper-Key comments that 'because of a lack of accurate information it has often been necessary to deploy a large

number of troops over a suspected area of ground in the hope of flushing terrorists into the arms of a waiting cordon. Results from this type of operation have normally been poor'.[70] Another Parachute Regiment officer was among many who realised that large-scale operations were ineffective:

> A big, fat white hand coming down on a map and the order 'Circle that area with ten thousand chaps' was totally counter-productive, because you were working in the local environment among people who looked at the terrorist guerrillas as freedom fighters … it just demeaned your own military prestige and effectiveness.[71]

Another soldier comments that searches were 'fairly ham fisted because we didn't have the exact information'.[72]

As with the other cases, over time the associated improvements in intelligence, increased troop numbers and better communications meant that smaller-scale operations could gradually be introduced. In Cyprus this process was aided by the arrival of Major General Kendrew as Director of Operations in February 1956. He made great attempts to introduce more unconventional methods (building on the lessons from Malaya and Kenya), stating in April 1957 that

> the arrest of EOKA leaders and organisers must continue relentlessly. The recovery of arms and ammunition remains a most important task. This should be achieved whenever possible by 'snatch' methods; the cordoning and searching of villages must be kept to a minimum.[73]

This demonstrates an understanding of effective small wars methods by a senior commander; he was promoting these as best practice and therefore transmitting an element of the British army's distinctive approach to small wars. Especially once the Parachute Brigade had returned to Cyprus following the Suez Crisis, small group operations became more commonplace, with small units often operating at night and for long periods at a time.[74] Major Cooper-Key comments that 'the

small-scale operation, based on accurate information, is undoubtedly the one that pays the greatest dividend and it has been by this method that the recent major successes have been recorded'; he goes on to say that

> speed in acting on information is essential for success in these types of operations and this can best be achieved by small mobile parties at instant readiness; a few men arriving at a hide within minutes is far more likely to be successful than a battalion arriving the next day.[75]

This example of methods demonstrates that troops *did* know that small-scale operations were preferable to large cordon and search manoeuvres (from a normative point of view), and that once they were possible (due to better intelligence), this more effective approach could be operationalised.

Phase 3: November 1957–August 1960

Field Marshal Harding left Cyprus in October 1957, having made some improvements, particularly at the tactical level, but with much progress still to be made at the political level and in defeating EOKA. He was replaced as Governor by a civilian, Sir Hugh Foot, who had a very different reputation from that of the Field Marshal. From a positive point of view, Foot focused on building up a good rapport with the local community and politicians, and he gained a reputation for visiting villages on horseback, getting to know the locals and the community leaders.[76] From a political viewpoint, the benefits of having a civilian Governor were that military activity was again completely subordinated to political negotiations, and progress was aided by a clearer policy from the British government. However, Foot's conciliatory attitude and gestures of good will made the military ever more wary of his methods, and he became increasingly detached from the security and military campaign. Robert Holland comments that 'Governor Foot, unlike Harding, had no close personal oversight of the security campaign'.[77] It was fortunate, therefore, that the military

Director of Operations was a strong leader, with a strong awareness of small wars methods and priorities (which will be discussed shortly).

Major General Kendrew was replaced as Director of Operations by Major General Darling on October 1958. However, just prior to this the most controversial incident of the conflict occurred. Two British army wives were out shopping for a wedding dress for one of their daughters when they were shot in full view in the street. One of the women, Mrs Cutliffe, was killed, and the other seriously injured. The subsequent reaction by the security forces was excessive, and as Dewar points out, 'there is little doubt that the troops were so disgusted by this horrific murder that they broke some of the rules'.[78] Hundreds of Greek Cypriots were rounded up and interrogated, and although Foot and Kendrew immediately flew to the scene to control the situation it had already escalated.[79] What does this say about the British army's small wars culture? Was this an exception to the minimum force principle, brought about by extreme provocation? Or does it demonstrate that part of the army's approach was in fact the use of inappropriate levels of violence? It is difficult to provide a definitive answer to this, although the doctrine of the time does emphasise the minimum force philosophy (see below, and Chapter 3). Partly on the basis of this incident, Darling later stressed that military tactics should be those of 'controlled robustness', and that the 'conduct of military forces must be above reproach': 'bludgeon tactics generally do not pay'.[80]

The replacement of Kendrew with Darling as Director of Operations heralded another new phase in the security campaign. Major General Darling brought a simple, aggressive military message to Cyprus but also demonstrated a clear small wars ethos. Kendrew had initiated a strategy which Darling implemented further: an intelligence-driven approach of 'softly softly, catchee monkey', using small silent night patrols to focus on catching and eliminating the EOKA leadership, by gradually turning up the pressure.[81] As Foley notes

> Every General who came to Cyprus made the same discovery sooner or later: EOKA had to be fought on its own terms. Periodically the army were told to get out of their trucks and on

> to their feet, to use stealth rather than force. Darling brought this principle into town patrols, with surprising effects. Soldiers in plimsolls and pullovers crept along the streets from doorway to doorway and waited in dark alleys, suddenly flashing torches in the faces of unsuspecting people.[82]

Darling himself reiterated this approach in his Report on the Cyprus Emergency in 1959, in which he highlights his view that

> it is clear that an underground movement cannot be tackled by purely overt means. Operations must be selective and not indiscriminate, and lasting success can only come with penetration at the top of the organisation and elimination of the leadership. The alternative to selective action is the attack on the periphery, large scale cordons and searches and mass arrests and detentions. This is costly in troops and money and plays into the hands of the terrorists by alienating public opinion from the forces of authority. Indeed to use large number [sic] of troops is to the advantage of an underground movement in that this provides more targets for attack by mine and ambush … A subversive yet nationalist movement is not destroyed by an assault on the ordinary people; it can only be by a selective drive against the terrorist leadership undertaken by small numbers of well trained and highly skilled forces acting on the best possible information that success is achieved …
>
> to beat an underground movement it was necessary to use underground methods. Small patrols, living close to the ground over long periods were to be carried out … the theme was to be 'brains' and not 'brawn'. Whenever possible small highly skilled bodies of troops acting on definite information were to be used against limited objectives in preference to large and cumbersome cordon and search methods.[83]

Of course, Darling was fortunate that the intelligence picture had improved sufficiently that he was able to use these pinpoint tactics (and

he stressed intelligence as being the top priority in the campaign).[84] On intelligence he said that

> it took at least a year for most Battalions to realise that the Intelligence Officer was the most important man in the Battalion and if he did not function properly nothing else did. The few Units that realised these points made their mark.[85]

He was also aided by progress in the political sphere, which he could leave to the diplomatic efforts of Foot and his administration. Darling was fully aware, however, of the need for overarching political solutions, and in his report he concludes, in the section on *Dependence of the Security Forces' Operations on Political Policy*, that 'the maintenance of the political initiative made it far easier to win and keep the military initiative'.[86] As a leader, Darling also focused on the importance of clear command and control, and coordination between the elements of the triumvirate. He wrote in a minute in 1959 that

> It is a fact that during the last ten years there have been major emergencies in three territories, viz., Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus. In each case we started on a business as usual basis, and eventually when our fortunes did not prosper too well, radical measures to meet the emergency had to be undertaken. One of the changes that inevitably had to be made was to alter the peacetime system of command so that it was properly geared to meet the new threat which was posed ... the command system at the centre must satisfy the following requirements ... a) The action of the Security Forces must be most closely related to political requirements and be in tune with the latter. This demands very close touch [sic] between the Governor and the command of the Security Forces. The more personal that this is, the closer will be the touch. b) ... the prime requirement is that these [Security] Forces should have a leader and know by whom they are being led. Leadership during emergency operations is at a premium ... c) For the successful conduct of operations we all agree that our main weapon is the Intelligence organisation ...[87]

Along with the ethos of using intelligence-driven small groups with an overarching political aim and an efficient command structure, Darling also recognised the importance of both the police and the people in small wars. He toured the army camps and said

> I want you to go into the towns and meet them [the Cypriots]. Some of them may tell you we were beaten by EOKA – well, you know better, so don't argue. Your job is to build up goodwill with the people. We must look forward and not back . . .[88]

While the military had been able to improve the effectiveness of their operations, the build-up of the police proceeded slowly. A report by the Chiefs of Staff committee, which was considering the reduction of troop numbers, focused on

> the vital need to build up an adequate police force. At present more than three major units are employed on purely police duties, a task for which they are unsuited and which they cannot carry out as effectively as regular police forces . . . There are still considerable difficulties in the way of building up a police force capable of acting independently in Cyprus and it is therefore unlikely that there will be a material reduction in the Army's commitments in the next two years, if the emergency continues as at present.[89]

Darling concurred with this view and conveyed the message that

> the lesson, therefore, from Cyprus is the need early in an Emergency for a sound leavening of skilled overseas (or U.K.) Police on a long term basis with an understanding of the language and local conditions, in order to give necessary leadership and backing to the indigenous police before its loyalties are impaired.[90]

This final phase of the conflict shows that the military leadership, in the form of Major General Darling, had the necessary mindset for effectively conducting small wars, and tried to put in place many

of the elements of the British army's approach to counterinsurgency operations that had proved successful in the past. However, the lasting solution to the conflict was always to be found in the political arena, and the changing positions of the British government and the Cypriots eventually made a settlement possible. Britain conceded that two Sovereign Base Areas on the island were sufficient for defence purposes, and offered independence to Cyprus, which was granted in 1960. From a military point of view, EOKA were never defeated; while British troops had been involved in other counterinsurgency operations in recent years, learning from those experiences and applying the same methods to the rebellion in Cyprus was only sometimes possible. John Newsinger notes that 'the military successes that the British were having in Malaya and Kenya were not to be repeated in Cyprus, the counterinsurgency lessons learned in these campaigns were not to produce the same result in the very different context of the Cyprus problem'.[91] However this stage of the conflict in Cyprus was resolved as all small wars are, by a political solution.

Doctrine, Training and the Institutionalisation of Learning

As discussed in Chapter 3, the generic small wars doctrine for the British Army was updated in 1949 and 1956, although both editions were very similar. They articulated the evolving British approach to small wars and emphasised the principles and values that were often seen in practice in Cyprus too. In the first phase of the conflict, however, the insurgency was not taken seriously and therefore any military doctrine was probably not considered relevant. The lack of effective military leadership at this stage meant there was no awareness of, or interest in, referring to military doctrine or 'best practice'. Harding, however, should have been well aware of current military doctrine, and his approach was indeed consistent (by and large) with doctrine, for example, in his emphasis on civil–military–police cooperation and intelligence. Even his use of collective punishment was permissible according to the doctrine, if done out of necessity to root out bad elements and not to punish the whole population, which is supported by

Harding's quote on p. 181 (see Chapter 3 also). As a leader, Harding therefore reinforced what was considered best practice and disseminated officially through doctrine. In the third phase of the conflict, the military leaders (Kendrew and Darling) also demonstrated small wars methods that were broadly consistent with doctrine, such as the emphasis on minimum force following the attack on Mrs Cutliffe, and their focus on intelligence.

This points to a cyclical relationship between the internalisation of the British army's approach to small wars in practice, and the intellectualisation of this approach in the iterative development of doctrine. For example, there is a relationship between the evolving small wars doctrine and generic military education at institutions like the army Staff College at Camberley. As discussed in more detail earlier, particularly in Chapter 3, the syllabus for the staff course was updated from 1955 onwards to include more content on small wars and imperial policing, and case studies were introduced based on recent and ongoing counterinsurgency campaigns, including the conflict against EOKA in Cyprus.[92]

What was lacking in Cyprus, however, was a tactical-level, campaign-specific manual like those which were produced in Malaya and Kenya (*ATOM* and *A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations*, respectively). This reflects the view that Cyprus, as a more urban conflict, did not have much to learn specifically from the previous and ongoing small wars in other parts of the world (or even from the earlier Palestine conflict). The leaders in Cyprus, even Harding, did not consider it necessary to produce any kind of guidance pamphlet (except for the short *Instructions to Individual for Opening Fire*, which was in no way equivalent to something like *ATOM*). This demonstrates a lack of broader small wars thinking by the leadership, who did not take many lessons from the other concurrent conflicts.

As discussed earlier, joint army/police training was conducted in Cyprus after 1955, and the Internal Security Training Centre was established in 1957. The syllabus for the Junior Leaders' Short Course at the Internal Security Training Centre (in late 1957) did provide some guidance on the nature of the conflict in Cyprus and the way it should be addressed, in a similar, if less comprehensive manner, to, for example,

the *ATOM* handbook in Malaya. This course noted that internal security operations in Cyprus have four key elements: mental alertness; knowledge of the enemy; speed of thought and reaction; and, importantly, the 'correct application of the principles of minimum force'.[93] Soldiers attending the course were also told of the importance of having a 'comprehensive knowledge of how the terrorist mind works' and 'an intimate knowledge of the country in which he lives and operates' for responding to a developing situation quickly and accurately.[94] The syllabus goes into detail on the correct application of the principle of minimum force, saying

> It is self-evident that a gun should never be used when a baton will do nor a cordon and search operation be mounted when a snatch party can achieve the same result … Patience and tact must be used whatever the provocation.[95]

The course also covers police/army cooperation, and notes that

> All military patrols will be closely co-ordinated with Police operations and in many instances patrols will probably require to be mixed [sic]. Successful patrolling will depend upon: a) a thorough knowledge of the area, b) a thorough knowledge of the enemy's habits and tactics, c) initiative, ingenuity and enterprise by Junior Leaders.[96]

Returning to the application of minimum force, this section of the syllabus reiterates that

> Personnel must fully understand the practical implementation of 'Firmness with Courtesy'. Searches must be completely thorough and carried out with tact, patience and consideration but must never be allowed to become cursory in an effort to remain courteous.

The syllabus goes on to say that

> Although patrols in the towns will be largely carrying out Police duties, maintaining law and order by a show of force, they must

> always remember that they are military sub-units and this must be reflected in their dress, turnout, equipment and discipline, which must be exemplary.[97]

Finally, the syllabus goes into detail on the conduct of cordon and search operations, and it is interesting to note that it says they can be used 'as a punitive measure where information indicates that a village is giving active support to EOKA operations',[98] that is, as collective punishment, which ties in with the guidance given in the generic small wars doctrine of the time (even though operational experience had shown that these operations were often counterproductive). The syllabus also included the text of a lecture given by the Cyprus education department covering the background to the insurgency and the Cypriot population, their culture, religion, politics, character and education. This makes it clear that emphasis was placed on troops gaining a clear understanding of the locals and their situation. There are also annexes covering riot drill notes on the Emergency Legislation, a précis of the Cyprus police force, and background information on Colonel Grivas, to provide additional knowledge for the army and police.

All these elements of the local training syllabus highlight that what the generic doctrine was stressing as an effective approach (understanding the local situation and the legal aspects of the conflict, minimum force, army/police cooperation and so on) was also being reinforced in training specific to the counterinsurgency campaign in Cyprus (at the Training Centre), thus further embedding the British army's distinctive approach to small wars. As in the previous cases, this section therefore underlines the concrete links between the small wars leaders and the approaches they were promoting in practice, doctrine for small wars at the time, broader military education, and conflict-specific training, thus reinforcing the dissemination of the British army's small wars culture.

Leadership and the Perpetuation of Culture in Cyprus

This chapter has so far looked at the three phases of the conflict in Cyprus to explore the extent to which the leaders there embedded and

transmitted the British army's approach to small wars, and its small wars culture (using Schein's model). As in the previous cases, the first phase saw poor leadership with the unrest not being considered as a conflict at all. The situation improved greatly in the second phase, with Field Marshal Harding implementing numerous methods in line with small wars best practice. However, he also adopted some of the less successful approaches (often through necessity), and it is uncertain whether a single leader in the 'supremo' role was the best option in this case. The third phase saw the development of more successful methods in the military sphere, along with the gradual improvement in the Cyprus Police Force and, most importantly, the agreement from a political point of view on a solution to the (immediate) crisis.

What becomes clear in this case is that what were previously thought of as 'exceptions to the rule' actually often form part of the 'rule'. There may well have been a philosophy of using the minimum necessary force and winning over the local population, but in practice, especially in the early stages of these counterinsurgency conflicts when intelligence was scarce, the approach chosen was one of collective punishments and exemplary force. This continued from conflict to conflict, from the South African War, Ireland and Palestine (discussed in Chapter 2), to the first stage in Malaya (see Chapter 3) and also Kenya (Chapter 4). This approach was embedded and transmitted by leaders in the same manner as the more acceptable practices of subordinating military action to political aims and focusing on 'hearts and minds'. That good intelligence was important, and could lead to the use of smaller groups and a more targeted approach, was recognised, but there was generally a pre-conflict legacy of poor policing and information-gathering, which meant good intelligence was often just not available. This highlights a split (which I discuss in the concluding chapter) between the *normative* elements of the British army's approach to small wars, which were known and institutionalised, and the *operationalisation* of that approach, which proved to be far more difficult in practice until the requisite conditions were in place.

In the remainder of this section I consider what qualities the military leaders displayed in Cyprus and how they influenced the evolution of the distinctive British approach to small wars.

Charismatic Leadership

Charismatic leaders have numerous characteristics, and in the military context the most important has been seen to be *dynamism*; an energetic, driven, focused leader, who demonstrates a small wars ethos, is important for advancing the evolution of a small wars culture. The previous chapter also showed that being a 'soldier-diplomat' is significant.[99] Switching between a warrior ethos and that of a politician, and dealing on a daily basis with a range of different actors, are key elements of the British army's distinctive approach to small wars, and being able to do this effectively is a key characteristic of an effective small wars leader.

The two primary leaders in the Cyprus conflict, Field Marshal Harding and Sir Hugh Foot, definitely had contrasting traits. Harding was very much the military leader, despite his experiences in diplomacy and politics. He is described as being straightforward, honest and direct, as 'a man of deep sincerity, great courage, mental and physical, tireless in his devotion to duty and determination to find a just and lasting solution', who 'inspired all those who had served under him'.[100] His military prestige was obvious to those on the ground in Cyprus. Lawrence Durrell wrote: 'Sir John flew in to take over. "Fly" is the word, too, for he had all the deftness and dispatch of a francolin [a partridge], and the keen clear bird-mind of one trained to decisions based in a trained power of the will'.[101] Among his soldiers, Harding 'consistently inspired an unusual degree of respect and affection' and had a 'characteristic determination and energy';[102] as the discussion in previous chapters has shown, this drive was key to embedding and transmitting his small wars approach among the soldiers, although a younger leader would surely have demonstrated a more dynamic attitude.

These are strong characteristics of a military leader, inspiring his men and communicating his methods, but were they the best traits to demonstrate on this occasion? The role in Cyprus was incredibly complicated from the perspective of international diplomacy, and having a military man in the 'supremo' role may not have been the best approach. While Harding verged on being authoritarian, Sir Hugh

Foot was a diplomat through and through. Widely renowned for his liberal views, Foot has been described as 'urbane, quick-witted, impetuous and approachable'[103] with 'courage and panache', demonstrated by his tours of towns and villages on horseback and walks around Nicosia upon his arrival in Cyprus.[104] Whereas it has been said that Harding 'did not reach out to the ordinary people' and when he did that his 'few contacts with them were stilted',[105] Foot tried to get to know and understand the people of Cyprus and their views; just before his arrival there, Foot is quoted as saying, 'Nothing is more obnoxious to my temperament than prisons, detention camps and the whole paraphernalia of repression'.[106]

Of course, Foot was a civilian leader, so while his approach and attitude may well have been the best one for handling the situation in Cyprus, he was not necessarily important in the transmission of the British army's small wars culture. This would have been more the role for Major Generals Kendrew and Darling, the Directors of Operations. As will be shown in the next section, support was again important in ensuring the evolution of a certain approach to counterinsurgency operations, and both Kendrew and Darling also possessed the right kind of small wars mindset for operations in Cyprus. Kendrew is described as straight, honourable, courageous and energetic, while Darling had a more ferocious reputation, as being fiery, outspoken, with 'fierce energy and determination', and a 'fire and brimstone image'.[107] These charismatic qualities, combined with an effective small wars approach, would have certainly helped with the embedding and transmission of that approach throughout the troops serving in Cyprus.

By experience, then, Harding should have been a soldier-diplomat but, frustrated by the politics of the situation, he returned to military type as the conflict progressed. Foot, on the other hand, was more diplomat than soldier, which suited this situation far better. In previous chapters I discussed how charismatic leaders share a sense of common purpose with their followers, are influential with superiors, peers and subordinates, and are confident, which gives others a sense of competence and good judgment. These traits were evident among the military leaders in the Cyprus campaign. In terms of charisma, Harding, Kendrew and Darling all displayed traits that meant that they could communicate their values and

beliefs clearly and effectively, and hence embed and transmit the evolving small wars organisational culture within the British army.

Support Networks

In this section I consider the proposition that the support of senior leaders is essential to enable campaign commanders to embed the British army's small wars culture into military operations and practice. In previous chapters, support from both senior commanders and politicians was shown to be important in enabling leaders with an effective approach to small wars to operationalise that approach.

It was the political situation which caused considerable problems with getting support for an effective approach and a lasting solution in Cyprus. From the outset it was difficult for those in position of authority in Cyprus to present a strong, unified response to EOKA, since the British government could offer no realistic answer to the Greek Cypriot demands. It is certainly true that Harding, for example, had personal support from Britain which his predecessors had lacked. In August 1956 he received a telegram from the Prime Minister saying 'The report about EOKA is encouraging. Warmest congratulations to you and all ranks in the security forces for your long and patient service. You have made this possible'.[108] Nevertheless, none of the leaders received much constructive *guidance* and official support during the process of negotiations. In an informal record of his visit to Cyprus, the Director of Military Intelligence said that 'up till the arrival of the new Governor very little had been done to stop the rot. It was not felt that the Colonial administration had the knowledge or the power necessary to deal with the situation, and they in turn felt that they did not have sufficient support from London'.[109] Even though Sir Hugh Foot was in a far better situation to broker a political solution, even he was still under instructions from the UK to resist *enosis*, and found his hands tied by a lack of support from Britain for local solutions. Philip Murphy goes as far as saying that the Foreign Office was guilty of 'ignorance, self-delusion and low cunning' and that the Governors in place from 1955 to 1959 were 'never allowed the freedom of action afforded to their counterparts in other colonies'.[110]

Support was also lacking from Britain due to other defence priorities at the time. Even though Field Marshal Templer was CIGS, and most certainly had a small wars mindset and supported effective small wars methods, his tenure in that role was overshadowed by the Suez Crisis and the wide-ranging review of British defence by Duncan Sandys, the Minister of Defence. Templer did visit Cyprus and provided support and advice:

> he examined the entire security system, and made recommendations on the structures of command, accountability and the relationships of the various arms of government: he was particularly struck by the plight of the Cyprus police, and advocated a thorough overhaul of the force.[111]

However, he must have had confidence that Harding could be left to his own devices to deal with Cyprus. Harding had been CIGS before Templer, with a wide range of small wars experience, and Templer must have thought that a 'hands off' approach would be sufficient so that he could concentrate on Suez and rescuing the armed forces from Sandys' far-reaching review. The CIGS also visited Cyprus in November 1958, and produced a report which was then turned into a brief for the Secretary of State for Defence Committee. This report contained details of the current situation on the island and importantly pointed out that 'it is recognised both by the political and by the military chiefs that no lasting solution is possible by military means alone'.[112] This demonstrates one way in which the senior leadership of the army was keeping small wars in the political field of vision, among the other priorities of the Cold War, and hence communicating some effective small wars principles to a wider audience.

In the military sphere, support for the British leaders in Cyprus was also mixed. From the little that is said about Lieutenant General Keightley, then Commander-in-Chief of the Middle East Land Forces, it would seem that Harding felt he could have received more support from him. Harding writes: 'Charles Keightley has been much more in London than here during the past few months – which seems all wrong to me – so I don't know what the current thinking is'.[113] However,

Kendrew and Darling, the Directors of Operations, did support Harding and Foot, and they in turn received support from superiors back home. Before Darling went out to Cyprus, the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, called for him and explained the political aim and military role on the island. Darling said

> You can imagine the effect this short talk had on me. Here I was going out as a new military commander to face a difficult situation, and I left 10 Downing Street that day well knowing that I had the whole power of my country behind me, and I lost no time in telling all my soldiers the form.[114]

Darling was instrumental in embedding an appropriate approach to small wars, and the support he received from the UK was central to doing so. Although the levels of support received in Cyprus were varied, the support that was received must have made a difference to the confidence of the leaders and hence their communication of effective methods. However, the support networks that were seen in part in Kenya, and which were particularly strong in Malaya, were not present here in Cyprus.

Continuity of Experience

In both Malaya and Kenya, the background of the leaders (and their supportive subordinates and superiors) in small wars (including colonial policing, counterinsurgency and political activity) was shown to be important for the inculcation and diffusion of an effective approach. Leaders who had experienced this type of conflict before were more successful, and displayed methods which were seen to be constructive and therefore were taken on board by the security forces; thus the learning process continued and the British army's small wars culture continued to evolve. I now examine this idea in the case of Cyprus, and explore whether and how the leaders' past experiences were influential in the approach they adopted.

Throughout his military career, Field Marshal Harding had served in roles that combined traditional military expertise with broader

tasks such as policing and politics. In 1935, for example, he went to the Saarland to supervise the plebiscite there (which would determine whether the area would be returned to Germany), and he worked in the War Office between 1936 and 1938 (although he did not enjoy this experience).[115] In World War Two he served in India and in North Africa, both theatres which were not as conventional as the European campaign. At the end of the war he was sent to Trieste, where building up the local police forces was a priority. Establishing an effective civilian police force was an experience that would be useful in the future, and the political atmosphere in Trieste (dealing with Tito, and Yugoslav interests and borders, and so on) was 'to be of value to him in the responsible posts which lay ahead'.[116] A spell in Southern Command returned Harding to a conventional role, but after that he moved on to be the Commander-in-Chief of Far East Land Forces (FARELF) in 1949, which coincided with the Malayan Emergency. As discussed in Chapter 3, although he realised the need for a political solution and recognised the importance of the police, Harding was criticised for not understanding the intricacies of coordinating the triumvirate.

Harding became CIGS in November 1952, while the Malayan Emergency was still under way and the crisis in Kenya just unfolding. He seems to have learnt from his involvement in the early stages of the Malayan conflict, and regarding Kenya he fully supported General Erskine and his methods, recognised the need for more troops, and demonstrated an evolving small wars mindset. Although the Malayan Emergency was ongoing, Harding did not feel the need to be closely involved, apart from making a few visits in his official capacity; Templer and his successors were turning the situation around and Harding left them to it.[117] Harding's top priority as CIGS was the Middle East, which required a conventional warfare perspective, and thus his various small wars experiences were continually overshadowed by the broader defence and security picture of the Cold War.

To sum up, Harding had a variety of small wars experience, which included political and diplomatic roles; these were interspersed with serious conventional warfare experience (for example, World War Two and the CIGS role). Consequently, it seems his learning about

small wars methods and his inculcation into the small wars ethos was never fully completed. Harding retired from the army after leaving Cyprus, which left little opportunity for him to pass on his small wars knowledge.[118]

Sir Hugh Foot similarly had a varied history which influenced his role in Cyprus, in his case one of colonial diplomatic experiences. He had been Assistant District Commissioner in Palestine during the Arab Revolt,[119] and was Political Officer to the Palestine Government from 1929 to 1937. Hence he had first-hand experience of insurgency and terrorism, and was familiar with arbitration between warring communities. Importantly, Foot had been Colonial Secretary in Cyprus from 1943 to 1945, and was therefore familiar with the communities and the interests of the Cypriots and understood their nature and motivations. This colonial, diplomatic experience would have been invaluable preparation for him towards governing in the difficult times between late 1957 and 1960, when political skills were required over and above military ones.

As was apparent in earlier chapters, the experiences of not just the leaders but also the regiments involved in the conflicts are worthy of discussion, since continuity of experience within the body of soldiers is equally important for operationalising effective small wars methods. The relevance of National Service is again important; while many of the officers and senior NCOs in Cyprus had served in Malaya and Kenya, most soldiers had not.[120] Because many soldiers involved in the post-World War Two small wars were national servicemen they could not build up the necessary body of knowledge of small wars that would enable them to develop a small wars culture. In Cyprus this was compounded by the fact that many soldiers who went there were preparing for operations in Suez, that is, conventional operations, and were only doing internal security duties until they were required for Suez operations. The Parachute Brigade and the Royal Marines, for example, both went off from Cyprus to Suez, fully prepared for undertaking conventional operations, and then returned to Cyprus for further counterinsurgency duties. This interrupted small wars experience meant that the internalisation and institutionalisation of the distinctive British approach to small wars could not be fully completed.

As David Anderson notes: 'With Palestine, Malaya and Kenya still fresh in the collective memory, the British did not lack for senior officers with relevant experiences: by 1955 clearer policies for dealing with colonial guerrilla insurgencies of this type were beginning to emerge'.[121] Both leaders and soldiers, however, had an interrupted history of counterinsurgency operations and small wars, and it was consequently difficult to operationalise the approach that had developed in Malaya and Kenya, and elsewhere.

Cultural Evolution through Leadership in the Cyprus Emergency

In this chapter I have explored the role of leadership in the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars, and its associated organisational culture, using the Cyprus Emergency as a case study. Firstly, the role of leadership in the embedding and transmission of organisational culture was analysed (which centres on what the leaders focussed on, how they managed critical situations, what they put resources into and what they promoted as best practice). How did the leaders in the Cyprus conflict perpetuate the evolving small wars culture within the British army? In the first phase of the conflict, from April to September 1955, before the arrival of Field Marshal John Harding as Governor, the situation on the island was chaotic. As in Malaya and Kenya, the insurgency was misunderstood and underestimated. Intelligence was poor and the police were undermanned and underprepared. The leadership, such as it was, did not focus their attention sufficiently on the EOKA uprising, did not channel resources into countering it, and, in short, they did not see a critical situation that needed to be managed. This case demonstrates a lack of forethought by the colonial administration prior to the outbreak of the conflict. There was little information about the seriousness of local resistance to colonial rule. There had been much political wrangling since the end of World War Two about the status of Cyprus, the question of *enosis*, self-determination and so on, but in thinking that the Cypriots' objections would peter out the colonial administration in Cyprus did not take the necessary steps to prepare for the possibility of an organised armed insurgency

on the island. Hence, effective small wars methods learned in previous conflicts were not employed, and therefore the army at this point had no opportunity for its culture to develop further.

The second phase of the campaign (September 1955 to October 1957) saw the arrival of Harding, in the 'supremo' role as both civilian Governor and military leader of the counterinsurgency campaign. Certain elements of his approach did draw on the acknowledged small wars best practice, but in other areas he was constrained by the conditions on the ground. He did focus on increasing the urgency of the campaign against EOKA, and introduced additional troops so that a more offensive approach could be adopted. He also improved coordination within the leadership of the civil–military–police triumvirate and centralised the collation of intelligence. Harding knew that the solutions would come not primarily from the military field but from social, economic and political developments. Although he introduced improvements to living conditions, Harding could never offer the political solution that would bring the conflict to an end. This split between knowing what *should* be done and not being able to implement these methods *practically* was also seen in the areas of intelligence and policing. Harding knew collective punishment and large cordon and search operations were counterproductive, but found it difficult to move away from this approach until intelligence and policing improved; he introduced improvements, but they were slow to take effect. It is difficult, therefore, to analyse how effective Harding was at the embedding and transmission of the British army's small wars culture. Would the army pick up on what *should* be done and perpetuate that as best practice, or would soldiers see what was actually happening on the ground and take that forward as the accepted small wars ethos? This point will be addressed further in the final chapter.

In the third phase of the conflict, November 1957 to August 1960, Sir Hugh Foot took over as Governor. Although a civilian, Foot played an important role in the counterinsurgency campaign. His civilian status is important in that it highlights the difficulties of choosing the right leadership for counterinsurgency operations which have a strong political element. The campaign in Malaya benefited greatly from having Templer in a 'supremo' role, able to lead both militarily and politically,

and the Kenyan campaign suffered as a result of not appointing someone in a similar position. However, the Cyprus conflict seemed to profit from the return of a diplomat to the role of Governor. Foot's political knowledge and diplomatic approach stood him in good stead for the Cyprus conflict, and combined with changes to the overall strategic situation, this meant he could more easily reach the necessary political solutions. From a small wars perspective, however, it was the military leaders, in particular the Director of Operations, who demonstrated best practice in this final phase. Due both to his own ethos and to improved intelligence and policing functions, Darling was able to promote effective methods such as the use of small groups and the 'brains over brawn' approach. He could therefore perpetuate the British army's distinctive approach to counterinsurgency operations, and its small wars culture.

The second leadership concept I looked at involved exploring the qualities and characteristics of the leaders in Cyprus. Dynamism was seen to be important for embedding organisational culture in previous cases, and this was again demonstrated in Cyprus. Harding was a strong military leader, with drive and determination, and he inspired other soldiers – all good qualities for passing on his mindset to his subordinates in the army. Both Kendrew and Darling, as Director of Operations, were also dynamic, which would have helped to reinforce the ethos that they put forward. Foot, on the other hand, was approachable; a liberal diplomat, which was entirely fitting for the job he was being asked to do. Harding was also a soldier-diplomat (based on both his past experiences and his outlook), which was seen to be important in previous cases. In Cyprus, however, Harding needed to be more of a diplomat-soldier, which he did not have the mental agility to achieve.

Finally, I looked at conditions in Cyprus in terms of whether the leaders were supported, and what their past experiences were. Field Marshal Harding definitely had the personal support of senior military and political figures, and his general approach was supported fully both by the CIGS (Templer) and the British government, and by his subordinate Directors of Operations (Kendrew and Darling respectively). What Harding was lacking (and to some extent Sir Hugh Foot too), however, was official political support for a lasting solution in Cyprus. Cyprus was also not a top priority, since Suez, the Sandys review and

the Cold War in general were all competing for the attention of senior leaders. In terms of support, then, Harding's methods (and Foot's) were encouraged by those around him, which was good for the evolution of a small wars culture, but he was not greatly assisted in reaching a solution to the Cyprus problem, which was not so good for resolving the conflict. Hence, the operationalisation of the small wars culture in practice foundered. In terms of experience, Harding had a considerable small wars background, but it was inconsistent, and interrupted by conventional warfare roles. Foot's colonial experience was also valuable, but he did not combine this with a military knowledge of small wars. Lastly, for all the soldiers, their learning experience in Cyprus was interrupted by the conventional flashpoint of Suez, and by the high proportion of national servicemen serving there, which made the embedding and transmission of the small wars organisational culture of the British army in Cyprus increasingly difficult. This chapter has shown that support was required, as was continuity of experience, but neither of these conditions was fully present in Cyprus, so in this case the evolution of the British army's small wars culture was weak.

Some broader points are evident in this chapter, which will be analysed further in the conclusion. It was highlighted by Major Cooper-Key that

> There are many lessons from the emergency in Malaya which are applicable in Cyprus; in particular the success of small scale operations based on good information, the successful withdrawal of troops from the police stations, the reward of the expansion of the Special Branch, and the formation of surrendered enemy personnel into infiltration squads.[122]

Nonetheless there seemed to be insufficient learning in Cyprus from either the Malayan and Kenyan conflicts or the earlier urban insurgency in Palestine, which was recognised at the time. A couple of ministerial notes to file demonstrate this:

> In dealing with the Cyprus Emergency problems we have from time to time felt a need for information regarding what we had

> done in Palestine but we usually drew a blank or had to rely on failing memories. As far as I know the emergencies in Malaya and Kenya were never written up in this way, but it is significant that the general course of events from the point of view of counter-terrorist operations has followed a remarkably similar pattern in Cyprus.[123]
>
> I think that in the past we have failed to make proper use of previous experience. When the Emergency was declared in Kenya, that Government set about its problems of detention, propaganda, rehabilitation etc. as if they were new and strange phenomena. Cyprus in turn did much the same thing. I do not think that this was the fault of either Government. It was merely that the experience gained in Malaya was nowhere summarised in a form available for reference. Cyprus, in turn, suffered from a lack of any systematic collation of experience gained in Kenya.[124]

In some respects it is unsurprising that there was little learning from Malaya and Kenya; for two years, 1955 and 1956, all three conflicts were ongoing concurrently, and in that high tempo environment there is little time to stop and reflect on best practice, or to recognise the similarities of conflicts which may have felt very different at the time. The lack of learning from Palestine is more surprising, but this draws out a more complex argument, which leads to the second broader point.

Harding, and the other leaders in Cyprus, seemed to be aware of the right way of going about counterinsurgency operations. They knew a political solution was required, they were aware of the need to improve intelligence, they knew large cordon and search operations were ineffective, and that collective punishment was often counterproductive. Learning had indeed taken place from these other, earlier small wars, and an ethos had been established within the leadership for the best way of conducting small wars. From a normative perspective the leaders knew what *should* be done, and had the small wars culture to enable this. However, from a practical, operational point of view, it was incredibly difficult to *operationalise* this culture, to put it

into practice, given the conditions on the ground in Cyprus. This split between long- and short-term learning processes is explored in greater depth in the conclusion. As Charles Allen notes

> From a military point of view the unsatisfactory resolution of the Cyprus conflict posed as many questions as it had answered: how to combat terrorism without a clear political agenda; how to remain impartial in a divided community where one side lends tacit support to terrorism; how far to curtail civil liberties in a western-style democracy where terrorism threatens democracy ... Few soldiers, however, indulge in post-mortems.[125]

The final chapter will do just this: it will reflect on the three case studies and on the concepts and ideas discussed, based on the legacy of imperial policing discussed in Chapter 2, in order to draw out some generic, detailed conclusions about the evolution of the British army's approach to small wars and its organisational culture in the period 1948 to 1960, and the implications of these findings for the future.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

> The task of executive leaders is creating an organizational culture incorporating shared values, beliefs, and norms that help the organization effectively carry out the functions of adapting, attaining goals, and coordinating activities ... [through] creating an organizational philosophy, establishing policies and programs, and personal interactive behaviour.[1]

In this final chapter, I consider the findings of my three main case studies and draw broader conclusions about the development of the British army's small wars culture and the role of leadership in its evolution during the 15 years following World War Two. Finally, I look at the relevance of the findings for conflicts post-1960 and for the army of the future.

The first of the three questions I posed in Chapter 1 was whether military leaders transmit and embed organisational culture (i.e. the British army's small wars culture), and if so, how. The case studies in the previous chapters have explored the notion that leadership plays a central role in the embedding of learning and the transmission of organisational culture – specifically, that leadership played a critical role in perpetuating the evolution of the British army's small wars culture in the period 1948–60, and particularly the campaign commanders in the cases covered here. The analysis across the cases shows that military leaders can, and indeed did, transmit and embed military

organisational culture, in the same way that business leaders do in other organisations; this concurs with Edgar Schein's models, which were used as a basis for analysis throughout the book. In Chapter 1 I described how studying the business world reveals that culture and learning have a relationship of 'reciprocal interdependence',[2] that leadership and organisational culture are 'two sides of the same coin'[3] and that they are 'conceptually intertwined'.[4] The general conclusion that can be reached is that this is also true for *military* organisational culture and learning, and *military* leadership.

This notion was tested in studying the campaigns in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus, and in each case it was shown that leadership improvements made a positive difference to the conduct and success of the conflict. This in turn meant that these leaders' ideas and methods were more likely to be continued by the army, and to be entrenched within the organisational culture of the army, since they were seen to be successful. In each case there was poor leadership at the start of the conflict, and ineffective approaches were adopted. These early leaders did not have a small wars mindset, and they made little progress in resolving the conflict; therefore their methods were not continued and their ideas were not embedded in the organisational culture of the British army. However, when these leaders were replaced with more effective small wars commanders, the small wars culture of the army could continue to evolve. The Malayan Emergency provides the best example of this.

These leaders embedded and transmitted culture (as proposed by Schein for business organisations) through what they focused on and paid attention to, how they reacted to critical incidents, what they taught as the best approach and what methods were put forward as best practice. For example, in Malaya Templer, as 'supremo', focused on political solutions and gaining the support of the local population, and both Erskine and Harding paid attention to intelligence and the cooperation of the triumvirate. The 'teaching' of culture was also continued through doctrine for small wars (both conflict-specific and generic), which is a 'cultural artefact' (as Schein would call it). Connections can be made in each case between operational practice and the approaches the leaders were endorsing, the development of the aforementioned

doctrine and military training, both in theatre (such as in the Training Centre in Malaya) and more broadly across the army (such as at the Staff College at Camberley). These links also reinforce the dissemination of best practice methods and the evolution of military organisational culture.

At a more tactical level, these leaders increased troop numbers and, once it became possible, also moved towards using smaller units for more offensive, targeted attacks. However, these leaders were each constrained by the situation on the ground when they arrived (poor policing and intelligence), and at times they also reacted to incidents by using collective punishments and other less productive measures. The nature of the small wars culture is therefore complex, and I explore this further in the following sections on long- and short-term learning.

The second question I posed in Chapter 1 concerned the qualities displayed by military leaders who are successful in transmitting and embedding culture, and how these characteristics influenced the evolution of the distinctive British approach to small wars. This book has explored the notion that for leaders to be successful in the transmission and embedding of culture they need to be charismatic, which is dependent on the possession of particular characteristics. In Chapter 1 the idea of charismatic leadership was considered from a business organisational point of view, in relation to its role in the evolution of organisational culture and the qualities of charismatic leaders. Diana Pheysey has noted how charismatic leaders have a specific skill-set and knowledge base of expertise that is respected,[5] and Bennett has described charismatic leaders as being unconventional, confident, competent, trusted and liked, with a personal conviction in their beliefs and strong influencing and persuasion skills.[6] Another key point was also made in this chapter: J. Steven Ott had realised that charismatic organisational leaders are the sources, transmitters and maintainers of organisational cultures,[7] and Edgar Schein concurred with this in saying that leaders embed culture through teaching basic assumptions, through the use of charisma.[8]

This is certainly true in the cases considered here. It was the more charismatic, dynamic small wars leaders who were more successful, and

whose methods were most appropriate, and their approach was embedded and transmitted as culture. These charismatic leaders demonstrated certain characteristics, as charismatic leaders do in the business world. In this *military* context, charisma is seen to be epitomised by the qualities of being influential, liked and accepted, determined and confident, with a positive attitude. Templer and Erskine, for example, were also unconventional, progressive, and possessed a sense of urgency coupled with a long-term outlook. Drawing on their existing small wars knowledge, these charismatic leaders (such as Templer, Erskine and also Harding to a degree, as well as commanders such as Kendrew and Darling in Cyprus, Briggs in Malaya and Lathbury in Kenya) used drive, energy and vigour to initiate progress in these conflicts, and also to ensure that their methods and ethos were taken forward. Pheysey comments that

> the power of charismatic leaders resides in their ability to form good relationships with others by providing what is wanted at the time … Followers identify with the charismatic leader and applaud what the leader proclaims. The leaders' power derives from the values which he or she symbolizes and expresses.[9]

This proposal can be seen to be true in the case studies, and is supported by Taylor and Rosenbach, who state that

> Leaders have an ability to 'see' and place matters in perspective. Such vision is not made up of daydreams but rather of goals for an organization and its people. The vision becomes the focus for the leader's commitment, drive, and energy. Followers often feel a sense of energy and excitement simply by being around their leader.[10]

Therefore the approaches and culture of leaders with these charismatic characteristics have a greater likelihood of being perpetuated; charismatic military leaders are indeed powerful transmitters of military organisational culture.

The third question I posed in Chapter 1 asked what conditions are required for military leadership to be influential in this organisational

learning process for the British army. The notion here is that the support of senior leaders is essential to enable campaign commanders to embed small wars culture in military operations and practice. Another idea from the business world was tested for the military setting, that support for certain methods can lead to the positive reinforcement of those beliefs and behaviours in culture. This theme concurs with existing research on innovation in the military field, which notes that the protection of influential, imaginative senior officers is important for successful innovation.[11] This idea was supported in Chapter 2, in which exploring the legacy of imperial policing showed that leaders who received support from more senior leaders, both political and military, had their methods and ideas taken forward more readily. Having support from influential, like-minded subordinates was also important in many instances.

This theme was continued through the case studies, where analysis of the support networks for the leaders involved led to the same conclusions. In Malaya, for example, both Briggs and Templer received support for their small wars ethos from influential politicians and from within the army, which meant that their ideas were championed and kept alive. Templer, for instance, was supported by Oliver Lyttelton, the Colonial Secretary, who demonstrated a similar mindset, and said of Malaya that 'no line could be drawn to show where politics, civil administration, police action, administration of justice and the like end, and where para-military or military operations begin'.[12] In Kenya, Erskine also received influential support from senior politicians; however, he was frustrated by a lack of support from the local administration, which consequently meant that even though he wanted to he could not operationalise some of the effective elements of the small wars culture. In Cyprus it was seen that, due to broader political constraints, the leaders did not receive sufficient backing for the whole spectrum of small wars methods. The failure to fully operationalise an effective small wars culture in Cyprus was therefore partly due to the lack of support for the leaders and their approach.

It is important here to comment on the role of the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. This position was significant for providing a link (in terms of support networks) both upwards, to politicians and

the government, and downwards, to the army as an organisation. Having a senior personality in this role who supported small wars methods, and who had a small wars ethos (such as Templer), would have been key to reinforcing the dissemination and embedding of the evolving small wars culture, in both directions. For example, it would have been important for the CIGS to keep these small wars in the thoughts of politicians, especially during the height of the Cold War. These senior army leaders had experienced small wars first-hand (for example, Templer in Malaya, Harding in Malaya and later in Cyprus, and even Slim to some degree in Burma),[13] and therefore they lent their support to ongoing campaigns and their leaders. The CIGS also had broad links across the army, with doctrine, training and education, as well as the conduct of operations in practice. It has already been drawn out that there are links between all these areas, and the small wars culture was underpinned by having senior support from the CIGS for the continued evolution of the army's approach to small wars.

Organisational learning was aided by campaign commanders receiving support for their approaches, which encouraged innovation and led to further cultural evolution. In essence, the case studies show that ideas which are championed by like-minded, influential people are more likely to become embedded within the military organisational (and in this case, the small wars) culture of the army. This support is *important* for enabling campaign commanders to embed the small wars culture in practice, to operationalise it. However, further analysis will be required to determine whether this support is in fact *essential*, since there is insufficient evidence here to reach a conclusion.

The book has also explored the idea that it was important for leaders to have prior small wars experience, in order for them to have developed the necessary mindset for conducting these counterinsurgency operations. In Chapter 1 I asked whether leaders need to have continuity of past experience in order for the learning process to be successful and for the British army's approach to small wars to evolve. Chapter 2 introduced the idea of interrupted learning, and considered the effect that the two conventional wars of the twentieth century, the World Wars One and Two, had on the development of an effective approach to *small*

wars. At this point it was concluded that a distinctive approach to small wars was indeed developing, albeit not fully embedded due to the leaders 'breaking off' from small wars to conduct major ones. Interruptions to the leaders' small wars experience by conventional warfare 'pushed out' from their psyche many of their innovative and effective small wars methods, and lessons were not necessarily carried forward.

The three case studies explored this thinking further. The leaders' earlier experiences were analysed to see whether those with unconventional, internal security and other small wars experiences were better able to perpetuate the army's small wars approach and culture. This was indeed found to be the case for the majority. Leaders who gained consistent experience in small wars built up their knowledge of effective methods and had more of a small wars culture. In particular, campaign commanders who had relevant past experience were far more willing and able to implement effective methods and hence transmit and embed the British army's small wars culture. This is especially true for Templer in Malaya, and to a certain extent for Erskine in Kenya. Harding, however, is a mixed example; he was involved in the Malayan conflict but did not employ a comprehensive small wars mindset. He appeared to have learned by the time he was CIGS for the Kenya campaign and fully supported Erskine. However, in Cyprus he did not apply all of his learning (partly due to circumstances out of his control – see later).

In terms of the British army's small wars culture being transmitted and embedded throughout the body of troops, National Service was found to be particularly relevant during the case studies considered in the preceding chapters. Leaders within the professional army were especially important for the transmission of military organisational culture, since a large number of the body of soldiers had a quick turnover rate; many were national servicemen who only served for two years, and the small amount of training they did receive was geared towards the Cold War. Therefore the evolution of small wars principles and approaches was retarded by the presence of national servicemen, and leaders had to work even harder to diffuse learning and inculcate troops with the small wars culture.

On the basis of the studies presented here, it is my conclusion that leaders who are charismatic and dynamic are influential in transmitting and embedding organisational culture (in this case the British army's small wars culture), particularly when they are supported by like-minded superiors, and when they also have a history of small wars experiences. The campaign commanders in the case studies considered here had mixed success with both the resolution of the conflicts, and the embedding and transmission of the small wars culture. Leadership during phase 1 in Malaya was unsuccessful, but after the arrival of Briggs, and particularly Templer, it was far more effective. Major General Hinde in Kenya was ineffective; however, General Erskine had far more success. And although less strongly proven, prior to Harding's arrival the situation in Cyprus was badly managed, but after he took up his post, there was an improvement in both the progression of the campaign and the evolution of the small wars mindset within the troops. In sum, those leaders who were more successful were shown to have the right mindset to focus on the small wars methods that had gradually been learnt from previous conflicts, and they also possessed charismatic qualities, received support from more senior leaders and had a significant amount of relevant past experience in analogous situations. These studies have demonstrated that theory from the business world on leadership and organisational culture can often validly be applied in a military context. The characteristics of charismatic leaders in a military situation are in part similar to those of business leaders; however, additional qualities are required, such as those of dynamism and also statesmanship.

March and Olsen say that 'Organizational learning includes both the processes by which organizations adjust themselves defensively to reality and the processes by which knowledge is used offensively to improve the fits between organizations and their environments'.[14] The process diagram in Figure 6.1 was introduced in Chapter 1, and it is now clear how military leadership in these small wars fits into this learning process. Considering this process in more detail leads to the understanding that some additional conclusions can be drawn from the analysis undertaken earlier in the book, and this is explored in the next section.



(1) Experience gained over time by leaders in similar situations.
(2) Appropriate and effective small wars methods picked up.
(3) Methods are perpetuated by leaders and accepted by the organisation.
Experience
Acquisition of new knowledge
Institutionalisation of learning in doctrine
Embedding and transmission of culture
Organisational learning
Internalisation of learning in behaviour and actual operational practice
(6) Culture evolves, and is continued by leaders through what they focus on and put forward as best practice.
(5) Leaders also *internalise* this best practice in the army by demonstrating it (and its success) during campaigns.
(4) Leaders are influential in the evolution of doctrine through putting forward certain methods as best practice and, with the support of the organisation, getting these approaches *institutionalised* in the army, in a 'cultural artefact', i.e. doctrine. These methods are also disseminated through training and education, and this often provides a (cyclical) link to the internalisation of learning in practice (box 5).

Figure 6.1 Leadership and the learning process

Long-Term Learning Cycles

Broad conclusions can be drawn from the analysis in preceding chapters about the complexities of the learning process and the part that military leadership plays in organisational cultural evolution. There is indeed a long-term learning cycle during the period covered here, during which the organisational culture of the British army evolved, especially at a *normative* level. During the period of decolonisation and counterinsurgency operations post-World War Two, from 1948 to 1960, military leaders were highly influential in inculcating in soldiers a sense of what approach *should* be adopted for small wars, and this approach became embedded in their ethos. This 'small wars culture' consists of both guiding principles, and more tactical-level actions. The normative principles include values such as subordinating military action to political

aims, using a 'hearts and minds' approach and gaining the support of the people, using the minimum necessary force and recognising the importance of the triumvirate of civil–military–police cooperation. At a more tactical level, the British army knew that its approach to small wars *should* include things like working in small groups on targeted operations, the importance of intelligence, and the use of infantry with junior leaders holding much of the responsibility. These guiding principles and tactical-level actions correspond to John Nagl's description of strategic vision and tactical innovation, which he aptly says work together in small wars with a third element – 'the man'.[15]

This longer-term, normative learning process can be illustrated by reference to Downie's institutional learning model, which was introduced in Figure 1.2, and is here augmented as Figure 6.2. Chapter 2 showed how the British army was learning about small wars prior to World War One, and also between the two world wars, but that this learning was interrupted and the cycle was broken twice, with the onset of World Wars One and Two. This meant that knowledge about effective approaches to small wars could not be fully internalised and institutionalised, and the British army's small wars *culture* was not embedded, prior to 1948, even though it had been gradually developing. From 1948 onwards, however, there was a steady stream of small wars, without the interruption of a large-scale conventional conflict, which meant that learning could carry on, and the organisational culture of the British army could continue to evolve, geared towards these small wars and counterinsurgency campaigns.

Of course, the Cold War is important here. The army was focusing much of its training on preparations for another conventional and potentially nuclear war, despite the fact the conflict was never enacted in practice. This preparation was in opposition to what was actually happening in reality; although they were training primarily for major wars, soldiers were undertaking counterinsurgency operations (small wars, in other words) in practice. The importance of leadership is therefore evident; those leaders with a small wars mindset and a wealth of small wars experience were invaluable in passing on the learning from previous conflicts, and in ensuring it was covered in training and educational courses.

Looking at Figure 6.2, it is clear that institutional learning did take place in the period between 1948 and 1960. The first five steps were



(6) It is here that the learning cycle became weak in the period 1948–60.*Operationalising* the small wars culture that the British army possessed proved to be difficult, especially in the early stages of the campaigns. The behaviour of members of the organisation did sometimes change to reflect a more effective approach. At other times, however, actions were contrary to the evolving culture (based on learning), and were therefore ineffective.
(1) This initial step requires effective leadership, and this was seen between 1948 and 1960. When learning took place it was initially individuals, leaders, who noticed that the existing approach was ineffective. Individuals who were paying attention to events and taking action included Briggs and Templer in Malaya, Erskine in Kenya and, to a certain degree, Harding (and Foot) in Cyprus.
(2) It has been seen that leaders who have a small wars mindset will recognise deficiencies in the approach and performance of the organisation. This was seen in phases 2 and 3 in Malaya, phase 2 in Kenya and, to some extent, phase 2 in Cyprus. Performance had previously been poor and the new leaders recognised this.
Individual action/ attention to events
Change in organizational behaviour
Organizational performance gap identified
Transmit interpretation: publish doctrine
Search for alternative organizational actions
Sustained consensus: accept/reject appropriate/alternative solution as doctrine
(3) With effective small wars leaders, their past experience and ethos dictates that they look for a better, more effective approach. Templer did this in Malaya and Erskine also did this in Kenya.
(5) During the period 1948 to 1960, both formal and informal doctrine for small wars evolved and institutional learning continued to take place. This doctrine would not have been produced if the methods it advocated were not accepted. This doctrine represents the institutionalisation of the British army's small wars culture.
(4) Where the leaders received support from superiors, both military and political, there was a greater consensus on the most appropriate approach. This meant that supported leaders had their solutions accepted more readily and these methods became internalised in organisational culture.

Figure 6.2 The learning cycle between 1948 and 1960.
Based on Downie's institutional learning cycle, in Richard Duncan Downie, *Learning from Conflict: The US Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p.38.

strongly implemented over this period, as experience dictated that initial 'gaps' in performance were remedied by leaders with a small wars mindset. This, in turn, meant that the British army's small wars culture evolved over this period, as the army learnt about the most effective way to conduct small wars (which built on earlier learning, as discussed in Chapter 2). This culture was also institutionalised in doctrine (both formal and informal), and was reinforced by supportive leaders, such as the CIGS, and senior politicians, who championed these small wars concepts more widely. This shows that there is a clear learning–culture–leadership nexus: small wars learning continued, the British army's small wars culture was perpetuated, and military leadership was critical in this process. As Schein notes, the culture of stable organisations evolves gradually, as adaptation to an environment, and the organisation evolves with a bias towards one subculture, aided by the systematic promotion from that subculture to positions of power within the overall culture.[16] In this instance, the British army evolved over this period with a bias towards the subculture for small wars, and this was facilitated by the rise of leaders such as Templer to positions of command, both of campaigns (Malaya) and of the army (as CIGS). The sixth step of the learning cycle, the application of this culture in behaviour and practice, is discussed further in the next section on shorter-term learning.

Short-Term, Campaign-Specific Learning

Downie comments that real 'learning institutions' are those which capture learning in doctrine *and* apply it operationally.[17] The case studies considered here also draw out that a cultural *preference* for a particular way of conducting small wars (at a normative level, as described above) was not always sufficient for behaviour in *practice* to always be consistent with this culture. This highlights a shorter-term, campaign-specific learning process, whereby culture becomes operationalised in the behaviour of troops in practice. The cases reveal a broadly consistent pattern of events, as shown in Figure 6.3.

These small wars generally began with poor policing and intelligence, too few troops and an unclear political situation. All too often, the local administration misjudged the situation and believed that




Figure 6.3 The campaign-specific learning process

what was in fact a growing insurgency was merely criminal activity and popular unrest that would simply blow over before long. Consequently, little effort was put into preparing the police force or building up troop numbers should the situation deteriorate (which it invariably did). Addressing legitimate grievances and improving the lot of the local population, through long-term political and social measures, was also therefore not a priority.

Subsequently, therefore, large-scale operations, collective punishments, and even brutality in gaining information, are introduced through necessity and there is little to no 'hearts and minds' focus. This is apparent in all three cases. In the first phases in Malaya, Kenya and Cyprus, the military leadership was poor and the civil administrations paid scant attention to the growing unrest. Therefore, attempts to

track down and defeat the perpetrators were ineffective. The poor prior preparation of the local police forces and a dearth of intelligence meant that small, targeted strikes were not possible, and large-scale sweeps and cordon and search operations had to be used, along with the collective punishment of entire communities. It was seen in all the cases that this ineffective approach often took the form of the government forces trying to prove they could be more intimidating than the insurgents (rather than showing that they could offer more to the people).

It was usually at this point that the leadership of the counterinsurgency campaign changed. Firstly Briggs and then Templer arrived in Malaya, General Erskine came to Kenya, and Field Marshal Harding arrived in Cyprus. As Figure 6.3 shows, these leaders first had to adopt existing measures to counter the insurgents, until the intelligence picture could be improved through the strengthening of the police, before an increase in troop numbers took place, and until the local population could be persuaded that the government could provide for them. These incoming leaders did indeed possess a small wars ethos, and they were imbued with the small wars culture that they had gained through the long-term learning process described above. Operationalising this culture in actual behaviour and methods during campaigns, however, took time and effort by these leaders and in some cases was more successful than others.

These leaders did, however, put into practice far more effective methods (based on their in-built culture, and past experiences, accompanied by their dynamic personalities and with the support of superiors), and once their approach had taken hold, improvements were seen in policing and intelligence, and larger numbers of troops meant that more offensive, targeted operations could be conducted. These leaders also introduced broader measures, focusing on social and economic improvements, and used their 'soldier-diplomat' qualities to put into place political aims and solutions, which were then supported by the military (and police). In general, there was a greater focus on effective small wars methods, by leaders who were receiving a greater degree of support for their approach.

Finally, this led to the ability to use smaller units with better intelligence, which are far more successful in small wars, and which need

to use less force to defeat the insurgency. Once entire sections of the population were no longer targeted with searches and punishments (because intelligence was far more precise), far more was done in terms of 'hearts and minds', improving social conditions and also in moving towards a more lasting political solution.

Therefore, we can see that *operationalising* the British army's small wars culture was often difficult, and required certain conditions to be in place. Returning to the main theme, it is clear that *effective small wars leadership*, from military leaders possessing an appropriate ethos and mindset, was a critical condition for the evolution of this small wars culture at a normative level (see above), and that leadership is central to the operationalisation of this culture during campaigns. It is clear that charismatic, dynamic leaders, with a history of undertaking small or unconventional wars, whose superiors (military and political) support their approach, are indeed powerful in embedding and transmitting the British army's organisational culture, and particularly in these cases, its small wars culture.

Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency

The findings of the case studies and the conclusions in the final chapter of this book have implications for the study of learning, leadership and military culture, and practical significance for military organisations. Scholars of military history, learning and innovation should appreciate that there can be multiple cycles of organisational learning, as have been drawn out here. Learning can occur over a period of time, as an army gains experience of similar types of conflict and builds up a knowledge base of how to approach these wars. However, this knowledge may not be sufficient for this best practice to be applied in reality. There is often a shorter-term learning process that occurs within conflicts, as the nature of the opponent is understood, intelligence improves and effective leadership is applied. In the future it will be necessary to consider not only whether learning has occurred within the group under consideration but also whether this learning can be and has been applied and operationalised in practice. The following broad points should be borne in mind: firstly, that there can be

different levels of learning within militaries, and that distinct learning processes can occur at the campaign and organisational levels; secondly, that militaries can forget what they have learned during campaigns if this learning is not institutionalised (for example in doctrine, and training syllabi) and internalised; and finally, that studies on military learning and innovation need to focus on the key role played by leaders in recovering past lessons and building them into campaign designs, and in embedding campaign lessons into organisational memory.

This conclusion has implications for the military. It is important for armies to understand that awareness at a normative level of best practice methods and approaches is not necessarily sufficient for these methods to be applied during conflicts, where the 'fog of war' often means that effective practices are lost sight of. This was seen in post-1960 conflicts, for example, in Aden and, most strongly, in Northern Ireland, where the 12-year duration of the Malayan Emergency was eclipsed by over 30 years of conflict and 'troubles', in which ineffective approaches were adopted time and again before more effective methods were operationalised. The military should be aware of the conditions that assist the practical application of best practice methods, including the importance of intelligence and, most relevantly here, the significance of effective leaders, who have the right ethos and experience for the type of war that is being fought, who are dynamic, and who are fully supported by those in military and political positions of power.


The findings of this book reinforce the need for officers to be soldier-statesmen and soldier-scholars, as well as competent war-fighters and peace-keepers.[18] Even though the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq have appeared to be 'hybrids' of conventional and unconventional warfare, of stabilisation and peace support operations, the principles behind small wars, which have evolved over the past 100 years, are still acutely pertinent. No operation is solely military, and reconstruction, the provision of societal reforms, and political negotiation are all vital in contemporary operations, as they were between 1948 and 1960. These findings also have implications for military education and in-service development. Chapter 1 noted how commanders fill the role of custodians and guardians of the organisational culture of an army; the army needs to be clear that commanders have an important role in

embedding and transmitting its distinctive culture. Education within the army should emphasise the key role for leadership in managing organisational culture and communicating the ethos that will enable its soldiers to be most effective in situations which require small wars-type thinking. The qualities discussed here that define charismatic small wars leadership can be encouraged and commended, and consideration can be given to commanders' previous experiences when appointing them to lead campaigns. The significance of support for small wars methods also needs to be communicated throughout the military hierarchy, and in the political sphere.

This book highlights the value of combining historical analysis and social scientific models to enhance understanding of the military as an organisation through an interdisciplinary approach. In exploring the military as an organisation, and applying ideas from the business world, previously unconnected areas can be linked in a mutually beneficial manner, as demonstrated in this case with leadership. Isenberg notes from his own research that he hopes that 'this process of applying knowledge from business settings will help future Army leaders at different levels to be as effective as possible, both in peace and war'.[19] For the military, the study of both history and doctrine is as important as ever, and it is hoped that this intellectual trend within armies will continue. As Richard Cousens notes about the British army, 'there is both a cultural and historical dimension to counterinsurgency that has contributed to success. There is a deeply embedded feel for the subject within the officer corps'.[20] The nexus between leadership, learning and cultural evolution should not be underestimated. As Neilberg recommends, 'subjects such as leadership ... must be brought into war and society studies',[21] and this book has gone some way towards achieving an initial step in that direction. Research in this field (by both academics and soldiers) must be continued in order to extend knowledge of the important role of leadership in the evolution of the army's distinctive approach, in order for military culture and ethos to adapt effectively to suit modern operations. In sum, it has been shown that leadership and cultural evolution are indeed, in a military context, conceptually intertwined.

ANNEX A

TIMELINE OF EVENTS


Imperial Policing
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1899–1902 Boer War
1919: Amritsar
1919–1921: Ireland
1936, 1945–47: Palestine
MALAYA
Phase 1
Phase 2
Phase 3
Phase 4
KENYA
1
2
3
4
CYPRUS
1
2
3
CIGS
SLIM
HARDING
TEMPLER
FESTING
DOCTRINE
1906: Callwell's Small Wars
1912, 1923, 1929, 1937, 1945: Duties in Aid of the Civil Power
1934: Gwynn's Imperial Policing and Notes on Imperial Policing
*
1949: Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power
ATOM
ATOM
1956: Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power)
*
ATOM
Malaya Doctrine
Kenya Doctrine
* Handbook of Anti-Mau Mau Operations

ANNEX B

A NOTE ON CONVENTIONAL WARFARE THINKING!

Reading this exchange of letters now, it seems tongue-in-cheek, but I imagine the author was deadly serious ...

Letter from ex-Captain Manby (1/RTR/RAC), 15 April 1952[1]

Dear Sir,

In view of the deplorable and endless drain on our military resources in the Malayan theatre, I write to put forward the following suggestion for your earnest consideration.

An area from coast to coast, somewhere near the Malay-Siamese border, is set aside, and all inhabitants given due notice to evacuate by a certain date.

On this date an atomic bomb is exploded over the selected area, in order to clear it from protective jungle, and to neutralise it by rendering it radio-active.

This action should effectively frustrate further rebel efforts to infiltrate down the peninsular, and should serve as a barrier across Malaya. The target area would, of course, be chosen with a view to density of population, known enemy strongpoints and suspected reinforcement centres.

The psychological reaction on Communists in all Malayan areas would be substantial, and the cleared territories would be suitable for cultivation in due course.

Trusting that this suggestion meets with your approval,
I remain,

Yours faithfully . . .

At least the Foreign Office did not seem to consider the suggestion seriously, replying:

Sir,
I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to thank you for your letter of the 15th April and the interest you have shown in suggesting a means of action against the enemy in Malaya.
I am [etc . . .]

NOTES

Chapter 1 Introduction

1. Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992), p. 1.
2. See, for example, Thomas Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); Robert Cassidy, 'The British army and counterinsurgency: the salience of military culture', *Military Review* May/June (2005); Tim Jones, 'The British army, and counter-guerrilla warfare in transition, 1944–1952', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 7/3 (1996); David Charters, 'From Palestine to Northern Ireland: British adaptation to low-intensity operations', in D. Charters and M. Tugwell (eds), *Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis* (London: Brassey's, 1989); Wade Markel, 'Draining the swamp: the British strategy of population control', *Parameters* (Spring 2006); Jim Baker, 'Systems thinking and counterinsurgencies', *Parameters* (Winter 2006–7), p. 32.
3. Richard Cousens, 'Amritsar to Basra: the influence of counter-insurgency upon the British perspective of peacekeeping', in R. Utley (ed.), *Major Power and Peacekeeping: Perspectives, Priorities and the Challenges of Military Intervention* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), p. 50.
4. This concurs with Chin, who notes that the British army is certainly not an 'ideal type' when considering the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. See Warren Chin, 'Examining the application of British counterinsurgency doctrine by the American army in Iraq', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18/1 (2007), p. 23.
5. For assessments of the British approach to counterinsurgency, see Steven Metz, 'Insurgency and counter-insurgency in the 21st century: reconceptualizing

threat and response', *SSI Paper* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2004); and Warren Chin: 'Examining the application of British counterinsurgency'; 'British counter-insurgency in Afghanistan', *Defense and Security Analysis* 23/2 (2007); 'Why did it all go wrong? Reassessing British counterinsurgency in Iraq', *Strategic Studies Quarterly* 2/4 (2008), pp. 119–35; 'The United Kingdom and the War on Terror: the breakdown of national and military strategy', *Contemporary Security Policy* 30/1 (2009). Comparative studies include Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, *Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare* (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008); Ian Beckett, *Modern Counter-insurgency* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007); John Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002).

6. Geraint Hughes and Chris Tripodi, 'Anatomy of a surrogate: historical precedents and implications for contemporary counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 20/1 (2009), p. 4.
7. Peter Smith and Mark Peterson, *Leadership, Organizations and Culture* (London: Sage Publications, 1988), p. 108.
8. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, p. 301.
9. Ibid., p. 5 (emphasis added).
10. Marshall Sashkin and William Rosenbach, 'A view of leadership that matters', in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, 5th edn (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2005).
11. Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars* (Princetown, NJ: Princetown University Press, 1997); Jeff Legro, 'Culture and preferences in the international co-operation two-step', *American Political Science Review* 90/1 (1996).
12. Diana Pheysey, *Organizational Cultures: Types and Transformations* (London: Routledge, 1993); Roger Bennett, *Organisational Behaviour (*London: Pitman Publishing, 1997); Andrew Brown, *Organisational Culture*, 2nd edn (London: Pitman Publishing, 1998).
13. Bennett, *Organisational Behaviour*, p. 187.
14. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, p. 229.
15. Ibid., p. 97.
16. Richard Duncan Downie, *Learning from Conflict: The US Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 22.
17. Frank Kitson: *Gangs and Counter-Gangs* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960); *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971); *Bunch of Five* (London: Faber and Faber, 1977).
18. Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1966), esp. ch. 4.
19. Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967).

20. Gregory Blaxland, *The Regiments Depart: The History of the British Army, 1945–1970* (London: William Kimber, 1971).
21. Ian Beckett, *Armed Forces and Modern Counter Insurgency* (London: Croon Helm, 1985) and *Modern Counter-Insurgency*; Michael Dewar, *Brush Fire Wars: Minor Campaigns of the British Army since 1945* (London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1984); John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Charles Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986).
22. Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency,* pp. 1–2.
23. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. ix (emphasis added).
24. Ibid., and Thomas Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995).
25. Rod Thornton, 'The British Army and the origins of its minimum force philosophy', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 15/1 (2004).
26. Thornton, 'The British Army', p. 83.
27. Ibid., p. 93
28. David Charters, 'From Palestine to Northern Ireland: British adaptation to low-intensity operations', in D. Charters and M. Tugwell (eds), *Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis* (London: Brassey's, 1989). John Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*, also considers the British army's capacity for organisational learning using Malaya as a case study, and his work is considered in more detail in a later section.
29. See, for example, Roy Payne and Derek Pugh, 'Organizational structure and climate', in M. Dunnette (ed.), *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 1125–73; Renato Tagiuri and George Litwin, *Organizational Climate: Explorations of a Concept* (Boston: Harvard University, 1968); J. Steven Ott, *The Organizational Culture Perspective* (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1989); Andrew Pettigrew, 'On studying organizational cultures', *Administrative Science Quarterly* 24/4 (1979), pp. 570–82; Alan Byman, 'Leadership and corporate culture: harmony and disharmony', *Personnel Review* 13/2 (1984), pp. 19–24; Pheysey, *Organizational Cultures*; Bennett, *Organisational Behaviour.* NB: organisational climate is a term used to describe the 'perceived environmental quality' (Tagiuri and Litwin, p. 1) and it affects behaviour – it is the environment or circumstances of an organisation, and it is 'roughly at the same level as … culture' (p. 21). Payne and Pugh describe climate as the social context of an organisation, which reflects group members' values, attitudes and beliefs – therefore it is a similar concept to organisational culture, and was used in earlier management studies.

30. Brown, *Organisational Culture*, p. 7.
31. Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 3rd edn (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2004), p. 17.
32. Ibid., pp. 25–37.
33. Ibid., p. 25.
34. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn, p. 209.
35. Brown, *Organisational Culture*, p. 100.
36. Ibid.
37. Brown: *Organisational Culture,* pp. 101–2.
38. See, for example, John Adair: *Effective Leadership: How to Develop Leadership Skills* (London: Pan Books, 1998), and *The Skills of Leadership* (Aldershot: Wildwood House, 1984); Pheysey: *Organizational Cultures*, ch. 8; Bennett: *Organisational Behaviour,* ch. 13; Peter Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice* (London: Sage, 2007); Roger Gill, *Theory and Practice of Leadership* (London: Sage, 2006); John Storey (ed.), *Leadership in Organizations: Current Issues and Key Trends* (London: Routledge, 2004); Victor Vroom, 'Leadership', in M. Dunnette (ed.), *Handbook of Industrial and Organizational Psychology* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company, 1976), pp. 1527–52; Warren Bennis and Burt Nanus, *Leaders: The Strategies for Taking Charge* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1985); Noel Tichy and Mary Nevanna, *The Transformational Leader* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1986).
39. Victor Vroom, 'Leadership', p. 1527.
40. Pheysey, *Organizational Cultures*, p. 143.
41. Bennett, *Organisational Behaviour*, p. 187.
42. Ibid.
43. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn.
44. Ibid., p. 1.
45. Smith and Peterson, *Leadership, Organizations and Culture*, p. 122.
46. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn, p. 1.
47. Ott, *The Organizational Culture Perspective*, p. 7.
48. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn, p. 49.
49. Ibid., pp. 52, 68, 70, 93.
50. Ibid., p. 231.
51. Ibid., pp. 228–9.
52. Ibid., pp. 365–75.
53. Isabel Hull, *Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 96.
54. Theo Farrell, *The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), pp. 71–6.
55. Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, p. 95.

56. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 3rd edn, p. 36.
57. Hull, *Absolute Destruction*, pp. 2–3, p. 91.
58. Brown, *Organisational Culture*, p. 100, see also pp. 145–7.
59. Joseph Soeters, Donna Winslow and Alise Wiebull, 'Military culture', in G. Caforio (ed.), *The Handbook of the Sociology of the Military* (New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2003); and James Burk, 'Military culture', in L. Kurtz (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict* (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1999).
60. Burk, 'Military culture', pp. 448–54.
61. See Thornton, 'The British Army and the origins of its minimum force philosophy'.
62. Allan English, *Understanding Military Culture: A Canadian Perspective* (Montreal, Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2004), p. 5.
63. See Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds), *The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics and Technology* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002); Adam Grissom, 'The future of military innovation studies', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 29/5 (2006), pp. 905–34.
64. Jeff Legro, 'Culture and preferences in the international co-operation two-step', *American Political Science Review* 90/1 (1996), p. 119.
65. Barry Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Stephen Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).
66. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine*.
67. Rosen, *Winning the Next War*.
68. Deborah Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (London: Cornell University Press, 1994); Kimberly Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy: Organization Theory and Soviet Military Innovation, 1955–1991* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).
69. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*.
70. Zisk, *Engaging the Enemy*.
71. Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Longman, 1999); Downie: *Learning from Conflict*; Elizabeth Kier, *Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars* (Princetown, NJ: Princetown University Press, 1997); Legro, 'Culture and preferences'; Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*; Robert Cassidy, *Peacekeeping in the Abyss: British and American Peacekeeping Doctrine and Practice after the Cold War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004); Hull, *Absolute Destruction*.
72. See Allison, *Essence of Decision*; Kier, *Imagining War*; Legro, 'Culture and preferences'.

73. Hull, *Absolute Destruction*.
74. Downie, *Learning from Conflict.* This learning cycle is revisited later in this chapter.
75. Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*; Cassidy, *Peacekeeping in the Abyss*. NB: unfortunately, Cassidy's confusion of the terms military and strategic culture throughout (his continual use of the term 'military strategic culture' is inaccurate) is misleading, and detracts from an otherwise sound piece of analysis.
76. The term is John Nagl's: *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*; with new preface by author; foreword by Peter J. Schoomaker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 10.
77. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife*, p. 192.
78. For example, Eliot Cohen, *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime* (New York: The Free Press, 2002); Martin van Creveld, *Command in War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Lloyd Matthews and Dale Brown (eds), *The Challenge of Military Leadership* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International, 1989); Gary Sheffield (ed.), *Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Experience since 1861* (London: Brassey's, 1997).
79. Marshall Sashkin and William Rosenbach, 'A view of leadership that matters', in R. Taylor and W. Rosenbach (eds), *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, 5th edn (Cambridge, MA: Westview Press, 2005).
80. Sashkin and Rosenbach, 'A view of leadership that matters', pp. 46–8.
81. Taylor and Rosenbach, *Military Leadership*, p. 121.
82. Ibid., p. 121.
83. Frank Kitson, *Directing Operations* (London: Faber and Faber, 1989); David Benest, 'British leaders and irregular warfare', *British Army Review* 139 (Spring 2006), pp. 7–11.
84. Kitson, *Directing Operations*, pp. 50–8.
85. Ibid., p. 61.
86. Benest, 'British leaders and irregular warfare', p. 7.
87. Ibid., p. 8.
88. Ibid., p. 9.
89. As a point to note, certain terms are avoided, since they either do not provide sufficient clarity, or are misleading, namely 'asymmetric conflict' and 'low intensity conflict'. 'Asymmetric conflict' involves avoiding the strengths of the opposing forces and attacking weaknesses. However, purely symmetrical land combat – in which both armies involved in conflict are equal in size, approach, culture and intentions – is rare, and there has probably never been a totally symmetric conflict. Counterinsurgency

operations in particular are considered to be 'asymmetric'; however, this term will generally not be used, since it does not provide sufficient clarity for the type of operations that are being considered. 'Low intensity conflict' is another phrase often used to describe the range of operations that includes counterinsurgency operations. However, this phrase also will be avoided throughout, because it is inherently misleading: many operations in the counterinsurgency arena are in fact conducted at a very high intensity (in terms of tempo, risk and danger levels), and therefore as a descriptive term it does not do justice to the operations that are being covered here.

90. Charles Edward Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (London: HMSO, 1906), pp. 21–2.
91. Robert Cassidy, *Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and Irregular War* (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 23.
92. UK MoD, *Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) Land Operations* (Directorate General Development and Doctrine, 2005), p. 17.
93. Walter Ulmer, 'Leaders, managers and command climate', in Taylor and Rosenbach, *Military Leadership,* p. 147.
94. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn, p. 374, p. 209.
95. Kitson, *Directing Operations,* p. 2.
96. UK MoD, *ADP Land Operations*, p. 6.114.
97. Ibid., p. 6.115.
98. Chin, 'British counter-insurgency in Afghanistan', p. 210. For another good article on this topic see Hughes and Tripodi, 'Anatomy of a surrogate'.
99. See Rod Thornton, '"Minimum force": a reply to Huw Bennett', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 20/1 (2009), pp. 215–26; Huw Bennett, 'The other side of the COIN: minimum and exemplary force in British Army counter-insurgency in Kenya', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18/4 (2007), pp. 638–64; Rod Thornton, 'The British Army and the origins of its minimum force philosophy', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 15/1 (2004).
100. Thornton, '"Minimum Force": a reply', p. 216.
101. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn, p. 378.

Chapter 2 The Legacy of Imperial Policing

1. Britain had historically focused on the Royal Navy as the mainstay of defence, and therefore the army had been long neglected. It had become accustomed to fulfilling its broad role across the Empire with limited resources and support.
2. Edward Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 59.

3. Joseph Lehmann, *All Sir Garnet: A Life of Field-Marshal Lord Wolseley* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1964), preface, p. 9.
4. Ibid., p. 76. It is difficult to establish why the upper levels of the British military continued to consider small wars as not proper soldiering, especially when Britain continued to have a good deal of success in them. It could have been because they were thought of as internal pacification duties, and as 'business as usual' policing activity, rather than a form of war. In future conflicts, even though the political dimensions were beginning to emerge (as will be seen in Ireland and Palestine), the army really did not begin to consider small wars as a 'proper' role for the army until after 1945 (and still then the primary focus was on NATO and the Cold War). Another reason could be that small wars then did not often require the latest technology and were very much infantry-focused; hence they did not attract attention from a defence industry perspective.
5. Lehmann, *All Sir Garnet*, pp. 17–18.
6. Ibid., p. 73.
7. Ibid., p. 76.
8. Ibid., pp. 185–6.
9. The 1863 Lieber Code was the precursor to the Geneva Convention (first adopted in 1864) and the Hague Conventions (of 1899 and 1907), and was drawn up during the American Civil War. It provides a code of conduct for acceptable behaviour during war, and covers areas such as the humane treatment of prisoners of war and civilian populations. However, it is less clear on the treatment of locals in *guerrilla* warfare – it implies that if they are armed or support the guerrillas, then they are a legitimate military target. See http://www.civilwarhome.com/liebercode.htm – especially points 24, 51, 52, 82 and 156. The additional Martens Clause in the 1899 Hague Convention can be interpreted as closing this legal loophole, although this has been hotly contested ever since. See http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNHY: accessed 16 March 2011.
10. Lehmann, *All Sir Garnet*, pp. 19–20.
11. Ibid., pp. 176, 194.
12. Charles Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice* (London: HMSO, 1906), p. xi.
13. Garnet Wolseley, *The Soldier's Pocket-Book for Field Service* (London: Macmillan, 1886).
14. Ibid., pp. 188–91.
15. Ibid., p. 415.
16. Ibid., p. 412.
17. Lehmann, *All Sir Garnet*, pp. 165–6.

18. Philip Magnus, *Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist* (London: John Murray, 1958), p. 81.
19. Stephen Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 20–21.
20. Deborah Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 112.
21. Andre Wessels (ed.), *Lord Kitchener and the War in South Africa* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2006), p. xx.
22. Kitchener had worked with both Wolseley and Roberts in the past, but was not in either of the aforementioned 'rings'. See Magnus, *Kitchener*, p. 81.
23. Letter from Roberts to Lord Lansdowne, 29 April 1900, quoted in Andre Wessels (ed.), *Lord Roberts and the War in South Africa 1899–1902* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2000), p. 69.
24. Letter from Kitchener to Queen Victoria, 6 June 1900, in Wessels, *Lord Kitchener*, p. 35.
25. Wessels, *Lord Roberts*, p. 152.
26. Lord Roberts, evidence appended to the Elgin Report, quoted in Spiers, *The Late Victorian Army*, p. 68.
27. Hamilton, letter to Lord Roberts dated 6 December 1901, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives (hereafter cited as LHCMA) Hamilton Papers 2/3/6, and Wessels, *Lord Roberts*, pp. 202–3, 207–8.
28. LHCMA Hamilton Papers 2/2/7. Letter from Hamilton to his wife dated 11 November 1901.
29. Letter from Roberts to Kitchener, 13 December 1901, National Army Museum archive reference (hereafter cited as NAM) 7101-23-122-2-192, and Hamilton, letter to Lord Roberts dated 9 January 1902, LHCMA Hamilton Papers 2/3/11. See also Wessels, *Lord Roberts,* p. 210 and p. 222.
30. Letters from Kitchener to Mr St John Brodrick, Secretary of State for War, 31 December 1901, National Archives reference (hereafter cited as NA) PRO 30/57/22/Y111 and 11 May 1901, NA PRO 30/57/22/Y149. See also Wessels, *Lord Kitchener*, p. 178 and p. 228.
31. Letter from Roberts to Kitchener, 25 January 1901, NAM 7101-23-122-1-6. See also Wessels, *Lord Roberts*, pp. 158–9.
32. LHCMA Hamilton Papers 2/4/7.
33. See, for example, letter from Kitchener to Mr Brodrick, Secretary of State for War, 22 March 1901, NA PRO 30/57/22/Y36. See also Wessels, *Lord Kitchener*, pp. 91–2.
34. This is reflected in letters from Hamilton to his wife, 19 December 1901, LHCMA Hamilton Papers 2/2/7, and 17 January 1902, LHCMA Hamilton

Papers 2/2/8, and was reiterated in his correspondence with Lord Roberts, Mr Brodrick and Winston Churchill (LHCMA 2/2/9).

35. Letter from Hamilton to Brodrick (undelivered), 16 January 1902, LHCMA Hamilton papers 2/3/12. See also Wessels, *Lord Kitchener*, p. 194.
36. Letter from Kitchener to Brodrick, 29 March 1901, NA PRO 30/57/22/Y38. See also Wessels, *Lord Kitchener*, p. 92.
37. Hamilton letter to Lord Roberts, 1 February 1902, LHCMA Hamilton Papers 2/3/15.
38. Draft of *The Commander* by Ian Hamilton dated 1915, LHCMA Hamilton Papers 15/2/2, p. 20a–c (NB: much of this material was excluded from the published version of the book).
39. Ibid., pp. 86, 89, 90.
40. This will be noted time and again in future chapters: the continued use of internment, collective punishment and so forth, in most of the small wars begs the question of why learning did not take place? Was it because of a lack of intelligence, which constrained the choice of approach, or was it because it worked? Learning seems to take place *during* conflicts, but not *between* them. This theme is revisited in the concluding chapter.
41. The importance of intelligence was also emphasised in the Report of His Majesty's Commissioners on the War in South Africa (LHCMA Hamilton Papers 3/3/5, pp. 127–8).
42. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*, p. 106.
43. Callwell, *Small Wars.*
44. Hamilton, letter to Lord Roberts, 17 January 1902, LCHMA Hamilton Papers 2/3/11.
45. Callwell, *Small Wars*, pp. 21–2.
46. Ibid., p. 43.
47. Ibid., p. 76.
48. Ibid., pp. 100, 128–9.
49. Ibid., pp. 145–6.
50. For example, compared with the 3-year duration of the Boer War (which was considered to be protracted), the post-World War Two small wars in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Borneo and Northern Ireland took 12, 8, 4, 4 and 30 years respectively.
51. Edgar Schein's three levels of organisational culture were introduced in Chapter 1. Artefacts are the visible manifestations of culture in structures and processes, and in this case, documentation.
52. The War Office, *Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* (1912), NA WO 169/467.
53. See, for example, the 1937 version of *Duties in Aid of the Civil Power*, NA WO 169/469.

54. This lack of formal doctrine was not only evident for small wars. There was in general little official doctrine in the British army until the late 1980s – especially above the tactical level – and the doctrine that did exist was often never studied. The army emphasised common sense, and 'doctrine' was understood more informally, with theorising about war not being a priority. See Michael Duffy, Theo Farrell and Geoffrey Sloan (eds), 'Doctrine and military effectiveness', *Strategic Policy Studies* 1 (1997), especially ch. 3, pp. 14–17.
55. The army was called on to support the civil power during strikes in Britain, the Irish problem was beginning to emerge, and various areas of the Middle East and Africa were volatile; the main area of unrest, however, was India, where religious divisions and conflicting views over the direction of development led nationalist movements and revolutionary groups to commit acts of violence, particularly against British rule.
56. As discussed in Chapter 1, Downie defines institutional learning as follows: 'A process by which an organisation … uses new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional norms, doctrine, and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous gaps in performance and maximize future successes'. Richard Duncan Downie, *Learning from Conflict: The US Military in Vietnam, El Salvador, and the Drug War* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), p. 22. This model is revisited in the concluding chapter.
57. Ibid., p. 2.
58. C. E. Vickery, 'Small wars', *The Army Quarterly* 6/2 (July 1923), p. 308.
59. See, for example, Barbara W. Tuchman, *The Guns of August* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1962).
60. The army grew rapidly from 270,000 men at the outbreak of war, to 2.5 million at the end of 1915, and after conscription was introduced in 1916 the final size of the army reached 3.8 million in 1918 at the end of the war. See John Turner (ed.), *Britain and the First World War* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), p. 74.
61. See Theo Farrell, 'Transnational norms and military development: constructing Ireland's professional army', *European Journal of International Relations* 7/1 (2001), pp. 84–5.
62. Downie, *Learning from Conflict*, p. 23.
63. Callwell, *Small Wars*, p. vi.
64. B. C. Dening, 'Modern problems of guerrilla warfare', *The Army Quarterly* 13/2 (1927), p. 349.
65. Vickery, 'Small wars', p. 312.
66. Thomas Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 84. The term 'hearts and minds' was first used by Lt Col Bruce in India in the 1930s (p. 85).

67. Dening, 'Modern problems', p. 351.
68. Vickery, 'Small wars', p. 308.
69. Ibid., pp. 308, 310.
70. Charles Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the 20th Century* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), pp. 132–3.
71. Ibid., p. 137. This figure is debated: see V. N. Datta, *Jallianwala Bagh* (Kurukshetra: Kurukshetra University Press, 1969), pp. 104–5.
72. See *Evidence Taken before the Disorders Enquiry Committee*, vol. III, *Amritsar* (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, India, 1920), NA CAB 27/92, especially pp. 114–39 (oral evidence) and pp. 201–19 (written evidence).
73. See *Report, Proceedings and Memoranda of Cabinet Committee on Indian Disorders*, vol. I, 1920, p. 2, NA CAB 27/91, and Dyer's evidence before the Disorders Inquiry Committee, vol. III, pp. 203–4. See also Datta, *Jallianwala Bagh*, pp. 112–3; Rupert Furneaux, *Massacre at Amritsar* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963), pp. 109–10.
74. Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars*, p. 137.
75. Disorders Inquiry Committee Report (1920) p. 134, NA CAB 27/91. See also Datta, *Jallianwala Bagh*, p. 114; Arthur Swinson, *Six Minutes to Sunset: The Story of General Dyer and the Amritsar Affair* (London: Peter Davies, 1964), pp. 111–12.
76. Analysis of the Majority and Minority Reports of Lord Hunter's Committee on the Punjab Disturbances, p. 5, para. 40, in *Report, Proceedings and Memoranda of Cabinet Committee on Indian Disorders*, vol. I, 1920, NA CAB 27/91. See also Datta, *Jallianwala Bagh*, p. 120; Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. 23; and Swinson, *Six Minutes to Sunset*, p. 131.
77. Disorders Inquiry Committee Report (1920), p. 136, NA CAB 27/91. See also Datta, *Jallianwala Bagh*, pp. 120, 130.
78. Letter from Secretary of State for India to the Governor General of India, p. 3, in *Report, Proceedings and Memoranda of Cabinet Committee on Indian Disorders*, vol. I, 1920, NA CAB 27/91 (emphasis added). See also Datta, *Jallianwala Bagh*, p. 137; Swinson, *Six Minutes to Sunset*, p. 135.
79. Report, Proceedings and Memoranda of Cabinet Committee on Indian Disorders, vol. I, 1920, p. 3, NA CAB 27/91.
80. Rod Thornton, 'The British Army and the origins of its minimum force philosophy', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 15/1 (2004), p. 85.
81. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. 23.
82. Charles Townshend, *Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion* (London: Penguin, 2005).
83. Peter Hart, *The IRA and its Enemies: Violence and Community in Cork, 1916–1923* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), p. 53.

84. Ibid., p. 72.
85. Joost Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare: The Experience of Ordinary Volunteers in the Irish War of Independence 1916–1921* (Blackrock: Irish Academic Press, 1996), p. 66.
86. Hart, *The IRA and its Enemies*, p. 10.
87. Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars*, p. 65.
88. The police reported that early in the conflict 70 per cent of the local population supported Sinn Fein and the IRA. See Charles Townshend, *The British Campaign in Ireland, 1919–1021: The Development of Political and Military Policies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 22.
89. Hart, *The IRA and its Enemies*, p. 63.
90. Ibid., p. 73.
91. Ibid., p. 37.
92. Ibid., p. 80.
93. Ibid., p. 93.
94. Augusteijn, *From Public Defiance to Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 183.
95. Charles Townshend, *Political Violence in Ireland: Government and Resistance since 1848* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 348.
96. Ibid., p. 351.
97. Townshend, *The British Campaign*, p. 53.
98. This is recognised by Charles Gwynn in *Imperial Policing* (London: Macmillan, 1934) – discussed shortly – who notes how people were focusing on the experience and lessons of World War One (p. 7).
99. Townshend, *Political Violence*, p. 346.
100. Hew Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), p. 169.
101. Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*, p. 12.
102. Ibid., p. 7.
103. Ibid., p. 14.
104. Ibid., pp. 5, 15.
105. John. T. Fishel, 'The normative implications of "The Savage Wars of Peace"', *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 9/1 (1998), p. 104.
106. Thornton, *The British Army*, p. 96.
107. Gwynn, *Imperial Policing*, pp. 34–5.
108. Ibid., pp. 60–2.
109. Ibid., p. 6.
110. The War Office, *Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* (1929). NA WO 279/468, p. 3.
111. The War Office, *Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* (19379). NA WO 279/469, p. 22.

112. Ibid., p. 18.
113. It is unfortunate that *Notes on Imperial Policing* has not been found in any of the libraries or archives.
114. H. J. Simson, *British Rule, and Rebellion* (Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood and Sons Ltd, 1938).
115. Ibid., pp. 7, 35. See also p. 69 – 'Three bodies have to move in step together, the civil authorities, the police, and H. M. Forces.'
116. Ibid., p. 64.
117. Ibid., p. 123.
118. Ibid., p. 229.
119. T. R. Moreman (1997) '"Small Wars" and "Imperial Policing": the British Army and the theory and practice of colonial warfare in the British Empire, 1919–1939', in Brian Holden Reid (ed.), *Military Power: Land Warfare in Theory and Practice* (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 112, 125.
120. See 1921 *Staff College Regulations* (e.g. pp. 12–13), NA WO 32/3098.
121. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. 180. For example, a War Office Report was also produced in 1934 entitled 'Notes on Certain Lessons of the Great War' – although it described key principles such as surprise and the indirect approach, the production of this official document 16 years after the end of World War One demonstrates the lack of consideration paid to formalising lessons and a strategic approach even to conventional war. See Brian Holden Reid, 'A doctrinal perspective, 1988–1998', *SCSI Occasional Paper No. 33* (1998).
122. Chris Bellamy, *Knights in White Armour* (London: Pimlico, 1997), p. 73.
123. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. 87.
124. Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars*, p. 104.
125. Ibid., p. 105.
126. Trevor Royle, *Orde Wingate: Irregular Soldier* (London: Phoenix Giant, 1995), p. 2.
127. It is interesting to note that the effective use of night attacks in 'small wars' was put forward by Sir Garnet Wolseley in 1886, 50 years earlier, in his *Soldier's Pocket-Book for Field Service*: e.g. 'If you wish to fall upon him unawares, your marches must be made at night, in perfect silence, by little frequented paths, no fires to be allowed during temporary halts, and in some instances smoking even to be forbidden when in his vicinity' (p. 413).
128. Royle, *Orde Wingate*, p. 140.
129. Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars*, p. 108.
130. Wingate's approach in Palestine has been likened unfavourably to that of the Black and Tans in Ireland. See Simon Anglim, 'Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads: a feasible policy for counter-terrorism?', *Contemporary Security Policy* 28/1 (2007), pp. 28, 31. See also Simson, *British Rule*, p. 17.

131. Royle, *Orde Wingate*, p. 120.
132. Ibid., p. 125.
133. Ibid., p. 117.
134. After World War One, with the army returning to its traditional role of imperial policing, numbers were greatly reduced. At the start of World War Two the British army totalled 53,287 officers and 839,460 other ranks. Following the call-up of all men aged 18 to 41 in September 1939, the army nearly tripled in size, reaching 2.2 million men in June 1941, and a maximum of 2.9 million in June 1945. See David French, *Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War against Germany, 1919–1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 63–4.
135. French, *Raising Churchill's Army*, p. 73.
136. Ibid., p. 66.
137. Mike Calvert, *Chindits: Long Range Penetration* (London: Ballantine Books, 1974), pp. 95–6.
138. Foreword, by Sir Robert Thompson, in Peter Mead, *Orde Wingate and the Historians* (Braunton, Devon: Merlin Books Ltd, 1987), p. 10.
139. Shelford Bidwell, *The Chindit War: The Campaign in Burma, 1944* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), p. 45.
140. Richard Rhodes James, *Chindit* (London: John Murray, 1980), p. 11.
141. Ibid., Foreword, by Bernard Fergusson, p. 2.
142. Mike Calvert, *Fighting Mad*, 2nd edn (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing Ltd, 1996), p. 68.
143. Cited in Frank Owen, *The Campaign in Burma* (London: HMSO, 1946), p. 34.
144. Quoted in Calvert, *Chindits,* p. 157.
145. David Rooney, *Wingate and the Chindits: Redressing the Balance* (London: Arms and Armour Press, 1994), pp. 248–9.
146. See, for example, Rooney, *Wingate and the Chindits*, and Mead, *Orde Wingate.* Robert Thompson describes the Official History as a 'hatchet job by little men' in the foreword to Mead's book.
147. Rooney, *Wingate,* p. 243.
148. David Charters, *The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945–47* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), p. 126. This suggests that there was some *institutionalisation* of past lessons but that *internalisation* had not occurred; this is interesting in itself since in most cases the opposite was true – small wars methods were often practised without being formalised in doctrine.
149. David Charters, 'From Palestine to Northern Ireland: British adaptation to low-intensity operations', in D. Charters and M. Tugwell (eds), *Armies*

in Low-Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis (London: Brassey's, 1989), p. 215.

150. Bernard Fergusson, *The Trumpet in the Hall, 1930–1958* (London: Collins, 1970), p. 227.
151. Charters, *The British Army*, p. 151.
152. General Sir Nigel Bagnall, Foreword to Charters, *The British Army*, p. ix.
153. Ibid., p. ix.
154. Ibid., p. 171.
155. Charters, *From Palestine to Northern Ireland*, p. 182.
156. This concept was originally put forward by Argyris and Schon – for them, single-loop learning occurs when an organisation's members detect and correct errors in order to maintain the current position/norms/*modus operandi*. Learning occurs in order to preserve constancy/stability and so that existing goals and objectives can be achieved. Double-loop learning on the other hand occurs when the organisational goals/norms themselves are modified. It is recognised that change is required and new priorities are set, through finding the best solution (among alternatives) and implementing it, resulting in innovation. See Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, *Organizational Learning: A Theory of Action Perspective* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1978), pp. 18–26.
157. Joseph Nye, 'Nuclear learning and US–Soviet security regimes', *International Organization* 41/3 (1987), p. 380.
158. Draft of *The Commander* by Ian Hamilton dated 1915, LHCMA Hamilton Papers 15/2/2, p. 41.
159. Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992), p. 231.
160. Hamilton notes for *The Commander* (on scrap of paper), LHCMA Hamilton Papers 15/2/6.

Chapter 3 The Malayan Emergency, 1948–60

1. Note from Field Marshal Montgomery to Oliver Lyttelton, Colonial Secretary in Malaya. John Cloake, *Templer, Tiger of Malaya: The Life of Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer* (London: Harrap, 1985), p. 201.
2. David Ucko, 'Countering insurgents through distributed operations: insights from Malaya 1948–1960', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 30/1 (February 2007), p. 65.
3. Who formed a minority of 38 per cent of the population of Malaya: Thomas Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 210.

4. Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
5. As discussed in Chapter 1, the British army was working closely with both local police forces and local auxiliary troops in these decolonisation counterinsurgency operations. Here, however, the focus is on the British army as a distinct organisation, and this is reflected in the discussion, which centres on *British* troops, leaders and army culture, as opposed to any indigenous security forces.
6. Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn (San Francisco: Jossey Bass Publishers, 1992), p. 1.
7. Ibid., ch. 12.
8. QHR FARELF Training Centre – qtr ending Mar 1949 – Interim Training Report Sept. 1948–Jan. 1949. NA WO 268/116.
9. The reasons for this are explored further later in the chapter, when discussing the importance of continuity of experience.
10. Donald Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency 1948–1960: The Domino that Stood* (London: Brassey's, 1997), p. 90.
11. Ibid., p. 71.
12. Ibid., p. 81.
13. Cloake, *Templer*, pp. 194–5.
14. Gurney Statement at Press Conference, 15 December 1950 (p. 5). NA CO 537/6004.
15. Noel Barber, *The War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya Defeated the Communist Guerrillas, 1948–60* (London: Collins, 1971), p. 62.
16. Harry Miller, *Jungle War in Malaya: The Campaign against Communism, 1948–60* (London: Arthur Baker Ltd., 1972), p. 72.
17. Cloake, *Templer*, p. 197.
18. Chiefs of Staff Committee – Minutes of Meeting held on 23 November 1950. NA CO 537/5975.
19. General Lockhart's appreciation of the situation in Malaya in November 1951. NAM 1995-01-165-28, pp. 3, 11. Lockhart was also an intellectual leader, keen to study past successful counterinsurgency operations, as seen in his notes on 'Anti-Bandit Measures' from December 1951: 'Have we the necessary literature to study anti-guerrilla tactics in other countries, e.g. Burma 1930–32, Greece, Spain, etc. etc.? If not, can we get?' NAM 1995-01-165-38-1, p. 3, para. 17. It is also interesting to note that in 1951 Lockhart suggests using more night operations, which had up to then been deemed ineffective (even though this approach was suggested by Sir Garnet Wolseley in 1886!) but this method was also put forward by Frank Kitson six years later in 1957 as a possible approach. Why did the organisational learning process fail in this tactical instance?

20. Lockhart memo to Slim re situation in Malaya, 14 January 1952. NAM 1995-01-165-49. Discussions between Gurney, Briggs and the Colonial Office also reflect a general awareness of a need for operations to be speeded up (see, for example, NA CO 537/5975).
21. Filmscript for 'Templer on Malaya', a filmed discussion with FM Sir Gerald Templer on the Anti-Terrorist Campaign in Malaya, 25 March 1977 (Templer interviewed by Maj Gen Lloyd Owen and Lt Col John Foley). LHCMA O'CONNOR 12/35, p. 4.
22. Directive to High Commissioner (Templer), 5 February 1952. NA CO 1022/102.
23. Filmscript for 'Templer on Malaya', p. 10.
24. Templer repeatedly told the press that Malaya was a long-term commitment and that there was a long way to go (see, for example, *The Times*, 5 December 1952) and also Templer's press conference statement from 4 December 1952. NA CO 1022/493, and *The Times* Digital Archive. Templer's task was of course greatly aided by the 1951 change in government in the UK and its clear and positive views on granting independence to Malaya.
25. Barber, *War of the Running Dogs*, p. 177.
26. Press statement made by General Templer at a press conference, 19 June 1952. NA CO 1022/492.
27. Federal Government of Malaya press statement made by General Templer at press conference, 4 July 1952. NA CO 1022/492.
28. This approach was also adopted further down the chain of command, as Maj I. S. Gibb, a platoon commander in Malaya notes: 'We as soldiers never forgot that we were acting in aid of the civil power. We also fully appreciated that the situation was not a military one but a political one.' IWM 86/3/1, p. 66.
29. Cloake, *Templer*, p. 262; and Richard Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare: The Malayan Emergency, 1948–1960* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 259.
30. The example is often quoted of Templer imposing a 22-hour curfew on one village and halving their basic food ration because they refused to give information on local communist groups that he knew they possessed. But he also provided all the villages with a means of anonymously informing the authorities about local CT activities (since he understood that they were afraid of communist reprisals), which produced good results, and the collective punishment was subsequently lifted.
31. Templer's London press conference, 4 December 1952. NA CO 1022/493.

32. See, for example, Templer's London press conference, 18 May 1953. NA CO 1022/494. Also see telegram from Templer to his deputy MacGillivray re setting up boys clubs in Malaya, the role of the Social Welfare Officer, the Malayan Youth Organisation, etc. (24 June 1952, NA CO 1022/492); and Barber, *War of the Running Dogs*, p. 183, re Templer's focus on social services, rural industrial development, co-operatives, etc., and the *Malayanisation* of society (across races), improving education so that it was *Malay*.
33. Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds*, p. 146. Templer himself also talks of his aim to travel extensively around the country, meeting people from all walks of life and communicating to them why they should support the government, plus to see issues at first-hand and deal with them with a sense of urgency. See filmscript for 'Templer on Malaya', p. 23. See also Cloake, *Templer*, pp. 219–20.
34. See, for example, Cloake, *Templer*, p. 251, which includes a discussion of Templer's role in improving the water supply to New Villages, schooling and sports.
35. Brig W. H. Lambert to Stockwell, 21 May 1953. LHCMA STOCKWELL 7/8/1-7.
36. Filmscript for 'Templer on Malaya', p. 17.
37. Although not the originator of the phrase, Templer is renowned for using it in Malaya and bringing it into common usage. See, for example, Templer's speech to the Malayan Chamber of Commerce, 24 April 1952, when he said that 'the answer to our present problems and frustrations by no means lies in the jungle. It lies in the hearts and the minds of the men, women and children of this country'. NAM 1974-10-29-10.
38. Outline of Future Anti-Bandit Policy in Malaya, 12 May 1950 (prepared by Briggs). NA CO 537/5975.
39. Filmscript for 'Templer on Malaya', p. 30.
40. Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds*, p. 147.
41. See, for example, HQ FARELF Weekly Situation Reports on Bandit Activity in Malaya, NA CO 1022/11 and /12, and FARELF Situation Reports, Malaya, NA FO 371/101226 to 9, for examples of the slow process of picking off one or two CTs at a time, and frequently not having any contact at all.
42. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, p. 231.
43. Oliver Daddow, 'Facing the future: history in the writing of British military doctrine', *Defence Studies* 2/1 (2002), p. 158.
44. John Gooch (ed.), 'The Origin of Contemporary Doctrine', *SCSI Occasional Paper 30* (1997), p. 5.
45. Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 3rd edn (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 2004), pp. 25–6.

46. The War Office, *Imperial Policing and Duties in Aid of the Civil Power* (London: Fosh and Cross Ltd, 1949), NA WO 279/391.
47. War Office, *Imperial Policing*, p. 4.
48. Ibid., p. 6.
49. Ibid., p. 5.
50. Ibid., pp. 4–5, 26.
51. Ibid., pp. 5–7.
52. Ibid., pp. 6, 9–11.
53. Ibid., p. 9.
54. Ibid., pp. 15–16, 37.
55. The War Office, *Keeping the Peace (Duties in Support of the Civil Power)*, Final Draft (1956), ch. 1, para. 8, NA WO 296/23.
56. War Office, *Keeping the Peace*, ch. 2, para 8.
57. Ibid., ch. 11, paras 7, 8, 11, 12; ch. 13.
58. Ibid., ch. 11, para. 9.
59. See Memorandum for Commandants [of Training Establishments] re: Tactics in Malaya, 25 October 1950. NA WO 231/38.
60. Notes of Conference held by GOC Malaya District on 11 July 1950. NA WO 231/38.
61. Ibid. Unfortunately, it was also agreed at this conference that no additional pamphlet on jungle warfare was required (p. 6). As is shown in the next section, Templer soon changed this.
62. Staff College Course 1950, Records, vol. 4 (Military History), JSCSC library archive.
63. Staff College Course 1950, Records, vol. 13 (Fighting under Special Conditions), JSCSC library archive.
64. Ibid., pp. 8, 11, 18, 19.
65. Internal Security, Programme and General Instructions. Staff College Course 1950, Records, vol. 14 (Internal Security), JSCSC library archive.
66. Ibid. Introduction to Internal Security and Civil Defence, p. 3.
67. Ibid., abbreviations and emphasis in original.
68. Recommendations by Students' Committee, 6th Term 1950 Course. Staff College Course 1950, Records, vol. 1 (Coordinating Instructions), JSCSC library archive.
69. Ibid. Notes from Assistant Commandant's Conference, November 1950.
70. Appendix F to Jungle Warfare. Staff College Course 1955, Records, vol. 15 (Operations under Special Conditions), JSCSC library archive. Esp. pp. 22, 23.
71. Ibid., esp. pp. 23–4.
72. Staff College Course 1955, Records, vol. 16 (Internal Security), JSCSC library archive.

73. Ibid. Appendix A to Précis IS 1, p. 4.
74. Ibid. Appendix A to Précis IS 1, pp. 5–6, pp. 14–15.
75. Ibid. Internal Security, DS Notes, Part 1, p. 9.
76. Ibid. Internal Security, DS Notes, Introductory Notes.
77. Recommendations from C-in-C East Africa, NA WO 231/101.
78. Correspondence between Commandant and Under Secretary of State, the War Office, 9 April 1956. NA WO 231/101. See also David French, *Military Identities: The Regimental System, the British Army and the British People, c.1870–2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 328.
79. Annex to Correspondence between Commandant and Under Secretary of State, the War Office, 'Staff College, Imperial Policing – 1956 Course', 9 April 1956. NA WO 231/101.
80. 'Cold War 3', 1957 Staff Course. NA WO 231/101.
81. 'Ex DRUM BEAT', 1957 Staff Course. NA WO 231/101.
82. 'Ex ORANG UTAN', 1957 Staff Course. NA WO 231/101.
83. C. N. M. Blair, *Guerrilla Warfare* (London: Ministry of Defence, 1957). NA WO 231/80.
84. Staff College Course 1958, Records, vol. 1 (Coordinating Instructions), and vol. 13 (Internal Security), JSCSC library archive.
85. Internal Security 1, Keeping the Peace. Staff College Course 1958, Records, vol. 13 (Internal Security), JSCSC library archive.
86. Ibid., esp. pp. 3–4.
87. Minutes of the Assistant Commandant's Conference, 7 November 1958. Staff College Course 1958, Records, vol. 1 (Coordinating Instructions), JSCSC library archive.
88. Staff College Course 1958, Records, vol. 1 (Coordinating Instructions), JSCSC library archive.
89. Staff College Course 1960, Records, vol. 12 (Internal Security), JSCSC library archive. Esp. p. 3–4.
90. Ibid.
91. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. 188.
92. The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya (ATOM), 3rd edn, 1958. NA WO 279/241.
93. The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, ch. 3, section 8.
94. Ibid., ch. 3, section 3.
95. Quarterly Historical Report of the FARELF Training Centre, qtr ending Mar 1949, Interim Training Report Sept. 1948–Jan. 1949. NA WO 268/116.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.

98. Half Yearly Training Report for the Period 1 Apr. to 30 Sep. 1949, FARELF Trg Centre. NA WO 268/116, p. 1.
99. Ibid., p. 2. It is interesting and surprising to note also that in the next quarter there were no training courses due to the intensification of operations (see WO NA 268/116), despite Walker stressing the need for far *more* training.
100. Daniel Marston, 'Lost and found in the jungle: the Indian and British Army jungle warfare doctrines for Burma, 1943–5, and the Malayan Emergency, 1948–60', in H. Strachan (ed.) *Big Wars and Small Wars: The British Army and the Lessons of War in the 20th Century* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), p. 102.
101. See Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency,* p. 127.
102. See DS notes on DWEC Training Course, August 1952, LHCMA STOCKWELL 7/4.
103. Marston, 'Lost and found', p. 105.
104. Cloake, *Templer*, p. 242.
105. Peter Smith and Mark Peterson, *Leadership, Organizations and Culture: An Event Management Model* (London: Sage, 1988), p. 3.
106. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn, p. 229.
107. Bennett, *Organisational Behaviour*, p. 187.
108. Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency*, pp. 86–8.
109. There is indeed a debate within the academic literature on the importance of Templer in turning around the situation in Malaya. Karl Hack is critical of Templer's role, and holds the view that the situation was already improving prior to Templer's arrival (with the Briggs Plan), that his impact has been overstated, and that severe population control rather than winning hearts and minds accounts for the demise of the insurgency. This argument, however, is contrary to the views of a significant number of other historians, who express support for the opinion that Templer was instrumental in turning the tide against the insurgents, in part due to his personality and drive, and they hold strong reservations about Hack's arguments. In support of this point of view are Simon Smith and Kumar Ramakrishna (who believe that Templer provided much needed confidence in the Malayan administration), along with earlier works by Anthony Short, Richard Stubbs and John Coates. These views are also supported here, in agreement with Smith in holding the view that, 'While any exaggerated claims to originality are suspect, the single-mindedness and clarity of purpose with which Templer prosecuted counter-insurgency were not only novel, but also crucial in extinguishing the insurrection'. Simon Smith, 'General Templer and counter-insurgency in Malaya: hearts and minds, intelligence, and propaganda', *Intelligence and*

National Security 16/3 (2001), here p. 75. See also Karl Hack, 'Screwing down the people: the Malayan Emergency, decolonisation, and ethnicity', in H. Antlov and S. Tonnesson (eds), *Imperial Policy and South-East Asian Nationalism 1930–1957* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 1995); ' "Iron claws on Malaya": the historiography of the Malayan Emergency', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 30/1 (1999); 'British intelligence and counter-insurgency in the era of decolonisation: the example of Malaya', *Intelligence and National Security* 14/2 (Summer 1999); *Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britain, Malaya and Singapore, 1941–1968* (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001); Kumar Ramakrishna, ' "Transmogrifying" Malaya: the impact of Sir Gerald Templer (1952–1954)', *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 32/1 (2001); Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya 1948–1960* (London: Frederick Muller, 1975); John Coates, *Suppressing Insurgency: An Analysis of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1954* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992); Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds.*

110. R.W. Komer, *The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1972), p. 31.
111. Barber, *War of the Running Dogs*, p. 149.
112. Ibid., p. 205.
113. Cloake, *Templer*, p. 227.
114. Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency*, p. 122.
115. Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds*, p. 143.
116. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. 167. This is demonstrated very well in the diary of Maj David Lloyd Owen who was Templer's Military Assistant from 1952 to 1953; it provides great detail of the amount of work that was done, the visits that were arranged and undertaken, and the wide variety of people consulted and involved in fighting the insurgency on all fronts. See NAM 1998-06-176-1. See also Cloake. *Templer,* pp. 219–20, which stresses Templer's focus on areas such as the police, education, medical care, citizenship, youth movements, etc.
117. Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War*, p. 80.
118. Appendix A to FARELF situation report no. 219, Malaya for 3–9 October 1952. An Appreciation of the Situation in Malaya, 22 September 1952. NA FO 371/101229.
119. Barber, *War of the Running Dogs*, p. 204.
120. Diana Pheysey, *Organizational Cultures: Types and Transformations* (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 144–5.
121. Stephen Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), pp. 20–1.
122. Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency*, p. 86.

123. Barber, *War of the Running Dogs*, p. 63.
124. Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency*, p. 79.
125. Ibid., p. 79. It will be interesting to revisit the example of General Harding in the Cyprus case study, Chapter 5.
126. Barber, *War of the Running Dogs*, p. 140.
127. Filmscript for 'Templer on Malaya', pp. 7–8.
128. See Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds,* p. 138. Templer speaks highly of his relationship with Lyttelton – see filmscript for 'Templer on Malaya', p. 27.
129. Oliver Lyttelton, *The Memoirs of Lord Chandos* (London: The Bodley Head, 1962), p. 382. It is evident from Templer's biography that he received Lyttelton's continued support throughout his tenure in Malaya (see Cloake, *Templer*).
130. Rosen, *Winning the Next War,* p. 21.
131. Appreciation of situation in Malaya by Lt Gen Sir Hugh Stockwell, 15 October 1953. LHCMA TALBOT 3/5.
132. Deborah Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change: Lessons from Peripheral Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 118.
133. Barber, *War of the Running Dogs,* pp. 96–97, 154.
134. Thompson's approach to counterinsurgency was eventually recorded in his book *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, in which he set out his five principles of counterinsurgency: the government must (1) have a clear political aim, (2) function within the law, (3) have an overall plan, (4) prioritise the defeat of political subversion rather than the guerrillas, and (5) secure its base areas first. Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya to Vietnam* (London: Chatto and Windus Ltd, 1966), pp. 50–7.
135. Tom Pocock, *Fighting General: The Public and Private Campaigns of General Sir Walter Walker* (London: Collins, 1973), p. 91.
136. Mike Calvert, *Fighting Mad*, 2nd edn (Shrewsbury: Airlife Publishing Ltd, 1996), p. 207.
137. Ibid., p. 204.
138. Templer also had a good relationship with and received support in his approach from the Director of Intelligence (Morton), the new Police Commissioner (Young), and the GOC Malaya (Stockwell), and was also backed by the C-in-C FARELF (Keightley); see Cloake, *Templer,* pp. 229, 241, 251.
139. Templer, for example, goes on to become CIGS following his time in the 'supremo' role in Malaya, and this recent small wars experience would have been important for keeping these often overlooked conflicts out of the political wilderness, and for advocating a certain approach to them, since the role of CIGS was key to bridging the gap between the military and the

government. The CIGS also has an important role to play in setting an example for more junior soldiers, and his championing of small wars methods would stick in the minds of eager junior officers at, for example, the Staff College, thus further embedding the evolving small wars culture. Slim, for example, addressed the Staff College in May 1949, and emphasised the importance in Malaya (even at that early stage) of policing, intelligence and obtaining information from the people (i.e. their support), and that there were no conventional pitched battles. See NA WO 216/789, Address by CIGS on World Situation to Staff College, May 1949. Later in the conflict, Lt Gen Bourne, when Director of Operations, corresponded regularly with the CIGS, keeping him informed of progress in implementing the Briggs Plan and Templer's objectives, hence reinforcing the approach taken and the developing concepts and culture. See NA WO 216/874.

140. See, for example, interviews by Adrian Walker of national servicemen in Malaya. NAM 2002-07-359-1, 2, 4.
141. Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency*, p. 37.
142. Barber, *War of the Running Dogs*, p. 62.
143. Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War*, p. 51.
144. Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency*, p. 44.
145. Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War*, p. 57.
146. Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency*, p. 89.
147. John Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 197.
148. Filmscript for 'Templer on Malaya', p. 2.
149. Ibid., p. 5.
150. Stubbs, *Hearts and Minds*, p. 144.
151. There are some additional examples of this (see also Figure 3.1). Gen Cassels was Director of Operations in Malaya from 1957 to 1959, and went on to become CGS in 1965. Gen Hull was C-in-C FARELF from 1958 onwards, and became C(I)GS in 1961. FM Harding will be covered in more detail in the Cyprus case study, Chapter 5.
152. Robert Thompson, *Make for the Hills: Memories of Far Eastern Wars* (London: Leo Cooper, 1989), p. 71.
153. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, p. 69.
154. Ibid., p. 69. See also Pocock, *Fighting General*, p. 90.
155. Calvert, *Fighting Mad*, p. 203.
156. Ibid., pp. 203–4.
157. See NA WO 216/494, Report on the Malayan Scouts (SAS Regiment), 22 December 1951.

158. Ucko, 'Countering insurgents', p. 58.
159. Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency*, p. 78.
160. From reading other literature, the principle of minimum force was not emphasised strongly during the conflict; but it was understood as a principle, and that the use of excessive force was inappropriate and a breach of an established 'norm' of British counterinsurgency warfare. For example, after an incident where 25 Chinese men were killed in December 1948, 'there needed to be a total reappraisal of the attitudes and policies of Government and Security Forces towards the rural Chinese communities. The Army and Police needed a definitive statement of aim, clear definitions of what might or might not be done, and senior officers must be made to accept responsibility for seeing that orders were carried out meticulously and with sensitivity'. Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency*, p. 60.
161. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*, p. 124.
162. Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency*, p. 72.
163. The fact that a majority of the books covering the Malayan Emergency have specific chapters entitled and focused solely on Briggs and Templer shows the importance of specific leaders during the conflict and the difference that leadership made.
164. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn, p. 301.
165. Ibid., p. 5.
166. Ibid., p. 15.
167. Bennett, *Organizational Behaviour*, p. 188.
168. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife*, pp. xxii–xxiii.
169. Avant, *Political Institutions and Military Change*, p. 127.
170. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn, pp. 386–91.

Chapter 4 Kenya and the Mau Mau Uprising, 1952–56

1. Randall W. Heather, 'Of men and plans: the Kenya campaign as part of the British counterinsurgency experience', *Conflict Quarterly* (Winter 1993), p. 21.
2. Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p. 85.
3. Mau Mau is the British name for the Kikuyu uprising; locally they were known as the Kikuyu Central Association (the KCA), Muingi ('movement') or Muigwithania ('the unifier'). John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 63.
4. Charles Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars: Counterinsurgency in the Twentieth Century* (London: Faber and Faber, 1986), pp. 198–9.

5. Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning*, p. 86.
6. Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars*, p. 200.
7. As noted in previous chapters, the local police forces and indigenous security forces played a key role in these small wars. However, in order to concentrate on addressing the core themes of the book, the analysis here remains focused on the *British* soldiers that were involved in these conflicts, and the British army as an organisation (and its culture).
8. Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five* (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 13.
9. The division of the conflict into these four stages is presented in Huw Bennett, 'The other side of the COIN: minimum and exemplary force in British Army counterinsurgency in Kenya', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18/4 (December 2007), pp. 638–9.
10. This correlates with Schein's theories on the relationship between leadership and culture in an organisational context that were introduced earlier. See Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1992).
11. See, for example, NA WO 216/560 re the appointment of Hinde.
12. David A. Percox, 'British counter-insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56: extension of internal security policy or prelude to decolonisation?', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 9/3 (Winter 1998), p. 70.
13. Heather, 'Of men and plans', p. 18.
14. David Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire* (London: Phoenix, 2005), p. 239.
15. Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars,* pp. 200–1.
16. Thomas Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 44–5.
17. Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, p. 14.
18. Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgen*cy, p. 49.
19. Ibid., p. 50. Alternative views are presented in Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*; Huw Bennett, *British Army Counterinsurgency and the Use of Force in Kenya, 1952–56* (PhD thesis, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, 2006); Caroline Elkins, *Britain's Gulag: The Brutal End of Empire in Kenya* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2005). On this topic, see also the ongoing debate between Thornton and Bennett (discussed in Chapter 1), in terms of differentiating between the different security forces involved in the campaign and the evidence on who was responsible for using exemplary force in Kenya. See Rod Thornton, ' "Minimum force": a reply to Huw Bennett', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 20/1 (2009), pp. 215–26; Huw Bennett, 'The other side of the COIN: minimum and exemplary force in British Army counterinsurgency in Kenya', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18/4 (2007), pp. 638–64; Rod Thornton,

'The British Army and the origins of its minimum force philosophy', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 14/2 (2004), pp. 83–106.

20. Percox, 'British counter-insurgency', p. 71.
21. Apparently Erskine carried a letter from the British Government with him at all times in his spectacle case, which gave him the authority to proclaim martial law and take control of the civil administration if necessary – this was never enacted. Michael Blundell, *So Rough a Wind* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 163; and Anthony Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya 1952–1960: A Study of Military Operations against Mau Mau* (Nairobi: Transafrica Publishers Ltd, 1976).
22. Draft despatch June 1953, NA WO 236/16, p. 3.
23. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 258.
24. Erskine letter to Harding (CIGS), 15 August 1953, NA CO 822/442. See also Erskine's notes for a lecture given to the 1955 Staff Course at Camberley, JSCSC library reference CONF 90, p. 1.
25. Kitson, *Bunch of Five*, p. 58.
26. Paul Melshen, 'Mapping out a counterinsurgency campaign plan: critical considerations in counterinsurgency campaigning', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 18/4 (December 2007), p. 681. See also Report by Gen Sir G. Erskine on operations in Kenya 1953 July–1955 May, NA WO 276/511; and Mau Mau Rebellion: draft despatch, June 1953, NA WO 236/16; and Michael Dewar, *Brush Fire Wars: Minor Campaigns of the British Army since 1945* (London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1984), p. 54.
27. Undated lecture to Kenya police college, Erskine papers, IWM 75/134/4.
28. George Erskine, 'Kenya – what is it all about?' *Journal of the Royal Artillery* 83/2 (1956), p. 105.
29. Dewar, *Brush Fire Wars*, p. 54; Kitson, *Bunch of Five,* p. 19.
30. Gregory Blaxland, *The Farewell Years: The Final Historical Records of the Buffs, 1948–1967* (Canterbury: The Queen's Own Buffs Office, 1967), p. 64.
31. J. K. Windeatt, *The Devonshire Regiment August 1945–May 1958* (Aldershot: The Forces Press, 1980), p. 52.
32. See, for example, the *Daily Herald,* 11 December 1953, in Erskine Papers, IWM 75/134/5. See also Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 258.
33. Draft despatch June 1953, NA WO 236/16, p. 7.
34. Erskine's directive to all officers of the army, police and the security forces, 23 June 1953, NA WO 236/17; the full text of this directive can be found in Appendix A. The role of the army in the excessive brutality in Kenya is still debated; however, the author believes that based on existing evidence they were far less culpable than many of the other elements of the security forces,

particularly the home guard and the police. The existing army culture that influenced the soldiers' ethos saw excessive force as counterproductive; one soldier is quoted as saying, when he saw an Askari (member of the King's African Rifles) beating detainees, 'this Askari was literally beating up this poor old guy who could hardly walk. I threatened to shoot this Askari corporal'. Charles Allen, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Soldiers' Voices 1945–1989* (London: Michael Joseph, 1990), p. 133. This is supported by Anderson, who states that 'police use of violence had become so routine by this time that some British soldiers were reluctant to hand over prisoners'. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 260.

35. Bennett, *British Army Counterinsurgency*, pp. 155–6.
36. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 299.
37. Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars*, p. 203.
38. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 259.
39. Bennett, *British Army Counterinsurgency*, p. 10.
40. Although Erskine said 'I set out to clean up not cover up', it is interesting to note, however, that he was very keen for this enquiry not to cover the first phase of the conflict, since he was 'quite certain prisoners were beaten to extract information'. See Erskine, letter to Anthony Head, Secretary of State for War, 10 December 1953, NA WO 32/15834. See LHCMA LIDDELL HART 15/5/412 for press reports relating to the incidents and accusations of brutality.
41. Bennett, *British Army Counterinsurgency*, p. 10.
42. That Erskine needed to educate the security forces about the need for restraint and the use of minimum necessary force could be down to various factors. The police and other local security forces did not have the historical background of the British troops, and hence were not as inculcated in proven methods (as discussed in Chapter 1). Army regiments could therefore have been influenced by the brutal conduct of these different security forces which led to 'exceptions to the rule', and this would have been compounded by extant views on the nature of their opponent. National Service also plays a role here: many of the soldiers were national servicemen and did not have the knowledge of the legacy left by years of imperial policing and small wars – that excessive force was counterproductive – and these troops could have been more easily influenced by other forces.
43. Erskine, letter to Harding (CIGS), 15 August 1953, NA CO 822/442. Although this shows that Erskine realised the need for social improvements, it will be demonstrated later that there was never a strong focus on 'hearts and minds' in Kenya, as there had been in Malaya.
44. Quoted in Anderson, *Histories*, p. 260.

45. Kenya Emergency: report by General Erskine, 1953 June–1955 May, NA WO 236/18.
46. Notes for C-in-C's talk to brigade and battalion commanders, 10 December 1954, NA WO 236/17.
47. Percox, 'British counter-insurgency', p. 85.
48. Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. 76.
49. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 293.
50. Erskine press conference notes, 12 April 1955, NA WO 236/17.
51. See, for example, Appreciation by the C-in-C East Africa (Lathbury), January 1956, NA WO 216/892.
52. D. Peters, *Between the Twighlights: The Military Experience of the Campaign against Mau Mau*, NAM 1997-12-19, pp. 4–2, 4–43.
53. C-in-C's Appreciation of the Operational Situation in Kenya, August 1955, NA WO 216/887, and Lt Gen Lathbury, The Kenya Emergency May 1955–Nov. 1956, NA WO 236/20.
54. Lt Gen Lathbury, The Kenya Emergency May 1955–Nov. 1956, NA WO 236/20, p. 9.
55. See Paget, *Counter-insurgency Campaigning*, pp. 101–3; Kitson, *Bunch of Five*; and Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping* (London: Faber and Faber, 1971); and *Gangs and Counter-Gangs* (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1960).
56. See, for example, Lt Gen Lathbury's report on The Kenya Emergency May 1955–Nov. 1956, NA WO 236/20.
57. Heather, 'Of men and plans'.
58. Letter to Templer (CIGS) from Lathbury, 27 September 1956, NA WO 216/892.
59. Hinde was not following the guidance in this doctrine by focusing on defensive guards for the settler population, since it advises that 'the soldier knows that the maximum success will be achieved by freedom of action and mobility' rather than from the provision of static guards. *Imperial Policing*, p. 15.
60. George Erskine, *Notes for a lecture given to the 1955 Staff Course at Camberley*, 1955, JSCSC library reference CONF 90, p. 5.
61. Erskine, *Notes*, p. 4.
62. Ibid., p. 9.
63. 'Ex DRUM BEAT', 1957 Staff Course. NA WO 231/101.
64. *A Handbook on Anti-Mau Mau Operations* (Nairobi: The Government Printers, 1954), NA WO 276/545.
65. Ibid., e.g. p. 34; ch. IV; p. 66.
66. 'Ex DRUM BEAT', 1957 Staff Course. NA WO 231/101.

67. Heather, 'Of men and plans', p. 20.
68. Percox, 'British counter-insurgency', p. 70.
69. Bennett, 'The other side of the COIN', p. 654.
70. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 179.
71. Letter to V-CIGS from Gen Cameron, 30 April 1953, NA WO 216/851. The expression of these views was not popular and Cameron was reprimanded.
72. Report from visit to Kenya by Gen Nicholson, 11–16 May 1953, p. 3, NA WO 216/852.
73. Blaxland, *The Farewell Years*, p. 73.
74. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 180.
75. Townshend, *Britain's Civil Wars*, p. 201.
76. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 258.
77. Ibid., p. 261.
78. Draft biographical note about Gen Erskine (no author), Erskine Papers, IWM 75/134/4.
79. Charles Allen, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Soldiers' Voices, 1945–1989* (London: Michael Joseph, 1990), p. 127.
80. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 2nd edn, p. 229.
81. See Letter to V-CIGS from Gen Cameron, 30 April 1953, NA WO 216/851; and Report from visit to Kenya by Gen Nicholson, 11–16 May 1953, p. 3, NA WO 216/852.
82. Bennett, 'The other side of the COIN', p. 654.
83. Percox, 'British counter-insurgency', p. 72; and Michael Carver, *Harding of Petherton* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978), p. 181.
84. Percox, 'British counter-insurgency', p. 72.
85. Bennett, 'The other side of the COIN', p. 654.
86. Carver, *Harding of Petherton*, p. 181.
87. Ibid., pp. 181–2. In a letter from early 1954, Harding writes of two problems in Kenya: (1) a clear and definite long-term political policy was urgently needed, and (2) more forceful leadership at the top was essential. This confirms that Harding was developing a keen 'small wars' mindset, and a frustration with the administration. See NA WO 216/863.
88. CIGS/MB/48/6664/3, Harding to Head, 28 August 1953, NA PREM 11/472. Templer also demonstrated his small wars ethos and his attempts to pass on his knowledge in a letter to Lt Col Hamilton, CO 1st Battalion Advance Party (East Africa Command), in which he wrote, 'The British Officer and man must treat the local population decently. I know how difficult this is under the present Mau Mau conditions … [but] the time perhaps will arise when it is possible for the battalion or parts of it to do something to help the local population. A tremendous amount in this line was done in

Malaya during my time out there . . . It boils down to . . . trying to do something to help the under dog . . .' In John Cloake, *Templer, Tiger of Malaya: The Life of Field Marshal Sir Gerald Templer* (London: Harrap, 1985), Appendix 2, p. 460.

89. Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, p. 6, fn 11.
90. Oliver Lyttelton, *The Memoirs of Lord Chandos* (London: The Bodley Head, 1962), pp. 352, 397–8.
91. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 269.
92. Ibid., p. 269.
93. Lyttelton, *The Memoirs of Lord Chandos*, p. 404.
94. Telegram from Lyttelton to Baring, 4 December 1952, NA CO 822/439.
95. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 260.
96. Harding's role in particular is important when considering that he was involved in Malaya and the associated organisational learning process there, and he will be covered in further detail in Chapter 5, on the Cyprus emergency.
97. Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, p. 6.
98. Hinde was also involved in the political administration of Germany after World War Two, as Deputy Military Governor in Berlin from the end of war to 1948, then Deputy Commander in the Allied Control Commission in Lower Saxony.
99. Anderson, *Histories of the Hanged*, p. 200.
100. It is a pity that he had little opportunity to pass on his small wars knowledge after the Kenya conflict; he returned from Kenya as GOC Southern Command, was then Aide-de-Camp to the Queen, finally retiring as the Lieutenant Governor of Jersey.
101. Heather, 'Of men and plans', p. 22.
102. Carver, *Harding of Petherton*, p. 166.
103. Heather, 'Of men and plans', p. 22.
104. Dewar, *Brush Fire Wars*, p. 53.
105. 1 Rifle Brigade went from Kenya to Malaya; a soldier is quoted as saying 'all the bad lessons were never repeated in Malaya and I'm glad of that because I have a feeling that if we had taken some of the bad things that we did in our early days in Kenya it would probably have cost us a lot of lives'. See Allen, *The Savage Wars of Peace,* p. 129.
106. Erskine directive to all officers of the army, police and the security forces, 23 June 1953, NA WO 236/17. See also Clayton, *Counter-Insurgency in Kenya*, pp. 38–9.

Chapter 5 The Cyprus Revolt, 1955–60

1. Macdonald to Neale, January 1957. NA CO 926/1076.
2. *Cyprus – The Final Round*, October 1958–March 1959, by Maj Gen Darling, April 1959. IWM Con Shelf 05/41/1 and 1A, p. 31.
3. John Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 88.
4. Ibid., p. 89.
5. Frank Kitson, *Bunch of Five* (London: Faber and Faber, 1977), p. 211.
6. Ibid., p. 211.
7. An attempt to assassinate FM Harding was made in March 1956, but the bomb that was placed under his bed did not detonate.
8. Lawrence Durrell, *Bitter Lemons of Cyprus* (London: Faber and Faber, 1957), p. 165.
9. Although this book primarily covers *military* leaders, the governorship of Sir Hugh Foot will be covered in this chapter in some detail, since it is particularly important to the outcome of the conflict.
10. For a detailed analysis of the conflict, in particular the political aspects, the various negotiations, and the relationship between the British government, the Governor of Cyprus, and the Greek and Turkish communities and leaders, see Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954–1959* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). The analysis here will stop at 1960, when independence was granted to Cyprus and the British counterinsurgency campaign finished; however, the situation remains unresolved in Cyprus, following the annexation of North Cyprus by Turkey in 1974. The involvement of the British army in Cyprus also continued after 1960, when a UN peacekeeping operation was initiated there (which is still in force), in which British troops have taken part ever since. The two British Sovereign Base Areas are also still operational.
11. Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, pp. 55–6.
12. Durrell, *Bitter Lemons,* p. 185.
13. John Kiszely, 'Learning about counter-insurgency', *RUSI Journal* (December 2006), p. 2.
14. A report in August 1956 criticised the unpreparedness of the police for the current insurgency, saying that it had been in decline for the past 20 years. Richard Stiles, *'Mayhem in the Med': A Chronicle of the Cyprus Emergency, 1955–60* (London: Savannah, 2005), pp. 118–19. Lawrence Durrell comments that the police force had 'remained unchanged, except for a change of title, since 1878!'. See Durrell, *Bitter Lemons*, p. 164.

15. Informal Record of Visit to Cyprus by the Director of Military Intelligence and Mr Dean, 26 October 1955. NA WO 216/889.
16. Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus*, p. 56.
17. Minutes of Meeting on Security and Intelligence in Cyprus, 2 September 1955. NA CO 926/520.
18. Cyprus Policy, October 1955 to October 1957: Memorandum by Governor, FM Sir John Harding, 3 November 1957. NA CO 926/2084, p. 2.
19. Charles Allen, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Soldiers' Voices, 1945–1989* (London: Michael Joseph, 1990), pp. 140, 147.
20. Maj E. A. Cooper-Key, 'Some reflections on Cyprus', *British Army Review* 5 (September 1957), p. 41.
21. Durrell, *Bitter Lemons*, p. 153.
22. Ibid., p. 165.
23. Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt,* p. 70. See also NA FO 371/177322.
24. Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. 94.
25. Ibid., p. 94
26. Stiles, *Mayhem in the Med*, p. 41.
27. Michael Carver, *Harding of Petherton* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1978), p. 204.
28. David Anderson, 'Policing and communal conflict: the Cyprus emergency', in R. Holland (ed.), *Emergencies and Disorder in the European Empires after 1945* (London: Frank Cass, 1994), p. 199. See also Carver, *Harding of Petherton,* p. 209.
29. Interview with E. White: NAM 2002-07-365-1.
30. See Anderson, 'Policing and communal conflict', p. 177; Stiles, *Mayhem in the Med,* p. 44; articles by Harding in the *Daily Telegraph*, 7, 8 and 9 January 1958, NAM 1989-08-144.
31. James Corum, 'Training indigenous forces in counterinsurgency: a tale of two insurgencies', *SSI Monograph* (March 2006).
32. Carver, *Harding of Petherton*, p. 209.
33. Charles Foley and W. I. Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus* (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1975), p. 73.
34. David Charters, 'From Palestine to Northern Ireland: British adaptation to low-intensity operations', in D. Charters and M. Tugwell (eds), *Armies in Low-Intensity Conflict: A Comparative Analysis* (London: Brassey's, 1989), p. 219.
35. Cyprus Policy, October 1955 to October 1957: Memorandum by Governor, FM Sir John Harding, 3 November 1957. NA CO 926/2084, p. 306.
36. Panagiotis Dimitrakis, 'British intelligence and the Cyprus insurgency, 1955–1959', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 22/1 (2008), p. 376.

37. Foley and Scobie, *The Struggle for Cyprus,* p. 113; Stiles, *Mayhem in the Med,* p. 44; Cooper-Key, 'Some reflections on Cyprus', pp. 42–3. See also Charters, 'From Palestine to Northern Ireland', p. 199.
38. See Reports from the Cyprus Internal Security Committee. NA CO 926/517.
39. Julian Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning* (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p. 151.
40. Carver, *Harding of Petherton*, p. 204.
41. Address to District Security Committees by FM Harding, 21 October 1957, NA CO 926/1074. See also Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt,* p. 208.
42. Telegram from Harding to Secretary of State, 7 January 1956. NA FO 371/123864.
43. Telegram from Harding to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 October 1956. NA CO 926/556. See also Cyprus Policy, October 1955 to October 1957: Memorandum by Governor, FM Sir John Harding, 3 November 1957. NA CO 926/2084.
44. NAM 2002-07-365-2.
45. Adrian Walker, *Six Campaigns: National Servicemen on Active Service 1948–1960* (London: Leo Cooper, 1993), pp. 12, 66.
46. Thomas Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency, 1919–60* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), p. 135; Stiles, *Mayhem in the Med,* p. 52; Report by Director of Intelligence on Visit to Cyprus. NA WO 216/889.
47. Stiles, *Mayhem in the Med*, p. 101.
48. Harding Telegram to Prime Minister, 16 October 1955. NA CO 926/545.
49. Foreign Office minute by J. H. Peck, 11 January 1956, Internal Security Situation in Cyprus and Future Developments. NA FO 371/123865.
50. Paget, *Counter-Insurgency Campaigning*, p. 150.
51. Telegram from Harding to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 16 October 1956. NA CO 926/556.
52. Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt*, pp. 205–6.
53. Durrell, *Bitter Lemons,* p. 224.
54. Cyprus Policy, October 1955 to October 1957: Memorandum by Governor, FM Sir John Harding, 3 November 1957. NA CO 926/2084, p. 15.
55. Harding, letter to O'Connor. 10 May 1956. LHCMA O'CONNOR 10/21.
56. See Ian Martin, 'The "Cyprus Troubles" 1955–1960', in D. Holton and B. Olsen (eds), *Cambridge Papers in Modern Greek No. 1.* LHCMA Martin, I.W.G (1993), p. 6; Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt,* p. 83. Harding also banned the Cypriot Communist party AKEL, which was the only real

political opposition to EOKA – but this demonstrates the mood at the time, which was far more wary of Communism than of local insurgencies.

57. Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt*, p. 155.
58. Harding address to District Security Committees, 21 October 1957. NA CO 926/1074.
59. Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt*, pp. 209–12.
60. The Future of Cyprus: Appreciation by the Governor [Harding] of the Situation on 4 April 1956. NA FO 371/123882, p. 2.
61. Stiles, *Mayhem in the Med*, p. 109.
62. Ibid., p. 56. For the booklet itself see NAM 1995-11-323-1.
63. Quoted in Allen, *The Savage Wars of Peace,* p. 148. Another squadron commander acknowledged that 'I had quite a problem telling people to calm down and let justice take its course' (p. 143).
64. Nancy Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1978), p. 245.
65. See Charles Foley, *Island in Revolt* (London: Longmans, 1962), pp. 74–5, 76; Foley and Scobie, *The Struggle,* p. 123. For the British press coverage of accusations of brutality see LHCMA LIDDELL HART 15/5/147 and 15/5/152.
66. Governor's Report to the Chiefs of Staff on the Internal Security Situation in Cyprus, 5 June 1956. NA CO 926/384.
67. Foley and Scobie, *The Struggle*, p. 73.
68. Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt*, p. 132.
69. There are further conflicting accounts. Two soldiers are quoted as saying 'there is no doubt that torture of suspects was endemic' and 'torture was used extensively in Cyprus to extract information from suspected terrorists or their sympathisers' – although they do not say who was doing the torturing or how it was defined. NAM 2002-07-365-4, -7. Lawrence Durrell, on the other hand, describes commandos undertaking a screening operation as 'tugging and pulling good-naturedly at the fringes of the crowd like sheep-dogs at a trial, still smiling and patient. The whole operation was being conducted in a leisurely fashion with an air of awkward kindness'. Durrell, *Bitter Lemons*, p. 248.
70. Cooper-Key, 'Some reflections', p. 41.
71. Quoted in Allen, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, p. 141.
72. Ibid., p. 142.
73. Internal Security of Cyprus Governor's Instruction No. 8, 8 April 1957 [produced by the Director of Operations]. NA CO 926/1013. See also Foley and Scobie, *The Struggle*, p. 123.
74. See Allen, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, p. 151, and Governor's Report to the Chiefs of Staff on the Internal Security Situation in Cyprus, 5 June 1956. NA CO 926/384.

75. Cooper-Key, 'Some reflections', pp. 41–2. The use of large-scale operations, the improvement of intelligence and the move to more successful smaller-scale operations is also evident in Captain H. A. J. Stacpoole (2 Para), Cyprus, 'The fruits of patience', *British Army Review* 5 (September 1957); and *Against Two Colonels: An Illumination of the Cyprus Problem, with a Suez Interlude*, Draft book manuscript LHCMA LIDDELL HART 15/7/51 (1958). Stacpoole does comment that 'the machinery for hunting gangs developed in Malaya, had not begun to be established in Cyprus' (p. 51).
76. Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt,* pp. 214–5; Martin, 'The "Cyprus Troubles"', p. 10; Hugh Foot, *A Start in Freedom* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1964).
77. Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt,* p. 256. Foot and the senior military commanders differed in their views, for example on the early release of detainees, and the army became impatient and frustrated by what they saw as leniency by Foot. See Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus,* pp. 223–4, 240–1.
78. Michael Dewar, *Brush Fire Wars: Minor Campaigns of the British Army since 1945* (London: Robert Hale Ltd, 1984), p. 79.
79. Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt*, p. 287.
80. Lt Gen Sir Kenneth Darling, 'British counterinsurgency experience', *Military Review* 45/1 (January 1965), pp. 9–10.
81. Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt,* pp. 291–2. See also Darling's papers at the Imperial War Museum, Con Shelf 05/41/1 and 1A, and Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. 101.
82. Foley, *Island in Revolt*, pp. 219–20.
83. Report on the Cyprus Emergency by the Director of Operations, Major General Darling, 31 July 1959. NA CO 926/1077, p. 4 and p. 47 (see also NA WO 106/6020 for a bound copy). This is an insightful report by a commander with an obvious aptitude for small wars methods – in it he also focuses on the importance of junior leadership (p. 54) and the need for special groups such as interrogators to be carefully selected, organised and supervised (p. 46). But it is unclear what the purpose of the report was and what its distribution was. Here the 'lessons learnt' process seems to fall down.
84. Darling, 'British counterinsurgency experience', pp. 10–11.
85. Darling notes on the Baker Report. IWM Harding Papers 96/40/1/AFH 6.
86. Report on the Cyprus Emergency by the Director of Operations, Maj Gen Darling, 31 July 1959. NA CO 926/1077, p. 2. In his later article based on a lecture given at the US Staff College, Darling again stresses the importance of politics in counterinsurgency operations and the limited role that the military can play. See Darling, 'British Counterinsurgency Experience', p. 4.

87. Minute by Director of Operations (Darling), 3 December 1959. NA CO 926/1077. This is also stressed in his report from July 1959 on the lessons of the Cyprus Emergency, in which he notes that 'all elements of Government – the Administration, the Civil Police and the Armed Forces – should at all levels work in the very closest harmony as a single team'. NA CO 926/1077, p. 2.
88. Foley, *Island in Revolt*, p. 234.
89. Report on Redeployment Proposals, Cyprus by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, 7 October 1958. NA CO 926/1078.
90. Report on the Cyprus Emergency by the Director of Operations, Maj Gen Darling, 31 July 1959. NA CO 926/1077, p. 4.
91. Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. 84.
92. Annex to Correspondence between Commandant and Under Secretary of State, the War Office – 'Staff College, Imperial Policing – 1956 Course', 9 April 1956. NA WO 231/101.
93. Internal Security Training Centre – Syllabus – Junior Leaders Short Course. NAM 1994-02-49-1, 'General' section, p. 1.
94. Ibid., 'General' section, p. 1.
95. Ibid., 'General' section, p. 2.
96. Ibid., 'Patrolling' section, p. 1.
97. Ibid., 'Patrolling' section, pp. 1, 3.
98. Ibid., 'Cordon and Search' section, p. 1.
99. The role of soldier-diplomat or soldier-statesman has been debated in recent years by Charles Moskos and Christopher Dandeker. See Charles Moskos (ed.), *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). They claim that a feature of the 'postmodern' military (i.e. post-Cold War) is that soldiers now also need to be scholars, statesmen and communicators in addition to warriors and technical specialists, because of the challenging nature of many of today's complex peace support operations. However, it is clear from the case studies covered here that the soldier-diplomat role in particular is nothing new for the British army, and has been important for the effective resolution of 'small wars' throughout history too. Christopher Dandeker defines a soldier-statesman as a soldier with political skills, 'the military professional who is adept at handling the media and international diplomacy', and this is exactly what was required of the leaders during these counterinsurgency operations. See Christopher Dandeker, 'The United Kingdom: the overstretched military', in C. Moskos (ed.), *The Postmodern Military*, esp. p. 37.
100. Carver, *Harding of Petherton*, pp. 205, 226.
101. Durrell, *Bitter Lemons*, p. 222.

102. Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt*, p. 84; Carver, *Harding of Petherton*, p. 204.
103. Crawshaw, *The Cyprus Revolt*, p. 263.
104. Holland, *Britain and the Cyprus Revolt*, p. 222.
105. Ibid., p. 211.
106. Foley, *Island in Revolt*, pp. 167–8.
107. Foot, A *Start in Freedom*, p. 186; Martin, 'Cyprus Troubles', pp. 8, 15.
108. Telegram from Prime Minister to Harding, 18 August 1956. NA CO 926/521.
109. Informal Record of Visit to Cyprus by the Director of Military Intelligence and Mr Dean, 26 October 1955. NA WO 216/889.
110. P. Murphy, 'Book review of Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954–1959*', in *The American Historical Review* 105/4 (October 2000), pp. 1395–6.
111. Anderson, 'Policing and communal conflict', p. 187.
112. Brief for the Secretary of State for Defence Committee, 19 December 1958; Report by Chief of Imperial General Staff on visit to Cyprus. NA CO 926/1004.
113. Harding, letter to O'Connor, 27 October 1957. LHCMA O'CONNOR 10/21.
114. Darling, 'British counterinsurgency experience', p. 5.
115. Carver, *Harding of Petherton*, p. 41.
116. Ibid., p. 159.
117. Ibid., p. 179. This situation was reversed in Cyprus where Harding was in command and Templer was CIGS; their mutual trust comes across in that Templer left Harding to his own devices in Cyprus too. Harding, though, could probably have benefited from a little more hands-on support from Templer.
118. His biography also comments on his lack of intellectual focus, and his emphasis on doing rather than thinking.
119. Newsinger, *British Counterinsurgency*, p. 103.
120. Stacpoole, *Against Two Colonels,* p. 56. Both the Norfolk and Suffolk Regiments had distinguished themselves in Malaya, and went on to serve in Cyprus. See Dewar, *Brush Fire Wars,* p. 76.
121. Anderson, 'Policing and communal conflict', p. 187.
122. Cooper-Key, 'Some reflections', p. 43.
123. Neale, note to file, 3rd January 1957. NA CO 926/1076.
124. Macdonald, note to file, 4 January 1957. NA CO 926/1076.
125. Allen, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, p. 156.

Chapter 6 Conclusion

1. Marshall Sashkin and Robert Fulmer, 'Toward an organizational leadership theory', in J. Hunt *et al*. (eds), *Emerging Leadership Vistas* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1988), pp. 56, 61.
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